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Abstract 
The research evaluates the implementation of the Framework Agreements on 
Telework and Work-related Stress in Belgium, Denmark, UK, and Czech Republic 
and in the banking and local Government sectors within these countries. Further, it 
evaluates the various factors that explain divergent implementation outcomes in 
countries and sectors. It develops two benchmarks to assess the efficacy of the 
Agreements as modes of European social partner ‘soft’ law governance; a benchmark 
that assesses the procedural implementation of the Agreements, and a benchmark 
that assess the substantive implementation of the Agreements. A multi-level 
governance theoretical approach is also adopted. 
 
It emerged that ‘effective’ procedural implementation of the Agreements largely 
occurred in Belgium and Czech Republic, but did not occur to the same degree in 
Denmark and UK. It also emerged that the substantive effect of the Agreements was 
patchy and that the substantive impact of the Telework Agreement was greater than 
that of the Work-related Stress Agreement. Although structural factors were 
important in explaining divergent implementation outcomes, it also emerged that it 
was primarily policy and actor related factors that explained divergent national and 
sectoral implementation outcomes. The research ends with a rather skeptical 
evaluation of the Agreements as modes of European social partner ‘soft’ law 
governance. 
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Chapter 1: Introducing the European social dialogue 
 
This thesis studies the implementation of autonomous European social partner 
agreements. Specifically, the implementation of the Telework and Work-related 
Stress Agreements in four member states (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark and 
UK) and two sectors (banking and local Government). The goal of the study is to 
examine the potential and limits of autonomous European-level social partner 
agreements in terms of their ability to regulate industrial relations within European 
member states. Given the academic and policy concerns that have been raised about 
the extent to which these types of Agreements are likely to be implemented 
effectively (Keller, 2003; Branch, 2005), the thesis aims to make a key contribution 
to clarifying the issues at stake. Further, the thesis will identify the factors that 
explain variance in implementation outcomes within discrete national and sectoral 
contexts. Their identification will allow the thesis to come to a theoretical and 
empirical understanding of the relationship between European-level 'soft' law and 
change in national systems of industrial relations. Given the now widespread use of 
'soft' law at the European-level and the substantial academic debates that surround its 
efficacy (Hodson and Maher, 2001; Jacobsson, 2002), the thesis will use the findings 
from the specific field of European social partner 'soft' law that the Telework and 
Work-related Stress Agreements represent to contribute to wider debates on the 
topic. 
 
1.1 The European social dialogue: roots and development 
 
The term ‘European social dialogue’ refers to dialogue and negotiations conducted at 
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the level of the European Union between the European representatives of employers 
and organized labour within the European Union. The goal of the European social 
dialogue has been chiefly characterized as relating to the need to add a social 
dimension to the European single market in a manner that involves the 
representatives of European employers and organized labour within the process of 
European governance (Falkner, 2003). The European social dialogue started in 
earnest when Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission, invited 
the chairs and general secretaries of all the national organizations affiliated to the 
European social partner organizations (ETUC, UNICE1 and CEEP) to a meeting at 
Château de Val Duchesse outside Brussels on 31 January 1985. The result of this 
meeting was an Agreement to establish European inter-sectoral dialogue between the 
parties. In the subsequent months, the parties also established working groups at the 
European-level for the purpose of furthering social dialogue and concluded the first 
joint opinions on social dialogue. In following years, the European social dialogue 
was further institutionalized at the European-level with the establishment of working 
parties and a political steering group at the European-level that specifically focused 
on social dialogue. In sum, the process started at Val Duchesse produced 21 joint 
opinions and declarations, two key agreements and seven high-level summits 
between 1985 and 1995 (Hall, 1994; Falkner, 2003). 
 
The Val Duchesse process also led to the formal institutionalization of European 
social dialogue. Article 118B EC that was inserted into the EC Treaty via the Single 
European Act that came into force on 1 July 1987 explicitly referred to the role of the 
European social partners within the European governance process. Article 118B 
 
1 UNICE changed their name to Business Europe in 2007 
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committed the European Commission 'to develop the dialogue between management 
and labour at the European-level which could, if the two sides consider it desirable, 
lead to relations based on agreement' (Official Journal of the European Communities 
1987, p.9). Crucially, the Val Duchesse process also led to an Agreement between 
the European social partners that would subsequently be annexed to the Protocol on 
Social Policy of the Treaty on European Union. The Agreement, known as the 
'Agreement on Social Policy', was concluded by UNICE, ETUC and CEEP on 31 
October 1991. The social partners’ agreement proposed a constitutionally recognized 
role for the social partners in the Community legislative process, and a major 
extension of EC competences in the field of employment and industrial relations, 
allowing for qualified majority voting with respect to some of the new competences. 
Although the UK Government refused to be bound by this Agreement, the 
Agreement was eventually incorporated into the Protocol on Social Policy of the 
Treaty on European Union (Social Protocol) that was signed by the member states on 
7th February 1992. This was subsequently annexed to the Maastricht Treaty that 
came into effect on 1 November 1993 (Falkner, 2003). 
 
1.2 The European social dialogue: The post-Maastricht Treaty period 
 
Most crucially with regard to implications for the development of the European 
social dialogue, the Social Protocol, via Articles 138-139, contained clauses that 
stipulated statutory rights for the European social partners to be consulted by the 
European Commission on the topic of social policy. According to Article 138, the 
European Commission, before submitting proposals in the social policy field, had to 
consult management and labour on the possible direction of that Community action. 
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Moreover, if, after such consultation, the European Commission considered 
Community action advisable, it was obliged to consult management and labour on 
the content of the proposal envisaged.   
 
Articles 138-9 further stipulated that the European social partners had the option of 
engaging in contractual relations with one another to conclude Agreements on the 
topic of the consultation issued by the European Commission. Should this option be 
chosen by the European social partners, it was to take precedence over the 
'traditional' legislative route of a Directive. Should an Agreement be reached by the 
social partners, Article 139 (2) stipulated that the Agreement could be implemented 
via two possible routes. Firstly, a non-legally binding route was set out that allowed 
Agreements to be implemented via ‘the procedures and practices specific to 
management and labour and the Member States’. A second route, ‘implementation 
by Council decision’, allowed for the implementation of the Agreement by a 
traditional Council Directive. Articles 138-139 envisaged that the European inter-
sectoral social partners and sectoral social partners could be involved in the 
procedures foreseen. In order to ensure the representativeness of consulted 
organizations, the European Commission also engaged in a large scale exercise that 
assessed the representativeness of the inter-sectoral and sectoral organizations that 
had the procedural right to be consulted (Falkner, 2003). 
 
A further development occurred in 1998 when existing European sectoral-level 
dialogue arrangements were regularized into European sectoral social dialogue 
Committees (SSDCs). Commission Decision 98/500/EC of 20 May 1998 allowed for 
the establishment of SSDCs at the European sectoral level and aimed to facilitate 
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their expansion. These SSDCs were provided with funding by the European 
Commission, began to cover a growing number of European sectors in the years after 
1998, and, notably, produced a very large volume of non-legally binding 'soft' texts 
including sectoral 'joint statements' and 'codes of conduct'. 
 
1.3 The Framework Agreements of the 1990s 
 
Immediately after the annexation of the Social Protocol to the Maastricht Treaty, 
there was a wave of optimism that the new procedural rights granted to the European 
social partners would herald the coming of a new era of 'Euro-corporatism' (Falkner, 
1998; Kim, 1999; Jensen et al, 1999; Biagi, 1999). In 1994, the European social 
partners were afforded the opportunity to test the efficacy of their new rights when 
the European Commission consulted them on the direction of proposed regulation to 
establish European Works Councils. In this instance however, the European social 
partners failed to reach an agreement, and the European Commission went ahead 
with a legislative solution without the involvement of the European social partners. 
After this initial failure, the European Commission issued a consultation to the social 
partners on the topic of parental leave. This lead to the conclusion of the first post-
Maastricht Treaty agreement between the European inter-sectoral social partners. 
The Agreement stipulated a series of rights on leave from work in the case of 
pregnancy and maternity, childcare, and urgent family reasons. The Agreement was 
implemented via the second, legally binding, route available to the European social 
partners, and became Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996. Two further 
Agreements were concluded by the inter-sectoral European social partners that were 
also implemented via the legally binding second route. A Framework Agreement on 
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part-time work became Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997, and a 
Framework Agreement on fixed-term work became Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 
28 June 1999. 
 
Agreements that utilized the procedures enshrined in the Social protocol were also 
concluded at the European sectoral level. For example, Agreements on sectoral 
working time arrangements were concluded in the Maritime Sector in 1998 and the 
Civil Aviation sector in 2000 that were subsequently implemented as Council 
Directives. It is noteworthy that in this period, the first non-legally binding 
implementation route, via 'procedures and practices specific to management and 
labour and the member states', was not employed to affect the implementation of 
European social partner agreements. This meant that precise interpretations of the 
national 'procedures and practices' clause or potential difficulties with it had not been 
widely discussed by policymakers or academics in the ten years since the social 
policy protocol was adopted at Maastricht (Keller, 2003). 
 
1.4 A crisis in the European social dialogue? 
 
After having been consulted by the European Commission on the topic of temporary 
agency work, negotiations between the European inter-sectoral social partners on the 
topic collapsed in May 2001 (Prosser, 2006). Various commentators (Keller, 2003; 
Prosser, 2006) alleged that the failure was symptomatic of a more general malaise in 
the process of European social dialogue, and pointed to the limited quantitative 
output of the process in the years after the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty, the 
lukewarm commitment of European employers' associations to the process, and the 
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continued exclusion of key issues such as pay from the process (Keller, 2003). 
Concurrently, three developments in the political-economic structure of European 
governance emerged that had major implications for the European social dialogue. 
These were (1) the development of the European Commission's Lisbon Strategy that 
aimed to make the European Union 'the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-
based economy in the world by 2010', (2) the impending 2004 Enlargement of the 
European Union that would see the European Union expand from 15 member states 
to 25, and (3) the growing use of non-legally binding governance forms such as the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC) that emerged in other European policy fields, 
most notably in the European Employment Strategy. The existence of the first factor 
meant that the focus of the European social dialogue shifted to topics more 
concerned with 'employability' and supply-side factors (Prosser, 2006), whilst the 
imminent enlargement of the European Union, to include many countries in which 
there were lower standards of living and working conditions, led to a general re-
consideration of the role of 'hard' law in the European Union. 
 
The development of the OMC mode of governance at the European-level also had 
key implications for the use of 'soft' law by the European social partners. Initially 
emerging in the late 1990s, the OMC is a non-legally binding mode of European 
governance that involves European and national-level actors identifying policy 
priorities that should be acted upon at the national level. Specifically, the OMC 
involves a fourfold process. Firstly, (i) the Council of Ministers agrees on overall 
goals, before (ii) member states then translate these policy goals into National Action 
Plans (NAPs). Benchmarks (iii) are then agreed upon by EU and national actors to 
gauge best practice across Europe, before (iv) the implementation of the various 
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NAPs is monitored and appraised. The OMC has spread from and to many different 
policy fields over the previous decade, and has been subject to contrasting academic 
evaluation. Some authorities have viewed the development of the OMC at the EU-
level positively, have lauded its flexibility and ability to regulate diverse policy areas 
(Vandenbroucke, 2001), and have asserted that despite its non-legally binding form 
the OMC nevertheless possesses the 'teeth' to affect real change in member states 
(Jacobsson, 2003). Others have been more pessimistic. The most serious and 
repeated allegation that is made against the OMC (Hodson and Maher, 2001; 
Chalmers and Lodge, 2003) is that its non-legally binding form ensures that in reality 
it has little impact upon national-level policy contexts. 
 
The growing use of the OMC and of 'soft' law more generally had key implications 
for the development of the European social dialogue. With the 1998 establishment of 
sectoral social dialogue committees that extensively used 'soft' forms of governance 
and the conclusion of the non-legally binding Framework of Actions on Lifelong 
Learning in 2001 at the inter-sectoral level, the European social dialogue began to 
increasingly use 'soft' forms of governance that mirrored OMC styles of policy-
making. Further, in their joint contribution to the Laeken European Council in 
December 2001, the European social partners expressed their desire to develop ‘a 
more autonomous social dialogue’. 
 
1.5 The 'new phase' of the European social dialogue 
 
As a result of the above pressures, a 'new phase' of the European Social Dialogue 
emerged. This 'new phase' placed a premium on bipartite 'autonomous' interaction 
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between the European Social Partners, preferred 'soft' non-legally binding forms of 
governance, and tended to focus upon topics that were conducive to the development 
of the European Commission's Lisbon Agenda (Branch, 2005; Prosser, 2006). 
Central to the 'new phase' of the European Social Dialogue was the development of 
multi-annual work programmes. The first of these covered the period 2003-2005 and 
committed the inter-sectoral European social partners to addressing an agenda that 
ranged from lifelong learning to equal opportunities. A further feature of the 'new 
phase' was the use of new tools such as 'Framework of Actions'. 'Framework of 
Actions' assumed the form of OMC style instruments that set priorities for national 
social partner organizations and then monitored, at the European-level, the 
compliance of national social partners with these priorities. A 'Framework of actions 
for the lifelong development of competencies and qualifications’ was concluded by 
the inter-sectoral European Social Partners on 28 February 2002. This text identified 
four areas of priority action in the field of lifelong learning, and the European social 
partners agreed to monitor the impact of the text in member states from 2002 via a 
series of annual reports. This process culminated in the production of a report 
evaluating the overall impact of the text in 2006. SSDCs also continued to produce a 
large body of 'soft' texts. A notable text that mirrored the inter-sectoral level 
Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning was the European Banking SSDC's 
2003 'Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the European Banking Sector'. 
 
The most notable aspect of the 'new phase' of the European social dialogue however 
was the conclusion of Framework Agreements implemented via the first, non-legally 
binding, implementation route foreseen in Article 139 of the Social Protocol. The 
first Framework Agreement to take such a form was the Telework Agreement. 
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Following the issuing of a consultation by the European Commission on the topic, 
negotiations between the inter-sectoral level social partners led to the conclusion of a 
Framework Agreement on Telework that was concluded on May 23 2002 and 
formally signed on 16 July 2002. As foreseen by the non-legally binding 
implementation route set out in the Social Protocol, the Telework Agreement was to 
be implemented via ‘the procedures and practices specific to management and labour 
in the member states’. The Agreement was concluded between the European social 
partner organizations CEEP, UEAPME, UNICE and ETUC and committed the 
national affiliates of these organizations to implementing the Agreement nationally 
within three years of the date of the signature of the Agreement. Further, the 
Agreement foresaw the production of a report on the impact of the Agreement by the 
European social partners within four years of the date of the signature of the 
Agreement. In 2002, the European Commission began to consult the inter-sectoral 
European social partners on the topic of work-related stress. This led to the 
conclusion of a second Framework Agreement, on Work-related Stress, by the 
European social partners that was signed by the parties on 8 October 2004. This 
Agreement was also to be implemented via the first non-legally binding 
implementation route, was also to be implemented by the social partners’ national 
affiliates within three years of the date of the signature of the Agreement, and also 
foresaw the production of a report on the impact of the Agreement by the European 
social partners within four years of the date of the signature of the Agreement. 
 
1.6 The implementation of the Agreements and texts: the acid test of their 
efficacy? 
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A central issue that has attracted a considerable amount of attention from academics 
and policy makers is the extent to which the Agreements and texts produced in the 
'new phase' of the European social dialogue are likely to be implemented 'effectively' 
(Keller, 2003; Branch, 2005; Larsen and Andersen, 2007). This stems from concerns 
about the non-legally binding nature of the Agreements and texts, and is similar to 
concerns that others have expressed about the general efficacy of the use of 'soft' law 
in the European governance process (Hodson and Maher, 2004; Chalmers and 
Lodge, 2003). Critical appraisals of the likely efficacy of the Framework Agreements 
as tools of European social dialogue generally tend to follow the pattern of critiques 
of the OMC. Some scholars regard the emergence of the non-legally binding 
approach to European social dialogue as a welcome development in terms of the 
flexibility it is likely to bring to the social dialogue and its propensity to involve 
national social partner organizations (Branch, 2005). Others, however, are sceptical 
about the ability of non-legally binding social dialogue agreements to regulate 
national systems as effectively as the legally binding social dialogue agreements 
(Larsen and Andersen, 2007; Keller, 2003). Given that the Telework and Work-
related Stress Agreements are to be implemented in accordance with national 
'procedures and practices' for social dialogue, factors such as low union density rates 
and limited traditions of social dialogue in certain countries have been identified as 
serious barriers to the 'effective' implementation of the Agreements (Keller, 2003).  
 
A further concern relates to how the 'effective' implementation of the Agreements 
within member states and sectors may be appraised. Given that the Agreements are 
non-legally binding and thus need not be incorporated into national law, it is 
imperative to identify, in the absence of a 'legal incorporation' benchmark (Falkner et 
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al, 2005) that simply assesses whether legally binding Directives have been 
incorporated into national bodies of law, a means of assessing whether the 
Framework Agreements have been 'effectively' implemented or not within national 
and sectoral regulatory contexts. Should robust benchmarks to gauge 'effective' 
implementation not be identified, then there is a risk that the European-level social 
partners forfeit complete control of the implementation of the Agreements to their 
national affiliates. This would undermine the rationale for the existence of EU-level 
regulation of industrial relations (Falkner, 1998). To this end, a key task that the 
thesis will engage in is to identify appropriate benchmarks to gauge the 'effective' 
implementation of the Framework Agreements. This will allow the thesis to robustly 
appraise national and sectoral implementation outcomes and to compare differing 
national and sectoral implementation outcomes.  
 
1.7 The research questions 
 
The growing prominence of 'soft' law both in European policy circles and the 
European social dialogue has been set out above. The major concerns regarding the 
'effective' implementation of the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements and 
other 'new phase' texts have also been outlined, as have political and intellectual 
debates surrounding variance in national and sectoral implementation outcomes. The 
thesis will thus address the two following research questions: 
 
1) To what extent were the Framework Agreements on Telework and Work-related 
Stress and the Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning and the Joint Declaration 
on Lifelong Learning in the European Banking Sector implemented 'effectively' in 
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European member states and sectors? And how might ‘effective’ implementation be 
robustly assessed? 
 
2) What socio-economic, institutional and agency factors account for cross-national 
and cross-sectoral variance in the ‘effective’ implementation of the Agreements and 
texts? 
 
1.8 The structure of the thesis 
 
After an (1) introduction, (2) a review of the literature that exists on the European 
social dialogue and on European governance more generally will be conducted. This 
literature review will outline the empirical and theoretical debates that exist on the 
European social dialogue and European governance. This will then allow the chapter 
to set out how the thesis expects to contribute to bodies of knowledge within the field 
and also to establish a robust theoretical framework for the purposes of the thesis. 
Chapter three (3) will outline the benchmarks the thesis will employ to gauge 
‘effective’ implementation. After establishing the need for benchmarks with which to 
assess ‘effective’ implementation, the chapter will recall the debates in the literature 
outlined in chapter two and will assess the merits of various benchmarks for 
appraising the ‘effective’ implementation of European social partner ‘soft’ law. 
Then, the chapter will propose procedural benchmarks and substantive benchmarks 
to assess the ‘effective’ implementation of the Agreements and texts that are the 
subject of the study.  Finally, the chapter will propose a set of variables, based on the 
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literature outlined in chapter two, that will help the thesis identify the differing 
factors that explain converging procedural and substantive implementation outcomes 
in member states and sectors. A (4) research methodology chapter will then be 
offered. This chapter will outline the epistemological and ontological approach of the 
study, and will describe the research methods that the thesis will employ to achieve 
its research aims, and the details of the fieldwork that was conducted. The chapter 
also sets out the countries and sectors chosen for the purposes of the study and 
justifies their selection in line with the set of variables developed in chapter three that 
potentially explain differing procedural and substantive implementation outcomes in 
member states and sectors. 
 
Five chapters are then dedicated to the data collected in the course of the fieldwork. 
The first of these chapters (5), concerns the data collected at the European-level of 
industrial relations.  The function of this chapter will be to outline the views of the 
European social partners on the national ‘procedures and practices’ clause, to survey 
the variety of means used to implement the Agreements and texts, and to 
demonstrate that the countries selected for further research capture the diversity of 
implementation outcomes that took place. The following four chapters will then set 
out the data collected in the countries studied and will all be structured along the 
lines of the benchmarks established in chapter three. The purpose of these chapters 
will be to set out the data objectively and in line with the analytic schemes 
established in earlier chapters so as to allow for transparent and balanced conclusions 
to be arrived at in later chapters. Chapter six (6) sets out the data collected in the 
fieldwork in Belgium , chapter seven (7) sets out the data collected in the fieldwork 
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in Denmark, chapter eight sets out the data collected in the fieldwork in UK, and 
chapter nine (9) sets out the data collected in the fieldwork in Czech Republic. 
 
Chapters ten and eleven analyze the data collected in the course of the fieldwork and 
come to decisive conclusions regarding the research questions outlined in chapter 
one. Chapter ten (10) concerns the ‘effective’ procedural implementation of the 
Agreements and will review the data outlined in chapters five to nine against the 
procedural benchmarks established in chapter three and the variables outlined in 
chapter three regarding the sources of differential procedural implementation 
outcomes in countries and sectors.  Conclusions will be arrived at regarding whether 
the Framework Agreements were implemented ‘effectively’, the viability of the 
national ‘procedures and practices’ implementation clause, and the factors that 
explain differing national and sectoral  procedural implementation outcomes. 
Chapter eleven (11) concerns the ‘effective’ substantive implementation of the 
Agreements and lifelong learning texts and will review the data outlined in chapters 
five to nine against the substantive benchmarks established in chapter three and the 
variables outlined in chapter three regarding the sources of differential substantive 
implementation outcomes in countries and sectors.  Subsequently, conclusions will 
be reached regarding the extent to which the Agreements and texts were 
implemented ‘effectively’ from a substantive perspective, and the facts that explain 
differing substantive implementation outcomes in countries and sectors. Chapter 
twelve (12) will conclude the thesis. The empirical and wider analytic findings of the 
thesis will be outlined, and the extent to which they confirm and/or contradict the 
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academic debates set out in chapter two will be discussed. In addition to this, a set of 
policy recommendations and suggestions for further research will be set out. 
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Chapter 2: Europeanization: The debates and their relevance to industrial 
relations 
2.1 Introduction 
Having introduced the study, the chapter will elaborate in greater detail the academic 
debates that are pertinent to a broader understanding of the topic of the European 
social dialogue. It will also outline ways in which the study aims to contribute to the 
body of knowledge in the field. Accordingly, this chapter has two main aims. Firstly, 
it will attempt to outline the theoretical framework that the study will adopt on the 
basis of a review of the existing literature. The theoretical view of the process of 
European integration and the Europeanization of industrial relations that will be 
assumed will be that of 'multi-level governance'. The literature review chapter 
justifies the use of this theoretical paradigm and outlines the body of theoretical work 
that exists on European integration, the Europeanization of industrial relations, and 
the European social dialogue. 
 
Secondly, the chapter will attempt to map out the existing empirical work that exists 
within the field of enquiry. The rationale for doing this is that so the state of play 
within the field may be assessed in order to identify the gaps that exist, to sharpen the 
research questions, and also to justify the claim to contribute to the body of 
knowledge within the chosen subject area. A sound grasp of the empirical state of 
play within the field will also aid the thesis in developing appropriate benchmarks to 
gauge what constitutes ‘effective’ implementation of the Agreements and texts in 
chapter three of the thesis, and to develop the research methods that will be used for 
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the study in chapter four of the thesis. 
 
The literature review will be structured around five sections. Firstly, (1) it will 
outline the various theoretical approaches to European integration found within the 
political science literature so as to adequately establish the theoretical backdrop to 
the study. Then, (2) it will highlight the debates that exist around the issue of the 
Europeanization of industrial relations and how these debates are informed by the 
theoretical approaches to European integration that are found within the political 
science literature. Next, (3) it will review the theoretical and empirical work that 
exists on the European social dialogue so as to outline the gaps that exist within the 
specific field of study, before (4) discussing the literature that exists on the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC) and European governance. Finally, a (5) conclusion 
will be offered that will also outline how the chapter’s content will allow, in chapter 
three, for the development of benchmarks to assess the ‘effective’ procedural and 
substantive implementation of the Agreements and texts and for the development of 
a set of variables that potentially explain differing procedural and substantive 
outcomes in countries and sectors. 
 
2.2 Political science theory and European integration 
 
The theoretical writings that exist on European social dialogue and European 
industrial relations more generally have their genesis in political scientific works on 
the European integration process. It will thus be fruitful to set the broader scene by 
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outlining the body of scholarship that has been produced by political scientists on 
European integration. 
   
The academic study of European integration has its roots in two main political 
scientific theoretical paradigms (Rosamond, 2000). The first, neo-functionalism, 
emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as an attempt to describe and predict the origins and 
drivers of the nascent process of European integration (Haas, 1958). The central 
thesis of the neo-functionalist school was that the development of an European polity 
would proceed from a series of inter-related ‘spillovers’. The concept of 'spill-over' 
implied that integration in one policy area would lead to integration in other areas via 
the inter-locking of social and economic functions. As a result of the inter-locking of 
these functions it was hypothesized that national actors’ loyalties would transfer to 
the ‘higher’ political level that could provide jurisdiction over the entire scope of the 
functions. Falkner (1998) identified five forms of ‘spillover’ that were forecast by the 
neo-functionalists. These were, i) functional spillover (where the inter-dependence of 
actors in one sector leads to inter-dependence in another), ii) political spillover (a 
shift in the political loyalties of national actors), iii) geographical spillover (the 
enlargement of the supra-national polity to incorporate new member states), iv) 
cultivated spillover (where supra-national institutions act as ‘midwifes’ to the 
process of inter-state bargaining and gradually increase their power base), and v) 
cultural spillover (where the cultural expectations of national political elites shift to 
the supra-national level). As a result of these series of ‘spillovers’, neo-functionalist 
writers predicted the development of a supra-national European polity. 
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Adherents of the second theoretical approach to European integration, inter-
Governmentalism, retorted that the process of European integration was primarily 
state-driven, and that nation states were very unlikely to cede substantive powers to a 
supra-national political body (Hoffmann, 1995). As a result of their association with 
realist and neo-realist international relations theory, inter-Governmentalists stressed 
the historic and contemporary supremacy of the nation-state as the loci of political 
power and hypothesized that the transferal of policy competencies to a supra-national 
level would be slight. Aside from the idea of member state pre-occupation with 
sovereignty, the core characteristics of inter-Governmentalist scholarship also lay in 
an emphasis upon the role of European institutions as facilitators for inter-state 
bargaining, and the pivotal role of ‘grand bargains’ in the European integration 
process. As the pace of European integration slowed in the 1970s, the inter-
Governmentalist school of European integration theory gained the ascendancy 
(Falkner, 1998). 
 
After a lull in the debate during the 1970s and 1980s, the debates reemerged in the 
early 1990s as European integration re-appeared on the political agenda (Falkner, 
1998). Although the debate assumed a less teleological tone, the basic division 
between those who emphasized the processes underpinning European integration and 
those who emphasized the resilience of the European nation state were still evident. 
Refined inter-Governmentalist scholarship focused around the work of Scharpf 
(1988), who identified a ‘joint-decision trap’ (a process whereby individual states’ 
refusal to cede certain political competencies to the European-level led to inefficient 
outcomes in terms of European-level policy making) that precluded the development 
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of effective EU-level governance, and Moravcsik (1995), who formulated a theory of 
liberal inter-Governmentalism that combined a liberal theory of societal preference 
formation with a traditional theory of the international negotiation behaviour of 
states. 
 
Neo-functionalism also re-emerged in a different format. The majority of scholars 
recognized that classic neo-functionalist theory with its emphasis on pre-conceived 
outcomes and the eventual onset of an Europe that resembled the traditional nation 
state was an inadequate way in which to analyze an European system that 
increasingly took on a hybrid form and in which levels of political integration 
markedly differed between policy areas (Rosamond, 2000; Marks et al, 1996). A new 
approach was therefore sought that could potentially describe an emergent system in 
which some policy sectors were subject to significant EU-level control and in which 
other policy sectors remained largely within the control of member states. The main 
theory that emerged became known as 'multi-level governance'. Marks et al (1996), 
the scholars who first coined the term, developed their ideas on the basis of a series 
of studies of the relationship between European institutions and regional governance 
in member states (Marks, 1993; Marks et al, 1998). This underpinned the argument 
that a series of autonomous relationships existed between different tiers of 
governance across Europe that often bypassed the sphere of control of central 
Governments. Marks and Hooghe provided a three-fold definition of multi-level 
governance. Firstly, the theory of multi-level governance stipulated that political 
power was distributed amongst the supra-national, national, and local governance 
levels prevalent across the European Community. Secondly, the theory stated that 
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collective decision making amongst states involved a significant loss of control for 
individual Governments. Thirdly, the theory affirmed that political arenas were inter-
connected rather than nested. By this, it was meant that the different tiers of 
governance were potentially liable to enter into co-operative or conflictual 
relationships with one another, sometimes involving a third party. 
 
The views of multi-level governance theorists have been summarized by Andrew 
Jordan (2001). Jordan argued that the scholarship displayed five main features. These 
five features were identified as (1) the view that the process of European governance 
involves a great deal more than the mere conclusion of treaties between states, (2) 
that by participating in the process of European integration states have compromised 
their power by giving more power to sub-national and supra-national actors, (3) that 
there is a Europe of the regions where sub-national actors negotiate with the 
European level, (4) that European integration unleashes a dynamic of its own 
whereby states lose control of sub-national actors , and (5) that multi-level 
governance is a very recent phenomenon that has evolved since the 1980s. Hix 
(2005) concurred with Jordan in ascribing a similar set of premises to multi-level 
governance theorists. Hix added that multi-level governance theorists tended to see 
the European Union as a political system that operated on a day-to-day basis rather 
than as an inter-Governmental system that was based on periodic meetings by heads 
of states. 
 
The multi-level governance theory of European integration also draws upon other 
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approaches to the European integration process. Jordan (2001) identified the 
influence of policy network theory and historical institutionalism. Jachtenfuchs 
(1995) argued that the fashion for the concept of 'governance' amongst political 
scientists with its emphasis on the diffusion of competencies, the links between 
levels, and the continuous re-negotiation of institutional power relationships 
contributed to the development of multi-level governance theory. The work of two 
other scholars in identifying the various levels of operation of EU governance should 
also be credited with anticipating the development of multi-level governance theory. 
Peters (1992) contended that the governance of the European Union was 
characterized by two levels of operation. Firstly, he argued, there were the forms of 
deal making and bargaining on 'high-level' policy issues within the European Council 
and Council of Ministers. This process was animated by an inter-governmental logic. 
Secondly, he argued, there was the 'day-to-day' work of the European Commission 
on 'low' policy issues that was characterized by a supra-national style of policy 
making. Peterson (1995) argued that European Union governance should be 
classified on the basis of three levels; the (1) ‘super-systemic level, at which ‘grand 
bargains’ between states were made, (2) the ‘systemic’ level at which the power of 
the Council of Ministers was pre-dominant, and (3) the ‘sub-systemic’ level at which 
the influence of the European Commission, national civil servants and private actors 
was most pronounced.  
 
The theory of ‘transactionalism’ that was developed by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 
(1997) also complements multi-level governance theory and has also influenced 
many of the proponents of multi-level governance theory. ‘Transactionalism’ utilizes 
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parts of the neo-functionalist approach and closely resembles multi-level governance 
theory. The ‘transactionalist’ argument is that the higher the degree of cross-border 
transactions within a policy sector then the higher the degree of European integration 
the policy sector is likely to exhibit. The example of a policy sector such as trade, 
where there are extensive cross-border transactions and a high-level of integration, 
may be contrasted against an example such as the policy sector of defence, where 
there are low levels of cross-border transactions and low levels of integration. It was 
predicted by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet that the loyalties of actors would shift to the 
European level as cross-border transactions increased, and that subsequently, supra-
national institutions were likely to be able to wrest power away from Governments in 
those policy areas where there were substantial cross-border transactions.  
 
Different criticisms have been leveled against the theory of multi-level governance. 
Liberal inter-Governmentalists, the school most associated with the scholar Andrew 
Moravcsik (1993), have fundamentally criticized multi-level governance theory for 
paying insufficient attention to the role played by central Governments in the 
European integration process. This critique echoes the charge leveled against neo-
functionalist writers by an earlier generation of inter-Governmentalist scholars. 
Jordan (2001) offered seven main criticisms of multi-level governance theory (see 
also Rosamond, 2000; Benz and Eberlein, 1999; Jeffrey, 2000). He argued that (1) 
multi-level governance is just an amalgamation of existing theories, and that (2) it 
describes rather than theorizes European governance. On the latter point, Jordan cited 
Rosamond (2000) who argued that multi-level governance theory resembled a 
‘[dis]ordering framework’ that described the European Union rather than identifying 
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the dynamics that powered its operation. Thirdly (3), Jordan contended that multi-
level governance theory overstated the autonomy of sub-national actors vis-à-vis 
national Governments, and that (4) it adopted a ‘top-down’ view of sub-national 
actors . Fifth (5), it was argued that it focused on sub-national actors  to the exclusion 
of other actors, (6) that it mistook sub-national actor mobilization at the EU level for 
evidence of sub-national actor influence, and (7) that it ignored the international level 
of interaction whereby the European Union as a single political entity negotiated 
with sovereign states outside of Europe. 
 
The criticisms advanced above have been re-butted by proponents of the multi-level 
governance paradigm (Jordan, 2001; Olsen, 2001; Hix, 2005; Sisson, 2007). Of 
Jordan’s seven criticisms, the first four require the most serious consideration. With 
regard to Jordan’s first criticism, this may be effectively countered by emphasizing 
multi-level governance’s distinct contribution concerning the contested nature of the 
governance process, its incorporation of uncertainty, and its focus upon the 
articulation between levels of governance (Sisson, 2007). Its recognition of these 
factors ensure its originality and make it an auspicious theoretical tool with which to 
view an European Union that exhibits all of these characteristics. Concerning 
Jordan’s second criticism that multi-level governance theory describes rather than 
theorizes European governance, this may also be rebutted. Firstly, attention should 
be drawn to the emphasis that multi-level governance theory places upon interactions 
between levels. This enables the scholar to consider the evolution of the relationships 
between levels and the relevant dynamics between ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-up’ 
Europeanization, and horizontal and vertical aspects of Europeanization. Thus, the 
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multi-level governance approach to European integration becomes a theoretical lens 
for considering the dynamics and process of European integration rather than merely 
an ordering framework. 
 
On Jordan’s third point, it is important to note the extent of the process of 
regionalization and de-centralization that has occurred across European member 
states in previous decades (Marks and Hooghe, 1996). This political process has had 
major implications for the extent of the autonomy of sub-national actors vis-à-vis 
national Governments, and it is thus crucial that theoretical frameworks addressing 
the European integration process recognize the extent of the agency of sub-national 
actors. It is also notable that Jordan’s fourth criticism would appear to be at odds 
with this third. In any case, multi-level governance theory’s attention to the 
articulation between levels, the involvement of all actors in processes of change, and 
the agency it attributes to sub-national actors (Sisson, 2007) mean that it is unfair to 
describe it as adopting a ‘top-down’ view of sub-national actors. 
 
2.3 Europeanization of Industrial Relations  
 
The debates that have occurred within the field of political science on the form and 
scope of European integration have inspired parallel debates within the field of 
European industrial relations. The specific pressures that have precipitated the 
process of the Europeanization of industrial relations are well established in the 
literature. Authors have identified key steps towards European integration, including 
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the creation of the single European market, the introduction of the Euro, and 
enlargement of the European Union as pivotal in placing pressure upon national 
systems of labour regulation and leading to demands for greater EU-level regulation 
of the employment relationship (Hyman, 2001; Hoffmann et al, 2002; Marginson and 
Sisson, 2004).  
 
The theoretical debates that exist on the Europeanization of industrial relations 
generally mirror those to be found in the political science literature. On the one hand, 
there are those who assume the position that the governance of the employment 
relationship in Europe remains bound within the institutions that are peculiar to 
national member states (Streeck, 1994, 1998). These scholars generally argue that 
European integration in the field of industrial relations has been deeply constrained 
by the unwillingness of European states to delegate social policy making 
competencies upward, and are troubled by the potential of more considerable 
integration in policy fields such as trade and monetary policy to put pressure upon 
national labour markets that exhibit Europeanization only to a limited extent. On the 
other hand, there are those who argue that industrial relations in Europe is 
increasingly subject to supra-national forms of regulation, both in terms of 
procedures and substantial outputs (Falkner, 1998; Goetschy, 1994). These scholars 
utilize the concept of ‘spill-over’ to explain the development of an Europeanized 
system of industrial relations. 
 
It is a characteristic of the literature of the 1990s and early 2000s that there are few 
comprehensive accounts that approach the changing system of industrial relations in 
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Europe holistically (Hoffmann et al, 2002). Rather, there are different works that 
address various components of the system from a given theoretical standpoint. One 
author who is notable for his application of political science theory to European 
industrial relations is Streeck. Streeck’s writings are anchored in the inter-
Governmentalist tradition of European scholarship, and his views on the 
Europeanization of industrial relations stem from this theoretical position. In a series 
of articles (1994, 1998), Streeck argued that the inter-Governmentalist form that 
European integration had assumed had led to the EU-wide liberalization of markets, 
but that the regulation of social and employment issues remained primarily at the 
national level as a result of the reluctance of member states to cede control of social 
policy to the European level. Streeck justified this position by citing the many 
scholars who have noted that ‘negative’ integration (the removal of national-level 
barriers to European integration) is easier to achieve than ‘positive’ integration (the 
construction of corrective mechanisms via supra-national initiatives) (Majone, 1994). 
Owing to this, Streeck hypothesized that ‘regime competition’ would occur between 
national systems that were economically integrated with one another but that had few 
mechanisms to jointly regulate employment relations. Further, Streeck was also 
pessimistic of the prospects of the future harmonization of national systems of 
industrial relations.  
 
Regarding the European social dialogue, Streeck argued that its post-Maastricht 
impact was likely to be limited as a result of the limited competencies with which it 
had been endowed (1998). This thesis stemmed from Streeck’s views, outlined 
above, about the nature of European integration process. A rebuttal of Streeck's 
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position on the European social dialogue and a notable espousal of the opposing 
theoretical position was made by Goetschy (1994) whose writings are rooted in the 
neo-functionalist school of European studies. Denying the inevitably of national 
actors vetoing the development of an European system of industrial relations and 
arguing for the autonomous role of EU-level institutions, Goetschy’s identification 
with neo-functionalism meant that she suggested that 'spill-over' pressures were 
likely to lead to the development of an European level with strong social policy 
making capabilities. 
 
A further study that located the development of an European industrial relations 
system in the neo-functionalist tradition of the study of European integration was 
Falkner's EU Social Policy in the 1990s (1998). Falkner's volume analyzed the right 
of the European social partners to conclude European collective agreements under 
the terms of the social protocol that was annexed to the Maastricht Treaty in the light 
of political theories of European integration. It concluded, on the basis of a 
corporatist and policy network theoretical analysis of European integration, that the 
rights of the European social partners to conclude European collective agreements 
signified the development of a 'corporatist policy community'.  
 
A scholar who is notable for assuming a theoretical view of the emergent system of 
European industrial relations that straddles elements of neo-functionalist and inter-
Governmentalist analysis is Teague (2000; 2001). The argument of Teague is that the 
process of European economic integration has been strong enough to weaken the link 
between European nation states and economic citizenship, but that, given the EU 
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level’s limited competencies in areas such as fiscal redistribution, health and 
education, social benefits, pensions and pay and industrial action, ‘it lacks the 
institutional capacity to replicate existing national social systems’ (2001, p.26). 
Teague is dismissive, however, of the skeptical position that is assumed by scholars 
such as Streeck. Rather, he asserts that ‘the EU has had an impact on national labour 
regimes which may be fragmented and contested but which nonetheless cannot be 
discounted’ (2001, p.26). For Teague, the rise of processes such as ‘credibility 
bargaining’ (collective bargaining that aims to achieve sound macro-economic 
outcomes) and ‘deliberative governance’ (a style of governance that emphasizes 
problem-solving, flexibility, and involves actors at all levels) are manifestations of 
the European social policy regime that has emerged to complement existing national 
regimes. 
 
A 2002 literature review by Hoffmann et al took stock of the various works that 
existed on the Europeanization of industrial relations. Six discreet areas of the 
emerging system of European industrial relations were identified; (1) the 
Europeanization of industrial relations actors, (2) the European social dialogue, (3) 
Employment policy and macro-economic dialogue, (4) the European coordination of 
collective bargaining, (5) European Works Councils, and (6) the European company 
statute. The authors found that, in each of the fields surveyed, disparate degrees of 
Europeanization were evident. It was concluded, however, that national systems of 
employment regulation in Europe had faced a common set of economic, political and 
social challenges since the 1970s, and that moves towards Europeanization in each of 
the fields surveyed had been a response to this common set of challenges.  
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In more recent years, two works have sought to analyze holistically the discreet 
pressures and trends that are peculiar to the changing system of European industrial 
relations. Both have firmly rooted their analysis of European industrial relations in 
the multi-level governance theoretical approach to European integration. The first is 
Keller and Platzer’s edited volume European Integration and Industrial Relations 
(2003). On the basis of a series of contributions that addressed the forms in which 
national systems had become Europeanized, Keller and Platzer concluded that a truly 
‘European’ system of industrial relations had not emerged, and that, furthermore, 
industrial relations and social policy appeared to be one of the EU policy 
competencies in which there was the least developed level of integration. It was 
argued that the development of a vertically integrated European system of industrial 
relations had been prevented by factors such as the diversity of economies evident in 
the member states, the existence of diverse national institutional arrangements, and 
the opposition of national employers' associations and trade unions to many of the 
processes associated with European integration. Further, it was contended that the 
‘softer’ form that EU regulation had taken since the 1980s had had the effect of 
confirming ‘path dependency’ in member states.  With regard to the precise nature of 
the system that was emerging, it was concluded that multi-level governance theory 
was the best analytic framework with which to view developments. It was contended 
that this theory best explained the co-existence and interaction of ‘horizontal’ forms 
of Europeanization with hierarchical forms of governance of the employment 
relationship in European member states. 
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The second work is Marginson and Sisson’s European Integration and Industrial 
Relations: multi-level governance in the making (2004). Using empirical data from a 
series of national and sectoral studies, the authors attempted to identify the precise 
shape of the emerging system of European industrial relations through a thematic 
analysis of the various trends that have become manifest over the last decade or so. 
Cautious support was given to the converging-divergences theory of the 
internationalization of industrial relations that specifies that a series of common 
internal differentials are becoming manifest across countries. The authors argued that 
a series of ‘multi-speed’ Europeanizations were occurring, that different degrees and 
forms of integration were detectable across companies, sectors and countries, and 
these differing forms of integration were motored by bottom-up, top-down, and 
horizontal forms of Europeanization. These developments, it was contended, were 
best viewed through the prism of multi-level governance theory. 
 
There are strong reasons for adopting the 'multi-level governance' approach to 
European integration as our theoretical stance. As has been emphasized, the findings 
within the literature establish that the framework of European industrial relations that 
has actually developed exhibits a variety of properties, and cannot be adequately 
described with the use of the more teleological theoretical paradigms of inter-
Governmentalism and neo-functionalism. Multi-level governance would appear to be 
the most auspicious theoretical route to take when approaching such a system 
(Marginson and Sisson, 2004), for it stresses the multiplicity of actors, levels and 
processes within European integration. In addition to providing the thesis with a 
robust analytic framework, the adoption of the multi-level governance approach to 
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European integration by the thesis will also allow the study to add to the body of 
knowledge that exists on multi-level governance theory and European integration. 
Specifically, the findings that the thesis obtains on the relationship between the EU’s 
multi-level framework of industrial relations governance and ‘effective’ 
implementation of ‘new phase’ agreements will contribute to theoretical 
understandings of how 'soft' law and non-Governmental actors function in Europe 
from a multi-level governance perspective. 
 
There are four reasons why the thesis adopts the multi-level governance paradigm. 
Firstly (i), the theory of multi-level governance recognizes the role of non-
Governmental actors and attributes a level of agency to them that no other potential 
theories do. It is of crucial importance that the study adopts a theoretical approach 
that recognizes that the bodies that are the primary focus of the study, namely the 
European and national-level social partner organizations, behave in a differing 
fashion from Governmental organizations. The adoption of the multi-level 
governance approach will, in this sense, allow the study to depict the social partner 
organizations in a manner that recognizes their specific purpose in the process of 
European governance. The findings the study obtains will also contribute to 
theoretical comprehensions of the behaviour of social partner organizations within 
the European Union, their engagement with 'soft' law, and the extent of their agency. 
Secondly (ii), the multi-level governance theory of European integration focuses on 
the relationships between levels of governance to a degree that other theoretical 
approaches do not (Jordan, 2001). This too is a key advantage of the theory given 
that a focus of the thesis concerns the forms in which national-level actors implement 
the output of the higher-level European actors and the exact conditions in which 
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'effective' implementation of this output takes place. The use of the multi-level 
governance paradigm will give a theoretical direction to this endeavour and, with 
regard to the eventual findings of the thesis, will allow the study to draw theoretical 
lessons from the forms of relationships formed between social partner organizations 
at different levels in the course of the implementation of the 'new phase'. 
 
Multi-level governance theory's (iii) attention to bottom-up and top-down dynamics 
and its focus upon both the horizontal and vertical aspects of Europeanization also 
makes it an auspicious theoretical approach. In that the OMC implies that forms of 
political power are dispersed across levels and there is no fixed pole of authority, 
many of its characteristics as a form of governance are foreseen theoretically by 
multi-level governance theory. The processes associated with the implementation of 
the output of the 'new phase', i.e.  peer review of implementation, implementation via 
the national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue of the affiliates of the 
European social partners, also mean that the 'new phase' shares many characteristics 
with the OMC in this regard. In order to adequately describe this aspect of the 'new 
phase' and to frame it in a suitable analytic manner, it is necessary to adopt a 
theoretical framework that adopts this multi-directional view of governance 
processes. Finally (iv), multi-level governance theory's concern with change and 
innovation and actors' roles in implementing change makes it an appropriate 
theoretical tool for the purposes of the thesis. The thesis aims to identify the extent to 
which change is being affected through the 'new phase' of the social dialogue, and 
the precise role of actors and policy tools in bringing forms of change about.  Thus, 
multi-level governance's theory's endorsement of such an approach makes it 
appropriate in this regard and will help to give a theoretical character to this goal of 
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the thesis. 
 
2.4 European social dialogue 
 
The chapter now reviews the literature that concerns itself with the European social 
dialogue. Having established above the theoretical debates that exist on the 
Europeanization of industrial relations, empirically informed academic debates on 
the European social dialogue will be addressed. This section will be divided into two 
sub-sections. Firstly, that part of the literature which (1) concerns itself with the 
theoretical and procedural operation of the social dialogue at the European level and 
the associated potentials and problems will be analyzed, before (2) that part which 
concerns itself with the output of the social dialogue in terms of its substantive 
content and implementation at lower levels will be analyzed.   
 
2.4.1 The European social dialogue: the institutional machinery and theoretical 
approaches to it 
 
A series of scholars, collectively described as ‘Euro-optimists’ (Keller, 2003), argued 
that the creation of an institutional mechanism for collective agreements between the 
European social partners at European-level entailed an impressive development in 
the Europeanization of industrial relations. On the basis of a neo-functionalist 
analysis of the social dialogue, Falkner argued that the rights granted to the European 
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social partners under the terms of the Social Protocol and the Agreements 
subsequently reached signified the development of a 'corporatist policy community' 
at the European level (1998). A similar position to Falkner's was developed by 
Jensen et al (1999) who viewed the social dialogue and European integration in 
similar theoretical terms to Falkner and based their analysis on a comparison of the 
historical development of the European social dialogue with the development of 
national systems of social dialogue. Although the limited output of the European 
social dialogue was acknowledged, it was nevertheless asserted that the existence of 
EU-level institutions and actors and the presence of a substantive output meant that 
one could talk of an European-level system of collective bargaining. Other authors 
espousing the 'Euro-optimist' position include Kim (2001) who argued that the set of 
processes and practices that had evolved in the post-Maastricht period represented a 
form of European collective bargaining that was taking place in ‘the shadow of [the] 
law’.  
 
Various scholars (Jensen et al, 1999; Kim, 2001) have also emphasized the key role 
of the machinery for European sectoral social dialogue in the development of a 
system of European industrial relations. The arguments for the significance of the 
European sectoral social dialogue committees (SSDCs) largely resemble those that 
are made regarding the inter-professional level social dialogue. The role played by 
the SSDCs in an European system are referred to by Kim (2001) and Jensen et al 
(1999), who stressed, as with the inter-professional dialogue, that the existence of a 
set of processes and actors for European social dialogue was more significant than 
the limited output of the process. Specifically in relation to the European sectoral 
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dialogue, Jacobi and Kirton-Darling (2005) argued that the existence of a growing 
number of SSDCs at the European level was indicative of the Europeanization of the 
social dialogue process. 
 
A more voluminous body of work exists on the potential weaknesses of the social 
dialogue machinery established at European level. This scholarship has generally 
been penned by authors who adopt a more inter-Governmentalist view of European 
integration, and who have been collectively described as ‘Euro-pessimists’ (Keller, 
2003). A series of factors have been identified by these scholars, amongst whom 
Keller is prominent, to explain the perceived weaknesses of the inter-professional 
level social dialogue. The first (1) relates to the continued reluctance of European-
level employers' associations to participate in the dialogue. It was identified soon 
after the conclusion of the Social Protocol that the motivation of European employers 
in participating in European collective negotiations was primarily due to their wish to 
fend off the threat of legislation from the European Commission (Streeck, 1994; 
Hall, 1994; Gold, 1998). In recent years, others have attested to the continued key 
role of European employers' associations in vetoing the dialogue (Degryse, 2000; 
Keller, 2003). Several reasons have been put forward to explain the ability of 
European employers' associations to achieve this end. Firstly, there is the limited 
level of pressure that is placed upon European employers' associations to enter into 
negotiations for EU-level collective agreements. By the mid to late 1990s, the back 
log of Social Policy Directives that the European Commission had been unable to get 
through the Council of Ministers in the 1980s had largely been cleared, and from 
then the number of legislative proposals emanating from the Commission in the 
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social policy field declined (Keller and Bansbach, 2001; Keller, 2003; Keller and 
Platzer, 2003). As a result of the lack of new legislative proposals from the European 
Commission, the pressure on European employers to enter into EU-level collective 
negotiations correspondingly faded. 
 
A second (2) criticism that has been leveled against the social dialogue is the absence 
of key industrial relations topics and rights such as the issues of pay, freedom of 
association, and the right to strike from the process. The ETUC's lack of a strike 
weapon deprives the EU-level union movement of one of the key instruments that 
national unions have historically used to induce national employers to bargain 
collectively (Dolvik, 1999). Also, it has been argued that the absence of an issue such 
as pay, traditionally core to national collective bargaining regimes, from the agenda 
of EU-level collective bargaining deprives the European Commission of one of the 
major threats/enticements that characterize the operation of national corporatist 
systems (Streeck, 1994). Streeck attributes the absence of these issues from the 
European social dialogue and the subsequent emasculation of the process to the inter-
Governmentalist shape that European integration has taken. He argues that the 
refusal of national governments to cede key social policy competencies to the 
European level has led to a system of inter-professional level European social 
dialogue that is a weak imitation of national systems of collective bargaining. 
 
A third problem (3) that has been identified is the role of the organizational and 
financial problems that are internal to the European social partner organizations in 
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impeding the operation of the European social dialogue. The internal decision 
making processes of Business Europe, whereby a 'super-qualified majority' of 80% 
of members' votes is required to allow the organization to enter into negotiations 
with ETUC has been highlighted (Degryse, 2000), as have the lack of funding and 
resources that characterize all of the European social partner organizations (Dolvik, 
1999).  
 
Legal problems (4) have also been deemed to trouble the social dialogue. Jacobs and 
Ojeda Avilés (1999) have identified six legal problems that characterize the 
European social dialogue. These are given as (1) the voting procedures in the 
Council of Ministers (e.g. the differences in negotiating behaviour when the subject 
matter of the agreement requires unanimity or qualified majority) and the related 
importance of subsidiarity, (2) the relationship with the Council of Ministers (i.e. the 
checks made by the Commission and the Council when assenting to the 
incorporation of an agreement into a directive), (3) the ambiguous relationship 
between the European social dialogue and the European Parliament (particularly the 
legal possibilities for the European Parliament to overcome its restricted mandated 
role), (4) the ambiguous relationship with ECOSOC and the need to redefine its role; 
(5) the important but controversial role of the European Commission, and (6) the 
problems which might arise concerning subsequent interpretations of 
agreements/directives. 
 
The criticisms that have been made of the inter-professional level dialogue have also 
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been leveled at the sectoral dialogue (Keller and Bansbach, 2001). A series of 
specific criticisms have also been leveled at the sectoral dialogue. One concerns the 
generally poor organization and funding of the European sectoral social partners. The 
criticism that has been made is that employers’ organizations are poorly organized at 
the sectoral level (Keller, 2003), that many of the employers’ associations are not 
representative and are often trade associations rather than employers’ associations 
(Kirton-Darling and Clauwaert, 2003), and that both employers' associations and 
trade unions receive insufficient funding to engage in a meaningful dialogue at the 
European sectoral level. 
 
To date, the multi-level governance approach to European integration has not been 
used extensively to analyze the European social dialogue as a mode of European 
governance. Given that this study will focus upon the output and implementation of 
the dialogue and the multi-level governance theory of European integration 
preoccupies itself extensively with the relationships between governance levels, the 
study will be afforded a good opportunity to explore the utility of a multi-level 
governance approach in analyzing the European social dialogue  
 
2.4.2 European social dialogue: the output 
 
A range of output has been produced by the European social partners in the previous 
two decades or so. This may be usefully divided into (i) output that has been aimed at 
the European public authorities or another third party (i.e. joint declarations, joint 
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statements), and (ii) output that involves a reciprocal commitment with lower level 
actors (i.e. Framework Agreements, Framework of Actions) (Keller, 2003). The 
concern and focus of this study is with output of the second kind.  
 
A series of criticisms have been leveled at the output of the European social 
dialogue. The most common criticism that has been advanced is that only three 
Framework Agreements were concluded by the European social partners prior to the 
year 2000. This was evidence for many of the inherent weaknesses of the dialogue 
(Keller, 2003; Degryse, 2000). The quality and quantity of the output of the 
European sectoral social dialogue has also been subject to specific criticism. Pochet 
(2005) recorded that of the 353 documents produced by the European sectoral social 
partners since 1978 less than 2% had been Agreements. It was further noted that 60% 
of these documents were 'common positions', and that there was no statistical 
evidence of a progression from 'softer' tools to the conclusion of more substantial 
Agreements within sectors. A similar verdict was reached by De Boer et al (2005) 
who conducted a statistical survey of the output of the inter-professional and sectoral 
social dialogues. The conclusion of De Boer et al was that the system of social 
dialogue that had emerged was better considered a social partner lobbying system 
rather than a system of industrial relations given the lack of collective agreements 
and high quantity of non-legally binding texts. 
 
Falkner (1998) analyzed the content of the first three Agreements concluded since 
the annexation of the social protocol to the Maastricht Treaty, and concluded that the 
  
60
quality of the content of the Agreements was indicative of the development of a 
genuine system of 'Euro-corporatism'. Clauwaert and Harger (2001) examined the 
possible legal ramifications of the implementation of the Parental Leave Directive in 
member states, and argued that the Directive would be likely to have significant legal 
implications for the regulation of parental leave in member states.  
 
The most noteworthy study of the implementation of the output of the social dialogue 
is Falkner et al's Complying With Europe. In this work, the implementation of six EU 
social policy Directives in fifteen member states was examined. This involved 
ninety-one individual case studies of the implementation of the six Directives in the 
fifteen member states. Although only two of the Directives were actually the product 
of the European social dialogue (the Parental Leave Directive and the Part-time 
Work Directive), the study is nevertheless a key source of information on the impact 
of social policy Directives and the likely impact of future Directives and 
Agreements. This is particularly the case given that Falkner et al deal with the 
implementation and impact of the 'hard' and 'soft' clauses of the Directives. Several 
key findings are relevant. One was that the Directives in question had actually 
imparted comprehensive new rights to national systems of social and employment 
regulation. In a mere four cases out of the ninety-one studied were all of the terms of 
the relevant Directive present within a national system. In the vast majority of cases 
then, the Directives imparted at least some new rights to national contexts. This 
would seem to refute the suggestion of some (Streeck, 1998) that the potential of the 
European level to impart major new employment rights to national contexts is 
minimal. 
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Complying with Europe also revealed the persistent failure of many member states to 
implement Directives correctly and on time. Of the ninety-one case studies 
conducted by the scholars, only in ten cases (11%) was implementation 'on time and 
fully correct'. Also, as of April 2003 (the point at which the scholars finished their 
data collection), in forty out of ninety-one cases there was not 'full' correctness of 
transposition, and in seventeen of ninety-one cases there was not 'essentially' correct 
transposition. Ten out of the fifteen states studied took over an average of thirty 
months to transpose the Directives 'essentially correctly'. These findings would 
suggest that although EU social policy Directives have the potential to impart key 
new rights to national systems there is a persistent problem with the ability of 
member states to implement the terms of the Directives efficiently and effectively. 
 
Falkner et al found an ambivalent relationship between the 'soft' provisions of 
Directives and their implementation and impact in member states. In many cases, the 
'soft' clauses of the Directives inspired activity within member states. For example, in 
the case of the Parental Leave Directive, 'no fewer than ten member states reflected 
one or more of these "soft" law provisions in their transposition measures'. In the 
case of the Part-time Work Directive, the 'soft' provisions of the Directive inspired 
transposition activity in nine member states. However, Falkner et al also established 
that there was an ambiguous relationship between the 'soft' clauses of the Directives 
and the countries in which they achieved an impact. In Denmark and Sweden, two of 
the countries in which the legally binding clauses were transposed in the most 
efficient manner, the 'soft' clauses of the Directives had a minimal impact. In contrast 
to this, in many of those countries where the transposition of the legally binding 
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clauses of the Directives were less efficient, the 'soft' clauses of the Directives had a 
major impact. This finding would appear to suggest that there is an ambiguous 
relationship between EU-level 'soft' law and domestic political trends. It will be 
auspicious to investigate the possible nature of this relationship in other areas of the 
literature in the next section of this literature review.  
 
The explanatory factors advanced by Falkner et al to explain cross-national 
implementation outcomes are also worthy of comment. The concept of 'worlds of 
compliance' is introduced by the authors to explain varying national implementation 
performances. Falkner et al argued that there are three different 'worlds of 
compliance'; the 'world of law observance', the 'world of domestic politics', and the 
'world of neglect'. Falkner et al then argued that the fifteen countries that are the 
subject of their study could be categorized within one of the groupings. Further, a set 
of political and social factors were identified that were deemed to drive the 
implementation performances of the various country clusters. Within the 'world of 
neglect', it was argued that a permanent culture of apathy to EU regulation precluded 
the effective implementation of EU social policy directives. Within the 'world of 
domestic politics', it was argued that domestic political factors such as the political 
programme of incumbent Governments determined the response to the Directives. 
Finally, within the 'world of law observance', it was argued that a set of cultural 
attitudes existed that encouraged 'good' compliance with EU social policy Directives. 
A fourth ‘world of compliance’ was added by Falkner and Treib in 2008 after 
research on the implementation of three EU social policy Directives in four new 
member states. Their research suggested that the four countries studied fitted into 
what was described as ‘the world of dead letters’. This ‘world of compliance’ was 
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characterized by ‘politicized transposition processes and systematic application and 
enforcement problems’. It was also added that Ireland and Italy would be best 
classed as belonging to this ‘world of compliance’. 
 
Little however exists on the implementation of the Agreements and texts produced 
by the European social partners during the 'new phase' of the European social 
dialogue. Further, the small existing body of scholarship occupies itself almost 
entirely with the procedural implementation of the Agreements and texts and has 
little to say about the impact of the Agreements and texts upon substantive aspects of 
the employment relationship in European member states and sectors. Those studies 
that do exist are broadly pessimistic, in line with Keller’s (2003) expectation that the 
use of the first implementation route envisaged in the Social Protocol would involve 
a further weakening of the process given the existence of several member states in 
which there was little coordination between levels of social dialogue. Larsen and 
Andersen (2007), in a study of the implementation of the Telework Agreement 
across member states, contended that the national implementations that had occurred 
had reflected the logic of ongoing 'power games' between national social partners 
rather than those of actual national ‘procedures and practices’. Koukiadaki and 
Deakin (2008), in their study of the implementation of the Telework Agreement in 
five member states, found that the ambivalent nature of the national 'procedures and 
practices' implementation clause inspired ad hoc implementation outcomes and that 
the weak nature of the Agreement meant that little in terms of new regulation was 
offered to national contexts. 
 
  
64
2.5 The Open Method of Coordination and European governance 
 
Given the general paucity of literature on the ‘new phase’ of the European social 
dialogue and its implementation in countries and sectors, it will be particularly 
fruitful to examine the literature that exists on the OMC as a mode of European 
governance. This is because, as a mode of European governance, the OMC shares 
several characteristics with the Framework Agreements and texts that are the subject 
of our study. The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is a form of EU-level ‘soft’ 
law and operates on the basis of a fourfold mechanism. First (1), a series of policy 
goals are identified and defined by the Council of Ministers. Then, (2) member states 
develop national action plans (NAP) in order to transpose the policy goals. Next, (3) 
a series of benchmarks and indicators to measure ‘best-practice’ are agreed upon, 
before (4) the results are monitored and evaluated at the European level using non-
legally binding sanctions such as ‘peer pressure’ and ‘naming and shaming’. 
Although the OMC primarily engages Governmental actors rather than social partner 
organizations, both the OMC and the Agreements and texts are non-legally binding 
forms of governance, and rely upon the close coordination of EU-level actors with 
national actors in order for the output to be effectively implemented. The following 
section will therefore outline in greater detail the similarities that exist between the 
OMC and Framework Agreements as modes of governance and the lessons that one 
can take from the literature on the OMC with regards to our study.   
 
  
65
One area of the literature on the OMC concerns itself with the precise form of 
European governance that the OMC entails. Several authors are optimistic about the 
development of the OMC. Many have lauded it as a compromise between the rigidity 
of the Classic Community Method (CCM) of regulation and the possibility of an 
Europe where politics is de-centralized to the level of nation state (Zeitlin, 2005). In 
their study of the OMC, Scott and Trubek (2002) argued that the horizontal and 
loosely coordinated form that OMC governance took was suited to the European 
polity that was emerging in the twenty-first century. Jacobsson (2002), in her study 
of the implementation of the European Employment Strategy, argued that the OMC 
entailed a new form of policy discourse that combined supra-national and inter-
Governmentalist elements and that ruled through non-traditional means such as 
‘naming and shaming’. Specifically, the OMC has been praised for its ability to 
manage an enlarged European Union, to handle issues that traditionally fall outside 
the competence of the European level, and to reconcile the divergent views of 
national actors. Vandenbroucke (2001) praised the flexibility of the OMC, and 
described it as a ‘proactive and creative method that allows us to define ‘social 
Europe’ in more specific terms and to anchor it firmly as a common collective good 
at the heart of European co-operation’. De La Porte (De La Porte and Pochet, 2002), 
in her study of the Pensions OMC, lauded the OMC for its capacity to reconcile 
social and economic goals on an issue such as pensions. 
 
Other authors are rather less optimistic. The common critique that is made of the 
OMC is that it is non-legally binding, and therefore unlikely to achieve adequate 
penetration within member states. Cini, in a 2001 study of the OMC and the 
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European Union’s state aid policy, criticized it on these grounds, as did Scott and 
Trubek in their more general account of the OMC (2003). In a study of the OMC and 
European welfare states, Chalmers and Lodge argued that the non-legally binding 
nature of the OMC had the potential to undermine both the CCM and the acquis 
communitaire. Other scholars have characterized the OMC as an instrument that is 
used to achieve a set of supply-side economic goals, and that is potentially 
antithetical to the creation of a social Europe. Chalmers and Lodge (2003) contended 
that the OMC took place ‘in the shadow of the Stability and Growth pact’, whilst 
both Scharpf (2002) and Trubek and Mosher (2003) argued that the basic goals of the 
OMC were more orientated to supply-side economics than to market correcting 
social goals. De La Porte recorded that two of the Pensions OMC three pillars 
(financial sustainability and responding to changing needs) were related to economic 
stability, and argued that the Pensions OMC partly functioned as a legitimating tool 
for many national Pensions policies that were economically liberal in their 
orientation. 
 
2.5.1 The implementation of OMC 
 
It is also important to take stock of the literature that exists on the implementation of 
the OMC given that this study relates to the implementation of European ‘soft’ law. 
The literature that exists on the implementation of different OMCs is sparser than the 
literature that addresses its potential benefits and costs as a mode of European 
governance. Several authors who have disparaged the OMC’s non-legally binding 
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nature have also questioned the extent to which the output of the OMC is likely to 
penetrate national systems however. Trubek and Mosher (2003) contended that the 
impact of the European Employment Strategy in member states had not been 
significant. Chalmers and Lodge (2003), in their study of the relationship between 
the OMC and European welfare states, argued that the OMC was likely to produce 
sporadic implementation outcomes at the national level as a result of its non-binding 
nature. In a comprehensive analysis of the implementation of the Pensions OMC in 
member states, De La Porte (De La Porte and Pochet, 2002) contended that a 
substantial impact had not been achieved by the Pensions OMC. It was argued that 
the impact of the Pensions OMC had been rather questionable, and that path 
dependent national traditions of pensions regulation had precluded the OMC 
exercising a major impact.  
 
Others have expressed greater optimism. Hodson and Maher (2001), in their study of 
the OMC and the Stability and Growth Pact, argued that the ‘soft’ approach had been 
successful in this instance. Jacobsson (2002), in a study of the implementation of the 
Employment OMC, argued that the 'soft' mechanisms associated with the OMC had 
the potential to bring about substantial change in the employment policies of member 
states. It was asserted that although processes such  as 'peer review' and 'naming and 
shaming' were 'soft' modes of governance, the influence of 'socialization' upon 
national actors was likely to lead to the OMC affecting profound change within 
states. Many of the authors who have on the whole been pessimistic have also at least 
conceded that the OMC has the potential to lead to change in some areas. De La 
Porte (De La Porte and Pochet, 2002), for example, argued that the impact of the 
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Pensions OMC was likely to be considerable in those countries where the topic of 
pensions had thus far inspired few attempts at reform. Leonard (2005) and Lopez-
Santana (2006), although both broadly ambivalent about the potential of the OMC as 
a form of European governance, also predicted that, in certain circumstances, the 
OMCs that they studied were likely to have a significant impact. 
 
2.5.2 Factors promoting effective implementation 
 
The literature on the OMC also specifies a series of country-specific factors that are 
likely to enhance the level of impact that different OMCs have within countries. 
Given that this study will attempt to formulate a series of country and sector-specific 
factors that explain ‘effective’ implementation of EU ‘soft’ law, it is important to 
review the various factors that are outlined in the OMC literature. Firstly (1), the 
literature on the OMC stresses that where national policy agendas converge with the 
policy promoted by the OMC then the OMC is likely to have a greater impact. In 
their work on social policy and the OMC, De La Porte and Pochet (2002) argued that 
national Governments were more likely to implement OMC social policy initiatives 
if the form that the OMC took coincided with the Government’s policy goals. The 
authors provided the example of the UK Government’s assiduous implementation of 
the Social Exclusion/Poverty OMC. This, they argued, was mainly due to the 
existence of a prior long-term commitment from the Blair Government to 
significantly reduce child poverty. Leonard (2005) also contended that national 
Government preference can determine OMC implementation outcome, and added 
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that national social partner willingness to implement European-level policies is 
crucial. The argument was also advanced by Lopez-Santana in a 2006 article. In this 
work, it was argued that the effect that the OMC had upon national contexts was 
often contingent upon the status of the issue in national level political debate, and 
that the existence of an European-level OMC ‘strengthened the hand’ of those 
domestic advocates of the policy that the OMC promoted. This latter point is 
advanced in other areas of the literature, and De La Porte and Pochet also stressed 
the importance of this mechanism in the ‘effective’ implementation of different 
OMCs in member states. 
 
Secondly (2), the literature emphasizes that the degree of work that exists nationally 
on the topic of the OMC prior to its inception is a determinant of the impact that the 
OMC has. De La Porte and Pochet (2002) argued that the impact of the OMC is low 
in countries where extensive work has already been done on the topic promoted by 
the OMC. They cited the case of the minimal impact that, they argued, the 
Employment OMC had had in Scandinavian countries. This, it was contended, was 
because the issues that the Employment OMC attempted to tackle had been 
extensively addressed in Scandinavian countries prior to the development of the 
Employment OMC. Jacobssen and Schmidt also argued (2002) that in countries 
where pre-existing policy on the topic promoted by the OMC is highly developed 
then the impact of the OMC is likely to be low. 
 
A third (3) factor was suggested by Lopez-Santana (2006) who argued that should 
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social partners have experience of implementing similar EU-level initiatives then the 
effect of the OMC will be greater. Lopez-Santana found that some countries have 
‘legacies’ of implementation activity that complement the Employment OMC. This 
concept was described as ‘ideational fit’ and was based on a study of the 
implementation of the European Employment Strategy in Spain. Lopez-Santana 
argued that Spain’s receipt of European Structural Funding and the implementation 
of reforms associated with the funding had created an institutional compatibility with 
European-level employment reforms, and that this had paved the way for the later 
successful implementation of the European Employment Strategy. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
As this literature review has attempted to outline, the literature that relates to the area 
of enquiry is highly diverse and also straddles many different disciplines. The lessons 
one may adduce from the review of the literature may be divided into those (1) that 
relate to the theoretical aspects of the study, and those (2) that relate to the empirical 
aspects of the study. On the subject of (1) theory, it is hoped that the review of the 
theoretical literature on European integration and the Europeanization of industrial 
relations has made a sound case for the adoption of the multi-level governance 
approach to European integration as the study’s theoretical standpoint. As stated 
earlier, the reasons for doing this are due to the pragmatic nature of multi-level 
governance theory, its emphasis on the role of non-governmental actors in the 
process of European integration, and its popularity as a theoretical standpoint within 
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the field of European industrial relations. 
 
The ideas that adduced on the question of the (2) empirical aspects of the study 
should be outlined in greater detail. Firstly, it is relatively clear that there are no 
comprehensive empirical accounts of the implementations of the Framework 
Agreements on Telework and Work-related Stress. Although two studies exist on the 
implementation of the Telework Agreement (Larsen and Andersen, 2007; 
Koukiadaki and Deakin, 2008), these are by no means comprehensive and the 
question of the efficacy of the implementation of the Framework Agreements 
remains a terrain that is still largely unexplored. Secondly, it also appears that there 
is little empirically based work on the European social dialogue that attempts to 
discuss the theoretical implications of the empirical findings. No such accounts exist 
on the non-legally binding Framework Agreements, and the last comprehensive 
account that combined empirical data on the European social dialogue with a 
theoretical analysis was Falkner (1998), a decade or so ago. Finally, it appears that 
there is a need to attempt to identify the extent to which the country-specific factors 
that have been put forward to explain divergent national implementations of EU-
level Directives and OMCs are able to explain the national and sectoral 
implementations of the form of EU-level Social Partner 'soft' governance that the 
Framework Agreements on Telework and Work-related Stress entail. Although the 
factors that may explain divergent national implementations are well established with 
regard to the implementation of the OMC (De La Porte and Pochet, 2002; Lopez-
Santana, 2006) and EU Directives (Falkner et al, 2005), no work has been done on 
the extent to which these factors are transplantable to the area of this study. 
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The chapter also outlined in sections three and four the doubts that various 
authorities have about the extent to which the Framework Agreements and texts will 
be implemented ‘effectively’ within member states (Keller, 2003; Larsen and 
Andersen, 2007; Koukiadaki and Deakin, 2008), and the issue of the most 
appropriate means with which to benchmark the ‘effective’ implementation of the 
Agreements and texts (Falkner et al, 2005). In chapter three, these issues will be set 
out in more detail, and a framework will be proposed for benchmarking the 
‘effective’ implementation of the Agreements and texts. In section four, factors 
promoting ‘effective’ implementation of OMC policy were also outlined. In chapter 
three, these factors will also be set out in more detail, and a set of variables that 
potentially explain differing procedural and substantive implementation outcomes of 
the Framework Agreements and texts will be advanced. 
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Chapter 3: Benchmarking the effectiveness of the Framework Agreements and 
texts 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Having addressed the theoretical and empirical rationales for conducting the study, 
this chapter will outline the analytical devices proposed by the thesis to grapple with 
its research questions. Specifically, it will define (i) how ‘effective’ implementation 
is operationalized by the thesis, and (ii) the series of factors that are likely to explain 
divergent implementation outcomes in member states and sectors. Thus, this chapter 
has two aims. Firstly (1), it will develop a set of criteria for evaluating the 
Framework Agreements on Telework and Work-related Stress and the lifelong 
learning texts as forms of ‘soft’ European governance. To this end, it will outline and 
assess benchmarks that are potentially suitable for the task of analytically appraising 
national and sectoral implementations of the Framework Agreements and texts from 
a procedural and substantive perspective. The procedural dimension of the analysis 
focuses only upon the Framework Agreements and the procedural form in which 
they were implemented in member states. The substantive dimension of the analysis 
focuses upon both the Agreements and lifelong learning texts and the extent to which 
their implementation added to substantive aspects of the employment relationship in 
member states on the basis of (i) their contribution to levels of employment 
regulation and (ii) the extent of their impact at lower levels. Secondly (2), the chapter 
will develop a set of factors that potentially explain differential effects of the 
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Agreements and texts upon country and sector specific contexts. These factors will 
be based upon the literature, and will potentially account for explanations for the 
procedural and substantive effects of the Agreements and texts upon national and 
sectoral contexts.  
 
3.2 Developing benchmarks to appraise implementation 
 
It is necessary to outline the multi-dimensional framework of analysis will be 
developed to appraise the ‘effectiveness’ of the Agreements and texts as ‘soft’ forms 
of European social partner governance. In order to do this, the chapter starts by 
elaborating the analytical framework utilized by Falkner et al in their 2005 study of 
the implementation of six EU social policy directives, given that, as outlined in 
chapter two, Falkner et al’s work represents a key attempt to define the ‘effective’ 
implementation of EU-level policy in member states. Falkner et al developed a three-
fold model to appraise ‘implementation’ that distinguished between the (1) 
implementation, (2) enforcement, and (3) application of Directives in member states. 
The (1) first of these categories, implementation, involved assessing whether the 
Directives had been implemented ‘essentially correctly’ and ‘on-time’ in the states 
concerned. Falkner et al’s measure of ‘correct’ implementation was straight-forward; 
it related to whether the legally-binding terms of the EU Directives had been 
transposed into national law.  
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The (2) second of these categories, enforcement, involved an assessment of whether 
minimum requirements existed for the enforcement of the Directives within the 
country concerned. Falkner et al identified three factors that were likely to guarantee 
effective enforcement of the Directives within countries; (i) a substantial national 
coordination and steering capacity (i.e. the capability of national-level actors to draw 
the attention of lower level actors to the terms of the Directives), (ii) a substantial 
national pressure capacity (i.e. the capacity of individuals and actors who are aware 
of a breach of the law to bring it to the attention of the public authorities), and (iii) 
the availability of information to individual employees (i.e. the extent to which 
individual employees are informed of their actual rights). It was also added that 
factors such as the number of inspectors, the type of controls, and the sanction 
capacity of the country in question was likely to influence the degree of enforcement 
of the Directive. The (3) third and final category, the application of the Directives in 
member states, involved conducting interviews with national labour law experts who 
hypothesised the degree of application that the Directives were likely to receive in 
individual workplaces.  
 
3.2.1 Benchmarking the procedural implementation of ‘soft’ law 
 
It is important to outline the ways in which the thesis’ scheme for analyzing the 
implementation of the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements is different 
from Falkner et al’s framework.  Firstly, it is necessary to note that the form of EU 
governance  evaluated by this thesis is different to that analyzed by Falkner et al. The 
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Directives2 that were the subject of Falkner et al’s study required an implementation 
that guaranteed 100% coverage of national workforces and also, as legally binding 
instruments, were subject to the enforcement and monitoring mechanisms that are 
associated with labour law in the member states. Falkner et al’s benchmarks for 
measuring the implementation of the Directives stemmed from their legally-binding 
status. Thus, a straightforward benchmark of whether the Directives had been 
incorporated into national legal systems ‘essentially correctly’ and ‘on-time’ was 
developed by the authors. This benchmark had the advantage of simplicity and cross-
national transparency and was an appropriate one for appraising cross-national 
implementations of legally binding EU Directives. 
 
It is rather more problematic to benchmark the ‘effective’ implementation of the 
Framework Agreements on Telework and Work-related Stress. Although Falkner et 
al’s ‘on-time’ benchmark may be adopted to assess the implementations of the 
Framework Agreements, the fact that the Agreements are non-legally binding means 
that it is unfeasible to gauge their ‘effective’ implementation with regard to the 
extent to which national implementations guarantee erga omnes coverage of national 
workforces. Thus, the benchmark employed by Falkner et al to gauge 
implementation is insufficient when considering the implementation of the Telework 
and Work-related Stress Agreements. Nevertheless, it is highly necessary for two 
reasons to construct a benchmark in addition to the ‘on time’ benchmark to appraise 
national implementations of the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements.  
 
2 It should be noted that the two of the six Directives studied by Falkner et al were European social 
partner Framework Agreements that subsequently received legal backing 
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Firstly, should a further benchmark to appraise cross-national implementations not be 
devised, then EU-level actors would be left with little to no leverage upon the 
Framework Agreements and their implementation. The implication of this is that 
implementation would become entirely a national-level prerogative, and thus subject 
to whatever form that national-level social partners deem appropriate. The Telework 
and Work-related Stress Agreements may then be the subject of indifference or 
negligence at the national-level. This may be regarded as objectionable as it runs 
against a key rationale for the existence of an European-level of industrial relations; 
that is, the existence of a peak-level that attempts to coordinate the behaviour of 
national actors and seeks to mitigate the potentially damaging effects of competitive 
behaviour between national systems (Marginson and Sisson, 2004). Were EU-level 
actors to entirely abdicate control of the Agreements and their implementation, then 
one of the primary functions of the EU-level social dialogue would be undermined. 
A benchmark to gauge cross-national implementations of the Agreements is 
desirable from this perspective.  
 
A second rationale for the development and use of cross-national implementation 
benchmarks is more theoretical. Cross-national benchmarking of national 
implementation performances allows for the analytical comparison of national 
implementation outcomes, and allows one to determine what countries are ‘effective’ 
and ‘ineffective’ with regard to the implementation of EU-level social partner 
Agreements. Having established the importance of benchmarks to gauge cross-
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national implementations, it is now necessary to discuss benchmarks that are 
potentially appropriate for this task. 
 
3.2.2 Developing procedural benchmarks 
 
The study will imitate Falkner et al’s in that one benchmark it will employ to assess 
‘effective’ implementation is the extent to which the Agreements were implemented 
‘on time’. Thus, just as Falkner et al appraised whether the Directives that were the 
subject of their study were implemented in member states within the requisite time 
period, our study will assess whether the Framework Agreements were subject to 
some form of procedural implementation in member states in the three year timescale 
foreseen by the Framework Agreements. 
 
In the absence of the ‘legal incorporation’ benchmark with which Falkner et al were 
able to appraise the implementation of EU Social Policy Directives, a further 
benchmark with which it will be auspicious to gauge the implementation of the 
Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements is the national ‘procedures and 
practices’ implementation clause by which the Agreements were to be transposed in 
accordance with. As Agreements that have their foundation in Article 139 of the 
Social Protocol that was annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, it is clearly specified in 
both Agreements that they be implemented ‘in accordance with the procedures and 
practices specific to management and labour in the member states’. Thus, the study 
will also benchmark the implementation of the Framework Agreements with the 
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national ‘procedures and practices’ implementation clause in the same way as 
Falkner et al benchmarked the implementation of EU Directives by assessing 
whether the terms of the Directives had been transposed into national law.  
 
Given the existence of the national ‘procedures and practices’ clause, it has been 
insisted by the European-level trade union movement that national social partners 
display fidelity to national ‘procedures and practices’ when transposing the two 
Agreements. This is the espoused position of ETUC (Prosser, 2007), and the national 
‘procedures and practices’ clause is also referred to in the European social partner 
‘Joint Implementation Report on the Telework Agreement’ (2006). Advocates of this 
view (Larsen and Andersen, 2007) argue that in practice this implementation clause 
impels national social partners to use the instrument they would ‘normally’ use at the 
national level to transpose the European Agreement. Thus, if in country x the 
‘normal’ social partner tool for the regulation of an issue such as teleworking was a 
legally binding social partner national collective agreement, then the ‘effective’ 
procedural implementation of the Telework Agreement would entail the use of this 
method to transpose this Agreement. If the social partners in country x were to 
employ, for example, a set of non-legally binding guidelines to transpose the 
Telework Agreement, then this would imply that the Telework Agreement had been 
transposed ‘ineffectively’. 
 
In their study of the implementation of the Telework Agreement in the member 
states, Larsen and Andersen (2007) explicitly identified the national ‘procedures and 
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practices’ implementation clause as the criterion deployed for assessing the 
‘effective’ implementation of the Telework Agreement. Others have advocated the 
principle in broader terms. Hoffmann et al (2002), in a work predating the Telework 
Agreement, argued that the most appropriate manner in which to evaluate the 
implementation of EU ‘soft’ law was to appraise how the EU text was treated when 
compared to equivalent national regulation. Marginson and Sisson (2004) also 
advocated the use of this benchmark, arguing that it offered a pragmatic and 
constructive way of appraising the effect of EU ‘soft’ law. 
 
The national ‘procedures and practices’ implementation clause has also been the 
subject of criticism. The main objection that has been raised is the existence of a 
large body of states in which national ‘procedures and practices’ are either ill-defined 
or in their infancy. In the case of the former, critics such as Berndt Keller (2003) 
have pointed to examples such as the UK, where there is no forum for inter-sectoral 
collective bargaining, sectoral bargaining only exists in a minority of sectors, and 
collective relations between management and labour, where there is a trade union 
presence, primarily take place at firm or plant level. In the case of the latter, there are 
the majority of the new member states that have acceded to the European Union 
since 2004 (Prosser, 2007). In these states, structures for bipartite dialogue are 
developing at the inter-sectoral and sectoral levels, but the systems are as yet largely 
characterized by de-centralized plant or firm level social dialogue and/or inter-
sectoral tripartite concertation with a heavy emphasis on the role of the state. 
Although European Agreements may stimulate the development of social dialogue in 
states such as the UK and the new member states (European Social Partners, 2006), 
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the extent to which the implementation of the Telework or Work-related Stress 
Agreements may be carried out in accordance with national ‘procedures and 
practices’ is debatable given the dis-organized nature of social dialogue structures. 
 
Despite these criticisms, the national ‘procedures and practices’ implementation 
clause nonetheless provides a promising benchmark for the evaluation of the cross-
national implementations of the Framework Agreements. It is widely used both by 
policy makers and scholars, and also crucially has a legal basis in the Social Protocol 
and is specifically referred to in the two Agreements.  
 
3.2.3 Developing substantive benchmarks 
 
Also building on Falkner et al, the thesis’ system for analyzing the implementation of 
the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements and lifelong learning texts will 
incorporate a framework for analyzing the effects of the Agreements upon 
substantive aspects of the employment relationship within national and sectoral 
contexts. This is necessary for several reasons. Appraising the degree to which 
various national implementations are ‘effective’ and the extent to which the terms of 
the Directives are monitored and transposed properly merely addresses the 
relationship between European and national-level procedures, and does not touch 
upon the extent of substantive effect that the Framework Agreements are likely to 
have upon national systems in terms of their contribution to levels of regulation and 
impact in workplaces. The ‘correct’ implementation of either of the Agreements and 
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their effective enforcement and application may in reality mean that no new 
employment rights are imparted to national contexts or that the Agreements 
themselves exercise a minimal level of impact in individual workplaces, and it is 
therefore vital to bolster the benchmarks developed by Falkner et al with an analytic 
dimension that focuses upon the substantive effect of the Agreements and texts.  
 
National actors often implicitly appraise European Agreements and texts on the basis 
of their substantive effect within countries and sectors (Prosser, 2007; Larsen and 
Andersen, 2007). Should an EU-level instrument impart comprehensive new rights to 
national regulatory frameworks or exercise a clear impact in individual workplaces, 
then this is likely to form the basis of actors’ assessment of the EU instrument itself 
rather than the more abstract issue of its ‘effective’ or ‘ineffective’ implementation. 
A substantive element to the analysis will therefore give the thesis’ framework a 
more practical relevance.  
 
The substantive dimension within the analytic framework has two aspects to it. 
Firstly, it will address the extent to which the Framework Agreements impart new 
rights to the regulatory contexts in which they are transposed. For example, it may be 
that in sector x the topic of work-related stress was comprehensively covered by 
sectoral regulation prior to the European Agreement and that the European 
Agreement contained no provisions that were not previously present within sectoral 
regulation on work-related stress. In this case, the European Agreement would have 
added no new rights to sectoral regulation given that all aspects of the European 
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Agreement had been covered prior to the implementation of the Agreement in sector 
x. Conversely, it may be that in country y there was an underdeveloped level of 
regulation on the topic of work-related stress prior to the European Agreement and 
that the European Agreement contained many provisions that were new to country y. 
In this case, the implementation of the European Agreement in country y would be 
likely to add several new aspects to the regulation of work-related stress in country y.  
 
Secondly, it will assess the possible extent of the impact of the Framework 
Agreements and texts in workplaces in states and sectors. This will be done using 
two further tools. Firstly, the study will assess the extent to which the various policy 
tools (i.e. laws, collective agreements, guidelines) used to implement the Agreements 
are likely to have made the content of the Agreements ‘binding’ upon workplace 
level actors. This will allow for the construction of a typology of the efficacy of 
various policy tools in differing national and sectoral contexts. Secondly, the study 
will attempt to appraise the number of policies on the topics of teleworking and 
work-related stress that the implemented Agreements are likely to have inspired in 
workplaces as a result of their implementation. Although the study will not 
incorporate workplace level data, the fact that national and sectoral social partner 
representatives will be interviewed means that informed estimates of the extent to 
which the implemented Agreements were able to lead to such policies will be able to 
be made. 
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3.2.4 Summary 
 
The above section has addressed the question of the most appropriate benchmarks 
with which to gauge national implementations of the Framework Agreements and 
texts that are the subject of the study. Having assessed the merits of Falkner et al’s 
approach, the section established that it would be fruitful to benchmark the 
procedural implementation of the Framework Agreements on the basis of (i) whether 
the Agreements had been implemented via some form of procedural means in the 
three year timescale foreseen by the Agreements themselves, and (ii) the national 
‘procedures and practices’ clause by which the Agreements were to be implemented 
in accordance with. The section also proposed an analytical framework for assessing 
the substantive implementation of the Framework Agreements and texts. This 
analytical framework included the extent of the impact of the Framework 
Agreements and texts upon levels of national and sectoral regulation, and the level of 
impact of the Framework Agreements and texts upon sectors and workplaces. 
 
3.3 Explaining the effects of the Agreements on differential country and sector 
specific contexts: a set of independent variables 
 
Having established the criteria with which to appraise the ‘effectiveness’ of the 
Framework Agreements and texts as forms of European ‘soft’ law, it is now 
necessary to identify the independent variables that are likely to explain the 
differential effects that the Framework Agreements may have in country and sector 
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specific contexts. These independent variables will be categorised into those that 
potentially explain differential implementations of the Agreements, and those that 
potentially explain the differential substantive effects that the Agreements may have. 
Owing to the fact that many of the theses advanced in the literature are based on 
empirical findings adduced from fields separate to European social partner ‘soft’ law 
and its implementation, a challenge is to assess the extent to which the findings of 
other studies and the theses they have produced are applicable to the thesis’ area of 
enquiry.  
 
3.3.1 Independent variables related to the procedural implementation of the 
Agreements 
 
Three groups of independent variables that potentially explain the differing 
procedural implementations of the Agreements will be identified; (i) the ‘culture’ 
variable, (ii) policy variables, and (iii) institutional industrial relations variables.  
 
a) The ‘culture’ variable 
 
(i) The ‘culture of compliance’ that exists within the member state 
 
Falkner et al’s 2005 volume on the implementation of six social policy Directives in 
EU-15 member states identified what was described as the ‘culture of compliance’ 
  
86
                                                           
that existed within a country as a crucial factor in explaining national implementation 
outcomes. The authors argued that explanatory factors such as ‘policy misfit’3 and 
‘negotiating preference’4 that had previously been advanced (Anderson, 2002) only 
explained implementation outcomes imperfectly. Rather, it was contended that what 
was described as the ‘world of compliance’ in which an individual state should be 
classified was the crucial factor in explaining implementation outcomes within states. 
It was argued that three different ‘worlds of compliance’ existed, all of which 
displayed different characteristics and were driven by divergent factors. Those fifteen 
countries studied were categorized as belonging to one of these ‘worlds of 
compliance’ and it was argued that implementation outcomes within these countries 
would, broadly, follow a logic that accorded with the ‘world of compliance’ in which 
the country was grouped. A country such as Denmark, that was grouped as belonging 
to the ‘world of law observance’, was deemed likely to implement EU Social Policy 
Directives ‘effectively’ irrespective of whether the specific Directive exhibited high 
levels of ‘policy misfit’ or had not been supported by the Danish Government during 
the negotiating phase. It was argued by Falkner et al that a powerful ‘cultural’ force 
existed in such countries that ensured that the Directives were implemented 
‘correctly’ whatever the potential costs of compliance with the Directive. In a 
country such as the UK, that was included in the ‘world of domestic politics’ bracket, 
it was forecast that factors specific to the domestic political context would assume 
the major role in determining implementation outcomes. In this type of country, it 
was argued that a ‘culture’ whereby the Directives were implemented correctly 
 
3 The concept of ‘policy misfit’ relates to the extent of ‘fit’ that is perceived between the EU policy in 
question and existing policies on the topic at the national level 
4 The theory of ‘negotiating preference’ stipulates that individual Directives will be implemented 
more efficiently in member states should the member state in question have supported the Directive at 
the European level  
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irrespective of other factors was largely absent and that, in the absence of such a 
‘culture’, implementation was contingent upon factors such as the preference of the 
national Government for the content of the specific Directive. The final country 
bracket hypothesized by Falkner et al was that of the ‘world of neglect’ and included 
a country such as France. It was contended that those countries that belonged to this 
category neglected their implementation duties as a matter of course and that 
‘incorrect’ implementation of social policy Directives took place in these countries 
irrespective of the content of the Directive or the political climate within the state. In 
these countries, a ‘culture’ whereby EU Social Policy Directives were routinely 
complied with was deemed to be absent.  
 
The concept of ‘worlds of compliance’ and the associated importance that Falkner et 
al place upon culture as an explanatory variable has several key implications for the 
study. Firstly, it is necessary to test the hypothesis that ‘culture’ is a key explanation 
for implementation outcomes within countries. Although Falkner et al’s volume is 
primarily concerned with the implementation of ‘hard’ EU law by national 
Governments, it is still crucial to establish the extent to which the variable of 
‘culture’ helps explain variance in the implementation of EU social partner ‘soft’ law 
by national social partners. This is an opportunity given that little other academic 
work exists on the relationship between ‘soft’ law and ‘cultures of compliance’, and 
the extent to which Falkner et al’s hypotheses are translatable to the domain of EU 
‘soft’ law will be explored. 
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Before the hypotheses developed by Falkner et al may be tested, it is important to 
establish the authors’ precise definition of ‘culture of compliance’. This is defined by 
Falkner et al as ‘a socio-political mechanism’ that involves national actors 
(specifically national politicians, civil servants, and social partners) becoming 
inculcated with a belief that compliance with legal requirement (in this case EU legal 
requirement) is a non-negotiable function of public administration. This, in turn, 
reinforces the tendency within countries to take compliance seriously and also over-
rides any political opposition that the Directive may encounter within the countries. 
It was further argued that the existence of this ‘culture’ of compliance in certain 
countries leads to an emphasis on the long-term benefits of compliance to all actors. 
In the long run, a ‘culture’ of good compliance as a self-perpetuating socio-political 
force becomes engrained in national actors within such a country.       
 
In order to test the applicability and robustness of Falkner et al’s thesis then, the 
study will attempt to test the hypothesis that the effective implementation of the 
Framework Agreements on Telework and Work-related Stress is contingent upon the 
positioning of the four countries to be studied within Falkner et al’s typology of 
countries. On the basis of the data collected, the extent to which Falkner et al’s thesis 
explains differential national and sectoral implementations of EU social partner ‘soft’ 
law will be evaluated. 
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b) Policy variables 
 
ii) Convergence of national and sectoral policy agendas with the topic of the 
Framework Agreement 
 
This variable concerns to the extent to which the topic of the Framework Agreement 
converges with the policy priorities of national and sectoral actors. The hypothesis is 
that should the Agreement address an issue which is a policy priority within 
countries and sectors, then the implementation of the Agreement will be ‘effective’. 
For example, should the topic of teleworking be a policy priority in country x, then 
the hypothesis states that it becomes more likely that ‘effective’ implementation will 
occur. Conversely, if the topic of teleworking is not a policy priority in country x, 
then the hypothesis states that it is less likely that ‘effective’ implementation will 
occur. 
 
Although it assumes different forms, this hypothesis appears widely in the literature 
that exists on the implementation of European ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law. In their work on 
social policy and the OMC, De La Porte and Pochet (2002) argued that national 
Governments are more likely to implement OMC social policy initiatives if the form 
that the OMC takes coincides with the Government’s policy goals. The authors 
provided the example of the UK Government’s assiduous implementation of the 
Social Exclusion/Poverty OMC. This, they argued, was mainly due to the existence 
of a prior long-term commitment from the Blair Government to significantly reduce 
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child poverty. Falkner et al (2005) pursued a similar line of analysis. They found 
that, in countries that belonged to the ‘world of domestic policy’ grouping, 
European-level policy had a greater chance of being implemented efficiently should 
it coincide with the political programme of the Government in power at the national 
level. Léonard (2005) also contended that national Government preference can 
determine OMC implementation outcome, and added that national social partner 
willingness to implement European-level policies is crucial. The hypothesis was also 
advanced by Lopez-Santana (2006) who argued that the effect that the OMC had 
upon national contexts was often contingent upon the status of the issue in national 
level political debate, and that the existence of an European-level OMC 
‘strengthened the hand’ of those domestic advocates of the policy that the OMC 
promoted.  
 
iii) The degree of national and sectoral regulation that exists on the 
Framework Agreement prior to its implementation 
 
This variable relates to the degree of regulation that exists within the country or 
sector on the policy promoted by the Framework Agreement prior to the 
implementation of the Framework Agreement. The hypothesis states that should a 
comprehensive level of regulation exist within the country or sector on the topic 
promoted by the Framework Agreement prior to the implementation of the 
Framework Agreement then the implementation of the Framework Agreement is less 
likely to be ‘effective’. For example, if in state y a comprehensive level of regulation 
existed on the issue of work-related stress prior to the implementation of the 
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European Work-related Stress Agreement, then the hypothesis states that the 
implementation of the Work-related Stress Agreement in state y will not be 
‘effective’. Conversely, the opposite of this scenario is implied by the hypothesis. 
This is that there may be a very low level of prior regulation on the topic of work-
related stress within state y, and, subsequently, the implementation of the Work-
related Stress Agreement in state y is likely to be ‘effective’. This hypothesis is 
rooted in the literature. De La Porte and Pochet (2002) argued that the impact of the 
OMC is low in states where a high level of regulation already exists on the subject of 
the OMC. They cited the case of the minimal impact that, they argued, the 
Employment OMC had achieved in Scandinavian countries. This, the authors 
contended, is because the issues that the Employment OMC attempted to tackle had 
been extensively and effectively addressed in Scandinavian states prior to the 
inception of the Employment OMC. Falkner et al’s volume (2005) arrived at a 
similar conclusion. These authors found that in certain countries inactivity in 
response to European policy was sometimes attributable to pre-existing national 
regulation of the European-level policy. Finally, Jacobssen and Schmidt (2002) 
found that in countries where pre-existing policy on the topic promoted by the OMC 
was highly developed then the impact of the OMC was likely to be low.  
 
iv) Prior social partner experience of similar EU-level initiatives 
 
This hypothesis states that where national or sectoral social partners have experience 
of implementing or working on similar EU-level initiatives, then the implementation 
of the Agreements will be more likely to be ‘effective’. Specifically, it may be 
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possible that national and sectoral social partners may ‘learn’ through the 
implementation of the Telework Agreement how to transpose such Agreements, and, 
subsequently, the implementation of the Work-related Stress Agreement may be 
more ‘effective’. The thesis will therefore examine the hypothesis that, as a result of 
a ‘learning effect’, national and sectoral social partners are more likely to implement 
the younger Work-related Stress Agreement in a more ‘effective’ form given their 
prior experience of implementing the Telework Agreement. 
 
The precedent in the literature for this hypothesis is found in Lopez-Santana’s 2006 
study of the European Employment Strategy, which argued that prior national 
experience of implementing European-level output has an influence upon the quality 
of implementation. According to Lopez-Santana, some countries have ‘legacies’ of 
implementation activity that complement the Employment OMC. This concept was 
described as ‘ideational fit’. Lopez-Santana argued that Spain’s receipt of European 
Structural Funding and the implementation of reforms associated with the funding 
had created an institutional compatibility with European-level employment reforms, 
and that this had paved the way for the later successful implementation of the 
European Employment Strategy. 
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c) Institutional industrial Relations variables 
 
v) The Coordination of social dialogue levels 
 
A further variable that it is necessary to test is the coordination of social dialogue 
levels within member states. This variable is of particular relevance for an analysis of 
the implementation of the Agreements, for the structure of social dialogue levels 
within countries relates directly to the national ‘procedures and practices’ 
implementation clause by which the Agreements were to be transposed in accordance 
with. The concern that has been voiced (Keller, 2003) is that in those countries where 
there is a lack of clearly structured and tiered social dialogue levels the national 
‘procedures and practices’ implementation clause will come under strain. In states 
such as the UK and many of the new member states, it has been argued that the lack 
of robust national inter-professional social dialogue structures will lead to 
‘ineffective’ implementation of the Framework Agreements given that it is difficult 
to identify national ‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue. In the light of such 
arguments, the thesis will test the hypothesis that in those countries where there are 
clearly structured levels of national social dialogue, then the Framework Agreements 
will be transposed ‘effectively’, and that in those countries where there are not 
clearly structured levels of national social dialogue then the Framework Agreements 
will not be transposed ‘effectively’.  
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Aside from Keller’s concern that the Framework Agreements would not be 
implemented ‘effectively’ in those countries without structured levels of social 
dialogue, there are also precedents that support this hypothesis in the broader 
literature. Léonard (2005) argued that high levels of coordination between national 
bargaining tiers was necessary for employment pacts to be ‘effectively’ 
implemented. The countries in which employment pacts were ‘effectively’ 
implemented in Léonard’s study were states such as Belgium, Denmark, and Finland 
where multi-employer bargaining systems prevail, whilst it was asserted that in a de-
centralized system such as the UK employment pacts had not been ‘effectively’ 
implemented.  
 
3.3.2 Independent variables related to the substantive effect of the Agreements 
 
Three groups of independent variables that potentially explain the differing 
substantive effects of the Agreements and texts will also be identified; (i) policy 
variables, (ii) industrial relations structure variables, and (iii) institutional industrial 
variables.  
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a) Policy variables 
 
i) Convergence with national level policy agendas 
 
It is also appropriate to consider the ‘convergence with national level policy agendas’ 
variable with regard to the substantive dimension of the analysis. This variable is 
likely to be useful in assessing country and sector variance in terms of the effect of 
the Framework Agreements and texts with regard to content and impact. The 
hypothesis that will be tested is that should the topic that the Framework Agreement 
addresses converge with policy priorities within the country or sector, then the 
substantive effect of the Agreement or text in terms of content and impact is likely to 
be higher within the country or sector. The converse of the hypothesis, where the 
topic of the Framework Agreement or text is not a policy priority within the country 
or sector and subsequently the substantive effect of the Agreement or text in terms of 
content and impact is limited within the country or sector, will also be tested. The 
precedents for this hypothesis in the literature have been set out above (De La Porte 
and Pochet, 2002; Leonard, 2005; Lopez-Santana, 2006). Although the same broad 
principles apply for the two separate variables relating to the implementation of the 
Agreements and their substantive effect, it is possible that the study will obtain a 
different set of findings for the two variables. 
 
ii) The degree of national and sectoral regulation that exists on the 
Framework Agreement or text prior to its implementation 
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This variable, advanced above as a potential explanatory variable for the procedural 
implementation of the Agreements, may also be advanced as a potential explanatory 
variable for the substantive effects of the Agreements or texts. The arguments that 
exist in the literature for this view have been described above (Jacobssen and 
Schmidt, 2002; De La Porte and Pochet, 2002), and with regard to the substantive 
effects of the Agreements and texts it is of relevance to both the extent to which the 
Agreements and texts add to the content of national and sectoral regulation, and the 
extent of the impact of the Agreements and texts. With regard to the extent that the 
Agreements and texts add to the content of national and sectoral regulation, the 
hypothesis that will be tested states that in a country or sector where there is a 
comprehensive degree of regulation on the topic of the Framework Agreement or 
text prior to the implementation of the Agreement or text, then the content of the 
Agreement or text is unlikely to add substantially to national or sectoral rights on the 
issue. Conversely, it will also be necessary to ‘test’ the opposite of this hypothesis; 
that the Agreement or text is likely to have a comprehensive effect on the content of 
national or sectoral regulation on the topic of the Framework Agreement or text 
when there was little previous regulation on the topic within the country or sector. 
 
With regard to the extent of the impact of the Agreements and texts, the hypothesis 
here contends that in a country or sector in which the topic of the Framework 
Agreement or text is covered by existing regulation, then the impact of the 
Agreement or text will be limited. The converse hypothesis, where the impact of the 
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Agreement or text is extensive when there is little prior regulation on the topic of the 
Agreement, will also be tested. 
 
b) Industrial relations structure variables 
 
iii) Coordination of bargaining levels 
 
This variable relates to variance in the impact of the transposed Agreements. Keller 
(2003) has argued that the non-legally binding EU Framework Agreements are likely 
to be limited in their impact in those countries where bargaining levels are 
uncoordinated. On the basis of this criticism, the hypothesis will be tested is that in 
those states in which social dialogue structures are uncoordinated that the impact of 
the Agreements or texts will be limited. The converse hypothesis will also be tested, 
that the impact of the Agreements and texts will be significant in those countries 
where social dialogue structures are coordinated.  
 
iv) Rate of collective bargaining coverage 
 
A further variable that may exercise an effect on the level of impact that the 
Agreements and texts achieve in countries and sectors is the rate of collective 
bargaining coverage in the relevant countries and sectors. Keller (2003) and Arcq, 
Dufresne and Pochet (2003) argued that in those countries and sectors with low rates 
  
98
of collective bargaining coverage and no erga omnes procedure for the extension of 
collective agreements the impact of the Agreements and texts would be limited and 
that in those countries and sectors with high rates of collective bargaining coverage 
and/or an erga omnes procedure the impact of the Agreements and texts would be 
high. The hypothesis that where there are high rates of collective bargaining 
coverage and/or an erga omnes procedure the impact of the Agreements and texts 
will be significant will thus be tested. Conversely, the hypothesis that in those 
countries and sectors where there are low rates of collective bargaining coverage and 
no erga omnes procedure then the impact of the Agreements and texts will be limited 
will be tested. 
 
c) Sectoral variables 
 
The variables that are likely to explain differing substantive implementation effects 
between sectors will now be outlined. 
 
v) Homogeneity of sector 
 
This variable relates to the impact of the Agreement and texts, and concerns the 
homogeneity of the sector in which the Agreements and texts are implemented with 
regard to the range of sectoral economic activities. At the European level, sectors 
with SSDCs that may be considered ‘homogenous’ are inland waterways and private 
security, whereas sectors with SSDCs that may be considered ‘heterogeneous’ are 
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commerce and banking. The hypothesis that will be tested is that in those sectors that 
are ‘homogenous’ the impact of the Agreements and texts will be more significant. 
The converse of this hypothesis will also be tested; that in those sectors that are 
‘heterogeneous’ the impact of the Agreements and texts will be less significant. A 
range of scholars have argued that ‘homogenous’ sectors are better equipped to 
address European-wide issues of concern to them than sectors that exhibit more 
‘heterogeneity’ (Keller and Sorries, 1998; Leisink, 2002; Marginson, 2005). The 
argument that is advanced for this is that ‘homogenous’ sectors face a set of more 
coherent challenges than those sectors that are more ‘heterogeneous’, and that 
subsequently sectors with a ‘homogenous’ range of activities are more likely to 
manage European level output in an ‘effective’ manner. 
 
vi) ‘Europeanization’ of sectoral markets (labour and product markets) 
 
This variable relates to the impact of the Agreements and texts and concerns the 
extent to which sectoral markets are ‘Europeanized’, and involves labour and product 
market dimensions.  
 
1)‘Europeanization’ of sectoral labour markets 
 
With regard to the ‘Europeanization’ of sectoral labour markets, the hypothesis that 
will be tested is that in those sectors where there is a high degree of sectoral labour 
market integration the Agreements and texts will have a significant level of impact. 
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The converse of this hypothesis will also be tested; that in those sectors where there 
is a low degree of sectoral labour market integration the Agreements and texts will 
not have a significant level of impact. Leisink (2002) argued that the existence of 
‘Europeanized’ sectoral labour markets promotes political cooperation between the 
social partners at the European-level (see also Marginson, 2005). The thesis will thus 
examine the extent to which this general principle relates to the impact of the 
Agreements and texts within sectors. 
 
2)‘Europeanization’ of sectoral product markets 
 
With regard to the ‘Europeanization’ of sectoral product markets, the hypothesis that 
will be tested is that in those sectors where there is a high degree of sectoral product 
market integration the Agreements and texts will have a significant level of impact. 
The converse of this hypothesis will also be tested; that in those sectors where there 
is a low degree of sectoral product market integration the Agreements and texts will 
not have a significant level of impact. Precedents for these hypotheses are to be 
found in various parts of in the literature. Kollewe and Kuhlmann (2003), for 
example, argued that when European firms jointly face high cost competition as a 
result of integrated product markets they are more likely to engage in social dialogue. 
Leisink (2002) argued that the existence of ‘Europeanized’ sectoral product markets 
promotes political cooperation between the social partners at the European-level. The 
thesis will thus examine the extent to which these general principles relate to the 
impact of the Agreements and texts within sectors. 
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vii) EU-level pressures for the formation of an SSDC 
   
This variable also concerns the impact of the Agreements and texts and addresses the 
extent to which an EU Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee (SSDC) exists and is 
active within the sector. The hypothesis that will be tested is that in those sectors 
where there is a SSDC that is active then it is likely that the impact of the 
Agreements and texts will be more significant. The converse of this hypothesis, that 
the impact of the Agreements and texts will be less in those sectors where there is not 
an active SSDC, will also be tested. 
 
Several scholars have identified the EU-level pressures that encourage the formation 
of SSDCs. One of the most notable is Leisink (2002), who argued that the existence 
of a common European-level policy in a sector and a set of European-wide common 
challenges in the sector exerted what he called a ‘pull’ pressure on the sector to form 
an SSDC. Keller and Sorries (1998) also argued that Community-wide policies for 
particular sectors encouraged the formation of SSDCs. Kirton-Darling and Clauwaert 
(2003) added that the existence of a common sectoral interest in some European-
level topic encouraged the formation of an SSDC. Given that these authors have 
convincingly identified these factors as ones that facilitate the ‘Europeanization’ of 
industrial relations in these sectors, it will be necessary for to test the extent to which 
these factors increase the level of impact of the Agreements and texts within sectors. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the benchmarks that the thesis will employ to gauge the 
‘effective’ implementation of the Agreements and texts and has also set out the group 
of independent variables, based on the relevant literature, that the thesis will use to 
establish the factors that explain varying levels of effect of the Agreements and texts 
upon different national and sector-specific contexts. The chapter established different 
benchmarks to appraise the ‘effective’ procedural implementation of the 
Agreements, and the ‘effective’ substantive implementation of the Agreements. 
Procedurally, the chapter established that whether the Framework Agreements had 
been implemented ‘on time’ and whether they had been implemented in accordance 
with national ‘procedures and practices’ were suitable benchmarks with which to 
assess ‘effective’ implementation. Substantively, the chapter established that the 
extent to which the Framework Agreements and texts added to the content of 
national and sectoral regulation and were likely to achieve an impact at workplace 
level were suitable benchmarks with which to assess ‘effective’ implementation. 
Having established these benchmarks for ‘effective’ implementation, the thesis will 
now be able to sub-divide the data chapters on the basis of these benchmarks, and 
will also be able to assess in chapters ten and eleven, on the basis of the benchmarks, 
the extent to which the ‘effective’ implementation of the Agreements and texts 
occurred in the countries and sectors that are the subject of the study. 
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The independent variables that the chapter developed to explain diverging 
implementation outcomes were also divided into those pertaining to the procedural 
effects of the Agreements and those pertaining to the substantive effects of the 
Agreements and texts. Procedurally, the chapter identified variables relating to (i) 
culture, (ii) policy, and (iii) institutions that it would be useful to test in terms of the 
extent to which they were likely to lead to ‘effective’ implementation outcomes. 
Substantively, the chapter identified variables relating to (i) policy, (ii) institutions, 
and (iii) the sector concerned that it would be useful to test in terms of the extent to 
which they were likely to lead to ‘effective’ implementation outcomes. Having 
identified these variables, the thesis will now be able to establish, in chapters ten and 
eleven, the extent to which the factors identified explain the differing effects of the 
Agreement and texts in varying national and sectoral contexts. 
 
The identification of the differing variables that potentially explain divergent 
national and sectoral implementation outcomes also necessitates the careful selection 
of sectors and countries for the purposes of the study. Specifically, it is necessary to 
select countries and sectors for study that exhibit to differing degrees the cultural, 
political, institutional and sectoral properties outlined in section three of this chapter. 
Chapter four assumes this task and outlines in detail the rationales for the selection of 
the varying countries and sectors that are studied.  
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Chapter 4: Research Methods and Methodology 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
Having developed the research questions and the analytic means that will be used to 
address them in previous chapters, in this chapter the research methods and 
methodology that the study will employ to answer the research questions will be 
outlined. This will involve establishing the study’s epistemological and ontological 
approaches and how they tie into the goals of the study, before discussing the 
research methods that were selected to conduct the study. Then, the chapter will 
justify the selection of countries and sectors made, before discussing the actual 
process of conducting the fieldwork. Finally, the chapter will discuss the methods 
used to analyze the data collected before offering a conclusion.  
 
4.2 Epistemological and ontological approach 
 
As outlined in chapter two, the study will adopt a multi-level governance theoretical 
approach to the subject of European integration and industrial relations. The adoption 
of the multi-level governance paradigm raises subsequent questions as to the most 
appropriate analytic approach to the study. The approach that will be adopted may be 
described as post-positivist and is consistent with the study’s view of ontology and 
epistemology (Corbetta, 2003). Ontologically, a critical-realist stance is adopted. 
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This implies that social reality is ‘real’, but only in an imperfect and probabilistic 
manner. This position has been viewed as a compromise between a positivism that 
has been regarded as naïve, and a constructionism that has been regarded as overtly 
sceptical (Bhaskar, 1997). Further, it has been employed fruitfully in previous 
industrial relations research (Edwards, 2006). The thesis’ epistemological stance 
stems from its ontological position. In line with the critical realist stance, the position 
is taken that any results collected will be ‘probabilistically true’ and assume that any 
generalizations we will be able to make after concluding our study will be open to 
revision by future scholars (Corbetta, 2003). 
 
The ontological and epistemological approaches also feed into the choice of research 
methods, which will be qualitative rather than quantitative. Whilst a post-positivistic 
analytical framework may make use of quantitative and qualitative methods 
(Corbetta, 2003), qualitative methods have been chosen because the research is 
primarily attempting to appraise a process that is political and organizational. The 
benchmarks developed in chapter three would be difficult to operationalize on the 
basis of quantitative benchmarks. The essentials of the process of the implementation 
of the Framework Agreements and texts will be assessed through the qualitative 
methods of semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis. The bulk of the 
research that has been carried out in our field also employs the qualitative methods 
that will be used. In their study of the implementation of six European social policy 
directives, Falkner et al (2005) primarily utilized semi-structured interviews and 
documentary analysis to carry out their research. Marginson and Sisson’s study of 
European integration and industrial relations also primarily employed qualitative 
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methods to arrive at their conclusions, as do the great majority of other works in the 
field (Keller, 2003; De La Porte and Pochet, 2002). If the study is to build on the 
work done by these scholars, it is important to use similar methods.  
 
4.3 A case study approach 
 
For the purposes of the study, primary field research on the implementation of the 
Agreements and texts was conducted in four countries; Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark and UK. A case study approach to the issue of the implementation of the 
Agreements and texts was therefore adopted. This case study approach was chosen 
for various reasons. Firstly, it is important to note that the choice of case studies as 
research methods reflects the study’s post-positivist analytic approach. Also, the use 
of case studies as a research method are an established way of 'testing' in a deeper 
form generalizations in order to allow for broader application (Whitfield and Strauss, 
2000). Case studies therefore allow the researcher to gain a more profound insight 
into social reality than other methods, and can also, with regard to the cross-national 
research that the study conducts, provide a sophisticated and embedded view of 
existing social realities and national actors' relationships to them.  This endorsement 
of case studies within the literature is also specifically appropriate with regards to the 
study. Firstly, there are other studies that adopt a case study approach to appraise the 
implementation of the Framework Agreements and texts within discrete national 
contexts (Larsen and Andersen, 2007), and it is thus an established method for 
obtaining data on the implementation of the Agreements and texts. Case study 
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research also allows the researcher to employ a range of methods. Thus, the range of 
research methods that the study uses, outlined below will be compatible with a case 
study approach. 
 
Semi-structured interviews will be the primary research method. This is due to the 
fact that semi-structured interviews allow the researcher a more 'in-depth' and 
'interactive' view of social reality than the analysis of documentation, and will 
therefore allow the study  to gain a more powerful insight into the workings of the 
actors involved in the study than a mere analysis of documentation would. However, 
documentary analysis will be used as a secondary research method, and will buttress 
the data collected through the use of semi-structured research interviews. Owing to 
the substantial resources used in organizing and conducting semi-structured research 
interviews, the level of data one can realistically obtain from them is limited. The 
scope of documentary data is greatly broader. Therefore, the analysis of documentary 
data will provide a key source of complementary data to that which we will obtain 
from the semi-structured research interviews. Finally, the study will draw on research 
reports by the European social partners and public authorities on the implementation 
of the Agreements and texts. Three of these have been issued (Visser and Martin, 
2008; European social partners, 2006; 2008) and an analysis of these reports will 
allow access to a broad and rich range of data. 
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4.4 The selection of countries  
 
There were several rationales for the choice of countries that were the subject of the 
study. First, the four countries that were selected represent four types of national 
industrial relations systems that are prevalent across European member states 
(Marginson and Sisson, 2004; Visser, 2008). Due to the absence of sufficient 
resources to conduct in-depth qualitative analysis of the implementation of the 
Framework Agreements and texts within each of the countries in which the 
Agreements and texts were implemented, this approach offered the best way in 
which to gauge the general effects of the Framework Agreements and texts across the 
countries in which they were implemented. Although there are limits to the extent 
that the study may generalize its findings given the high degree of diversity in 
national systems, the selection of four countries with very different systems at least 
provide the study with a decent claim to be able to generalize its findings. Further, 
the countries represent three of the four ‘worlds of compliance’ identified by Falkner 
et al (2005) and Falkner and Treib (2008)  
 
The UK represents the model of an Anglo-Saxon industrial relations system of 
industrial relations and a country in the ‘world of domestic politics’ (Falkner et al, 
2005). Within the UK, levels of social and employment protection are relatively low 
compared to other Western European countries, collective negotiations are largely 
conducted at the firm or plant level, and there is very little coordination between 
levels of collective bargaining. The UK is also a model of the type of Liberal Market 
  
109
Economy (LME) that is widely discussed in the debate about varieties of capitalism 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). In those countries in which the Agreements and texts were 
implemented, Ireland closely resembles the UK. The case of the implementation of 
the Agreements and texts in the UK is also likely to offer crucial clues about the 
relationship between European-level 'soft' law and states that exhibit LME style 
characteristics. 
 
Denmark was selected as the model of a Nordic voluntarist-corporatist state, is a 
model of the type of Coordinated Market Economy (CME) that is widely discussed 
in the debate about varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001), and is grouped 
in the ‘world of compliance’ (Falkner et al, 2005). Within Denmark, there are very 
high levels of trade union and employer association density, collective negotiations 
between the Social Partners are conducted mainly at the sectoral level, there are very 
well established links between levels of social dialogue, and there are advanced 
levels of social and employment protection. Other countries in which the Agreements 
and texts were implemented that resemble Denmark closely are Norway, Sweden, 
and Finland.  
 
Belgium was selected as it represents a Western European country in which the erga 
omnes procedure is used extensively to regulate employment relations and is grouped 
in the ‘world of domestic politics’ (Falkner et al, 2005). Within Belgium, collective 
agreements concluded at the inter-sectoral level are also implemented via a legally-
binding erga omnes procedure. The case of Belgium represents that of countries such 
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as France, Spain, and Portugal where erga omnes mechanisms are also used 
extensively to regulate employment relations. 
 
The Czech Republic was selected to represent the model of the type of system 
prevalent in Visegrad countries and is grouped in the ‘world of dead letters’ (Falkner 
and Treib, 2008). Within Czech Republic, a national labour code is used extensively 
to regulate employment relations, levels of trade union and employer association 
density are low, collective negotiations between the social partners take place pre-
dominantly at the enterprise and firm level, and there is little social dialogue at the 
sectoral or inter-sectoral levels. Many topics of regulatory concern at the European 
level are also 'new' within the Czech regulatory context. Although there is some 
diversity within Visegrad countries, the above conditions are generally present within 
these countries, and the case of the implementations of the Agreements in the Czech 
Republic is thus likely to be representative of the effect of the Agreements and texts 
within these countries.     
 
The choice of countries was also informed by more practical considerations. Firstly, 
owing to the fact that the researcher's native language is English and that the 
researcher was based in the UK for the duration of the project, the selection of the 
UK as one of the countries was a somewhat obvious choice given the proximity of 
the social partner organizations and the use of the English language by the UK social 
partners. Practical reasons also facilitated the choices of Denmark and Belgium. 
Firstly, the researcher had existing contacts within the two states through his 
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participation in the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions' network of correspondents, and was provided with office space 
at the University of Copenhagen and Université Catholique de Louvain for the 
duration of the fieldwork within the two countries. The fact that the majority of 
officials within the Danish and Belgian social partner organizations also speak 
English also lay behind the choice of the countries.  
 
The researcher was unable to include in his country sample states from the Baltic, 
Mediterranean and Germanic variants of industrial relations systems. Owing to time 
and financial restraints, conducting research in more than four countries would have 
been unfeasible. 
 
4.5 The selection of sectors 
 
The selection of the local Government and banking sectors was inspired by analytic 
and practical rationales. Analytically, the selection of these sectors allow the study to 
appraise the effects of the Framework Agreements and texts within public and 
private sector contexts in European member states. The two sectors also illustrate 
very different degrees of Europeanization. In the case of the local Government 
sector, organizations within the sector are based solely within individual member 
states. In the case of the banking sector, the sector is highly internationalized and 
many firms operate in several member states. As a result of these differing degrees of 
Europeanization, gauging the effects of the Agreements and texts within the two 
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sectoral contexts will allow the study to gain clues of more general analytic relevance 
about the development of sectoral systems of industrial relations with regard to their 
relationship with European 'soft' law.  
 
The choice of the two sectors was also informed by more practical considerations. 
Access to interviewees was, for example, readily available within the two sectors in 
Belgium, UK, and Denmark. Owing to the under-developed nature of sectoral social 
dialogue within Czech Republic, a study of the two sectors in the Czech context was 
not deemed viable and was therefore not conducted. The disadvantages of not 
selecting certain sectors should also be outlined. The selection of a sector that acts as 
a ‘pattern setter’ for others (e.g. manufacturing) or a sector with great European 
cross-border mobility (e.g. construction or air transport) would have added further 
richness to the study. However, owing to the existence of time and financial 
constraints studying the implementation of the Agreements and texts in more than 
two sectors was not viable. 
 
4.6 Conducting the research 
 
The field research for the study was conducted between September 2006 and January 
2008. In all, 42 semi-structured interviews were conducted. Three ‘core’ case studies 
were adopted for the purpose of the study; Belgium, Denmark, and UK. Given 
restrictions on resources Czech Republic represents a supplementary case. Appendix 
A provides details on the organizations interviewed. 
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Access for the interviews was gained through a variety of means. Access to officials 
for the set of interviews at the European level was achieved through contacts that the 
researcher had gained during a previous project. In the UK, the researcher used a 
combination of contacts possessed by his supervisor and through contacts at the 
European-level to arrange interviews with the relevant officials within the UK. In 
Denmark, the researcher had prior contact with a team of researchers at the 
University of Copenhagen that had been gained through the researcher's participation 
in the network of correspondents for the European Foundation for the Improvement 
of Living and Working Conditions. This team of Danish researchers was able to 
arrange for the researcher to have access to the relevant officials within Denmark. 
The researcher was then based for three months at the University of Copenhagen in 
which time the interviews with Danish officials were conducted. Contact with 
officials in Belgium and Czech Republic was achieved through similar means. 
Through membership of the European Foundation's network of correspondents, the 
researcher was able to arrange for the Belgian and Czech correspondents to provide 
information on the most suitable officials to interview in Belgium and Czech 
Republic. The researcher was based for three weeks at Université Catholique de 
Louvain in Belgium in which time the interviews with Belgian officials were 
conducted. As appendix A illustrates, some extra interviews were conducted by 
telephone with officials in Belgium, Denmark, and UK where it was more 
convenient for the researcher to conduct the research by this means. 
 
 The researcher conducted the interviews with the Czech social partner officials at a 
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conference in Dublin in which the researchers and the officials had planned to be 
present at. An attempt was made to conduct field research in Prague but due to 
resource problems it was more convenient to conduct this aspect of the research in 
Dublin. Through these contacts, the researcher was able to obtain quite systematic 
access across countries and sectors. The exceptions were at the sectoral level in the 
Czech Republic (where the lack of development of sectoral social dialogue meant 
that the researcher was unable to identify appropriate organizations to interview), the 
employer side in the Belgian local Government sector, and the employer side in the 
UK banking sector. The researcher was unable to obtain access in these instances due 
to logistical problems. Also due to these problems, research was not conducted on 
the implementation of the Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning in Belgium or 
on the implementation of the Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning and Joint 
Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the European Banking sector in Czech Republic. 
 
The interviews that were conducted were designed in a semi-structured format. This 
was in accordance with the researcher's analytic views that were set out above. The 
average interview that was conducted by the researcher took one hour and concerned 
procedural and substantive aspects of the implementation of the Agreements and 
texts and the constitution for national ‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue 
in the countries in question. All the interviews were recorded, and were fully 
transcribed by the researcher after they were conducted. With regards to the design 
of the interviews, an initial draft was agreed upon by the researcher and his 
supervisor. This draft was used in the first interviews that were conducted, and was 
then modified slightly on the basis of the experience of the researcher and the 
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feedback of interviewees. Although the basic format of the interview remained the 
same in all of the countries and sectors in which the interviews were conducted, 
some of the questions were altered to fit differing national and sectoral contexts. As 
is normal with semi-structured research interviews, the researcher also posed ad hoc 
questions to interviewees that were formulated on the basis of the response of the 
interviewees to the set questions.  
 
The documents that were analyzed by the researcher were collected through a variety 
of means. Some, for example, were given to the researcher by the social partner 
officials whom he interviewed. Others were publicly available via organizations such 
as ETUC, Business Europe and the European Commission. 
 
4.7 Data Analysis 
 
As is noted within the literature, the robust analysis of data is also a crucial part of a 
research project. The method used to analyze the interview and documentary data 
collected by the study was through the data analysis software package Nvivo. The 
use of this package is consistent with the epistemological and ontological basis of our 
study, and is also used extensively by other qualitative researchers within our field. 
Further, the manner in which Nvivo critically filters empirical data in line with the 
researcher’s preferences is consistent with the choice of critical-realism as an 
ontological stance.  
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After the data from the interviews was transcribed, this data, along with documentary 
data, was input into Nvivo. The interview and documentary data was integrated with 
one another, and no distinction was made between the two forms of data for the 
purpose of the data analysis. In the limited instances were there appeared to be 
conflicts in the data, the researcher critically assessed which data source was more 
likely to be accurate on the basis of the source of the data and other evidence 
available. The research reports that were used in the course of the study (Visser and 
Martin, 2008; European social partners, 2006; 2008) were not input into Nvivo. This 
was due to the fact that they were authored by other researchers, and were thus not 
primary data in the way that the data from the semi-structured interviews and social 
partner and public authority documents were. Then, data 'categories' or 'nodes' were 
created that were consistent with the aims of the research. These ‘nodes’ separated, 
on a country by country and sector by sector basis, data pertaining to procedural and 
substantive aspects of the implementation of the Agreements and texts and the issue 
of national ‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue. Thus, the researcher was 
able to assess easily the data obtained for each of the Agreements, texts, countries, 
and sectors that were the subject of the study. This then allowed the researcher to 
methodically and impartially present the data collected in chapters five to nine of the 
thesis, and to arrive at judgments as considered as possible in chapters ten to twelve.   
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4.8 Conclusion 
 
In summary, a 'post-positivistic' analytic view was employed by the researcher for 
the purposes of the study that in turn fed into the researcher's epistemological and 
ontological views. A qualitative research methodology was adopted by the researcher 
for the study. This qualitative research methodology used semi-structured interviews 
and documentary analysis for research methods, and adopted a case-study approach 
for the purposes of the fieldwork. Case studies of the implementation of the 
Agreements and texts were conducted in four countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, and UK), and two sectors within the four countries (local Government and 
banking). The four countries were selected because they are representative several 
main forms of industrial relations regimes found amongst European member states, 
whilst the two sectors were selected because they exhibit differing degrees of 
'Europeanization'. Access to the relevant officials within the countries and sectors 
was largely achieved via prior contacts possessed by the researcher. After the 
fieldwork was conducted, the interviews were transcribed and the data analyzed 
using the data analysis software package Nvivo.  
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Chapter 5: The European-level: perspectives and monitoring activities 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The following chapter outlines the data collected at the European-level of industrial 
relations in the course of the fieldwork and also draws on social partner and 
European Commission reports on the implementation of the Agreements and texts. 
The chapter fulfills four main functions in relation to the main objectives of the 
thesis. Firstly (i), it outlines the details of the Framework Agreements on Telework 
and Work-related Stress and the interpretations of the European social partners with 
regard to the national 'procedures and practices' implementation clause. Secondly (ii), 
it sets out the details of the monitoring exercises that were conducted by the 
European social partners and European public authorities to appraise the 
implementations of the Agreements and Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning 
and the results of these monitoring exercises. Thirdly (iii), it establishes the variety of 
means by which the Agreements and Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning 
were implemented across European member states. Finally (iv), it outlines why the 
four countries selected for further research allow for generalization with regard to the 
applicability of findings. 
 
5.2 Benchmarking the implementation of the Framework Agreements   
 
The Telework Agreement was concluded by the European Social Partner 
organizations CEEP, UEAPME, UNICE and ETUC on May 23 2002 and formally 
signed on 16 July 2002. The Work-related Stress Agreement was concluded by the 
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same parties on 8 October 2004. The Telework Agreement contained the following 
clauses:  
 
(2) A specification of the definition and scope of teleworking 
(3) The voluntary nature of teleworking 
(4) The right of teleworkers to the same employment conditions as normal workers 
(5) Data protection issues 
(6) The right of teleworkers to privacy 
(7) The issue of the provision and maintenance of teleworking equipment 
(8) The health and safety of teleworkers 
(9) The organization of teleworkers' workload 
(10) The right of teleworkers to training 
(11) The inclusion of teleworkers in the terms of collective agreements applicable to 
'normal' workers 
 
The Work-related Stress Agreement contained the following clauses:  
 
(2) A statement outlining the Agreement's aim to draw attention to the issue of work-
related stress 
(3) A description of work-related stress 
(4) How to identify the problem of work-related stress 
(5) The responsibility of both managers and workers to manage work-related stress 
(6) The identification of potential measures to prevent, eliminate, or reduce work-
related stress  
 
  
120
The subject of the most appropriate benchmarks with which to gauge national 
implementation outcomes divided the European social partners. The official position 
of ETUC was that national implementation outcomes should be assessed on the basis 
of whether they accorded with established national 'procedures and practices' for 
social dialogue. An ETUC official outlined the position of the organization,  
 
'What ETUC consider to constitute the correct implementation of these forms of 
Agreements is, firstly, the use of the normal initial social partner procedures to 
implement the Agreements and then, secondly, the use of the normal policy 
instrument to implement the results of these procedures. So, if national 'procedures 
and practices' in one country are a collective agreement that then receives legal 
backing that is how we would expect the Agreements to be implemented... we would 
consider implementation routes that deviated from the 'normal' routes to be 
incorrect.'  (ETUC) 
 
It was also emphasized that ETUC did not view the Agreements as voluntary 
instruments. The official added,  
 
'Our position is clear; the only voluntary thing about the Agreements was entry into 
the negotiations. Once the Agreements had been signed they became contractually 
binding, although not legally binding, as are other labour and commercial contracts 
across Europe. Parties are bound to implement these contracts and the non-legally 
binding nature of the Agreements should not be used as an escape route.'  (ETUC) 
 
The official positions of the European employers' associations Business Europe and 
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UEAPME differed from ETUC concerning their interpretation of the national 
‘procedures and practices’ implementation clause. Three arguments against ETUC’s 
interpretation of national ‘procedures and practices’ were advanced. Firstly, it was 
stressed that national social partners should not be burdened with too onerous 
obligations. Secondly, it was emphasized that national social partners were in the 
best position to select the appropriate policy tool for the implementation of the 
Agreements. Finally, it was stressed that all of the implementations that had been 
affected for the Telework Agreement had been jointly agreed by national social 
partners. A UEAPME official stated,   
 
'It's not our task to judge whether different national implementations are good or 
bad. We have to respect the principle of the autonomy of national social partners, 
and can't just insist at the European-level that implementations are affected in a 
certain manner. National social partners are in the best position to judge what they 
have already in terms of legislation and collective agreements and we can't create 
good pupils and bad pupils out of our affiliates.'  (UEAPME) 
A Business Europe official stated, 
‘All of the implementations of the Agreements were jointly agreed by national social 
partners. Therefore, Business Europe doesn’t see how actors at the European-level 
can inform national social partners that they have not implemented the Agreements 
correctly.’ (Business Europe) 
 
The European Commission assumed a stance between those adopted by ETUC and 
Business Europe and UEAPME. A Commission official stated that although the 
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Commission recognized that the Agreements were to be implemented in accordance 
with national 'procedures and practices' it was important to allow scope for national 
flexibility and also to recognize that national 'procedures and practices' for social 
dialogue themselves evolved.   
 
The European social partners and European Commission were also unanimous in 
considering Frameworks of Actions as differing tools to the Framework Agreements. 
An ETUC official stated,  
 
'The Frameworks of Actions are different instruments. These are more OMC style 
instruments that are about defining and organizing a set of priorities at the European 
and national level rather than Agreements that must be implemented nationally. 
Also, the Frameworks of Actions do not have a legal status in the Social Protocol.' 
(ETUC) 
 
5.3 Monitoring implementation outcomes: the activities of the European social 
partners and European public authorities   
 
The European social partners undertook two major joint exercises to monitor the 
implementation of the Framework Agreements on Telework and Work-related 
Stress. These exercises involved obtaining joint reports from the national affiliates of 
the European social partners and then publishing overview reports. The report on the 
implementation of the Telework Agreement was published in 2006, whilst the report 
on the implementation of the Work-related Stress Agreement was published in 2008. 
These exercises concerned themselves with the procedural implementation of the 
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Agreements and the extent to which the Agreements had added to levels of 
employment regulation in member states. Further, an evaluation of the substantive 
effect of the Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning in member states was 
published in 2006. As a result of concerns that the Telework Agreement had not been 
implemented sufficiently in member states, the European Commission also 
conducted a monitoring exercise to appraise national implementations of the 
Agreements. This was conducted by the Dutch academic Jelle Visser and published 
in January 2008. 
 
5.3.1 European social partner reports: procedural results  
 
Table 5.1: National implementations of Telework Agreement according to 
European social partner report 
Implementation method Country 
  
Social Partner Agreements Finland, Spain, Latvia, Netherlands, 
Germany Sweden, Norway, Poland, 
Austria 
National, sectoral and company 
collective agreements 
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Greece, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, 
Standard company and sector agreement 
models 
Germany 
Guides and codes of good practices UK, Ireland, Norway, Latvia 
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Implementation through national 
legislation 
Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, 
Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg, UK 
Other tripartite activities Latvia, UK, Malta 
 
The European social partner report on the implementation of the Telework 
Agreement classified the procedural forms in which the Telework Agreement had 
been implemented in the member states on the basis of six groupings. Some 
countries were included in two or more of the groupings. Table one charts how the 
report grouped the various implementations that were affected.  Firstly (i), the report 
described ‘social partner’ agreements that had been concluded. These were defined 
as ‘general social partner agreement which does not have the same legal status as a 
collective agreement’. As table one demonstrates, this form of implementation 
outcome occurred across European member states and was not confined to one sort 
of European system. Secondly (ii), the report identified ‘national, sectoral and 
company level collective agreements’. As table 1 shows, this form of implementation 
was confined to old member states (with the exception of Iceland). In many of these 
countries, a social partner collective agreement implementing the Agreement was 
given subsequent erga omnes effect, and the terms of the European Agreement 
entered national law. Third (iii), the report outlined ‘standard company and sector 
agreement models’. Germany was the only country included in this bracketing, and 
‘standard company and sector agreement models’ were taken to mean unilateral or 
join social partner ‘models of collective agreement for use in bargaining at sector, 
company, and/or establishment level’. Fourth (iv), the report identified non-legally 
binding ‘guidelines and good practices’. Two of the four countries included in this 
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bracketing were UK and Ireland, the two EU countries that are commonly described 
as Liberal Market Economy (LME) (Hall and Soskice, 2001) countries. Fifth, the 
report identified ‘implementation through national legislation’.  As table one 
demonstrates, many of the countries that chose this implementation route were those 
that acceded to the European Union after 2004. The definition of national legislation 
was very broad however, and included a country such as the UK by virtue of the fact 
that a measure was included in the 2003 UK budget, unrelated to the European 
Agreement, that impart upon employers the obligation to pay for some of the costs 
incurred by employees who work at home.  Finally, the report identified ‘other 
tripartite activities’. This grouping included ‘soft’ activities that national social 
partner organizations engaged in with national public authorities on teleworking. 
Table 5.2: National implementations of Work-related Stress Agreement 
according to European social partner report 
Implementation method Country 
  
Social Partner Agreements Sweden, Austria, Spain, Finland, Latvia, 
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Poland, Spain, 
Hungary, Slovenia 
National, sectoral and company 
collective agreements 
Belgium, Iceland, Romania, Denmark, 
Netherlands, France, Sweden, Norway, 
Hungary, Spain, Slovak Republic, 
Germany, Portugal 
Implementation through national Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Czech 
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legislation Republic, Latvia, Poland, Hungary, 
Slovak Republic 
Tripartite activities Slovenia, UK, Hungary, Luxembourg, 
Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal 
Complementary activities Portugal, Germany, Austria, Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway, Netherlands 
 
The European social partner report on the implementation of the Work-related Stress 
Agreement classified the procedural forms in which the Work-related Stress 
Agreement had been implemented in the member states on the basis of five 
groupings. Table two charts how the report grouped the various implementations that 
were affected.  Firstly (i), ‘social partner agreements’ that varied ‘in their legal status 
and differ in terms of their obligations upon the signatory parties’ were identified by 
the report. As was the case with the report on the Telework Agreement, the report on 
the Work-related Stress demonstrated that these forms of implementations had been 
affected in a cross-section of European countries. Secondly (ii), the report described 
‘national, sectoral and company level collective agreements’.  The report noted that 
‘collective agreements specifically on work-related stress have not been a common 
method of implementation’. Although there were instances of collective agreements 
in new member states, it was mainly in old member states that collective agreements 
were concluded to implement the Work-related Stress Agreement. This is 
demonstrated in table two. Thirdly (iii), the report classified ‘implementation through 
national legislation’.  In most cases, as the report states, national legislation actually 
preempted the content of the European Agreement and implementation took place in 
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a de facto form.  This occurred in both new and old member states. The report also 
lists (iv) instances of implementation that are described as ‘tripartite activities’. 
These tripartite activities were mainly ‘soft’ in scope, and involved the social 
partners and national authorities in the countries concerned. Finally (iv), a set of tools 
described as ‘complementary activites’ were listed. These were essentially ad hoc 
measures taken by national social partners to attempt to tackle the problem of work-
related stress. 
 
5.3.2 The European Commission’s monitoring activities 
 
The Visser report for the European Commission monitored both the procedural and 
substantive implementation of the Telework Agreement. On the procedural side, the 
report outlined on a country by country basis the actions that had been taken by 
national social partner organizations to implement the European Agreement. Nine 
forms of procedural implementation outcomes were identified. 
(1) Joint guidelines, recommendations, model agreements 
(2) Autonomous national agreement 
(3) Separate guidelines , model agreements by one of the social partners 
(4) Collective agreements (sector, company, establishment, staff or works 
agreements) 
(5) National agreement turned into law 
(6) Law preceded by joint consultation 
(7) Special legislation, not based on consultation or agreement 
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(8) Implementation process not yet completed 
(9) Other, unknown, no final report to European social partners on 
implementation 
 
Visser’s appraisal of the implementation of the Agreement was largely positive. It 
was asserted that in the majority of cases national ‘procedures and practices’ for 
social dialogue had indeed been followed during the implementation process. Three 
discrete ‘clusters’ of implementation outcomes were identified by Visser. Firstly, 
there were those countries in which guidelines and agreements were primarily used 
to implement the Agreement. These countries were identified as ‘Scandinavia, the 
British Isles, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria… Italy and Spain’. A second 
cluster of countries was identified in which legal instruments, following 
consultations with or collective agreement by national social partners, were used to 
implement the Agreement. These countries were identified as ‘Belgium, 
Luxembourg, France, Greece, Portugal, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia, possibly also Slovenia’. It was also stated that in some cases there was an 
overlap between the two clusters, as the use of a collective bargaining tool and a 
legal instrument were not mutually exclusive. Overlap was deemed to have occurred 
in ‘Belgium, France, Greece and, possibly Spain and Italy’. Finally, a cluster of 
countries was identified in which implementations of the Agreement had not been 
affected or completed as of 2007. These countries were identified as ‘the three Baltic 
States, Malta and Cyprus, and Bulgaria and Romania’. 
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5.3.3 European social partner substantive findings 
 
The European social partners also monitored the substantive impact of the 
Agreements and texts upon systems of regulation in member states.  In addition to 
outlining the procedural form in which the Agreement was implemented, the 
European social partner report on the implementation of the Telework Agreement 
described, on a clause by clause basis, the ways in which the implementation of the 
clauses of the European Agreement had contributed to levels of employment 
regulation in member states.  The clauses regulating the voluntary nature of 
teleworking and the provision of equipment of teleworkers achieved a particular 
impact within member states according to the report.  The former clause contributed 
to levels of substantive regulation in old and new member states alike, and in France, 
Luxembourg, Poland and Belgium social partners elaborated upon the terms of this 
clause. In the case of the clause regarding the provision of equipment to teleworkers, 
in some contexts (German public sector, Belgian private sector) the report outlined 
that implementations had been affected that imposed all of the duties regarding the 
provision, installation and maintenance of teleworking equipment upon employers. 
In other contexts (France, Ireland, Poland, Luxembourg) duties in this regard were 
shared between employer and employee.  
 
The European social partner report on the implementation of the Work-related Stress 
Agreement also outlined the substantive impact of this Agreement. In this instance it 
was stated that the existence of large bodies of prior regulation on health safety and 
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work-related stress in member states implied that the Agreement had mostly 
triggered ‘fine-tuning existing regulations,… raising awareness of the European 
Agreement at national, sectoral and company levels… [and] elaborating and 
providing concrete and targeted measures and tools to help employers, workers and 
their representatives to tackle work-related stress at the work floor level… rather 
than the creation of new legislation and/or collective agreements’ (ETUC et al 2008, 
p.33). However, it was noted that the implementation of the Agreement in member 
states had been successful in that it had triggered the development of many new tools 
to help combat work-related stress and that it had led to a growing awareness of the 
role management should play in tackling work-related stress. 
 
The European social partner evaluation report of the Framework of Actions on 
Lifelong Learning outlined the work national social partner organizations had carried 
out on the four clauses of the European text. Although the report did not engage in a 
discussion regarding the extent to which the measures listed had been specifically 
precipitated by the European text, it was emphasized that it was evident that national 
social partner organizations had ‘intensively debated the issue of competence 
development’.  Specifically, the report stated that the text had directly triggered 7 
examples of ‘creating or reforming forums to discuss national labour market and 
education policies with public authorities’, 5 examples of ‘launching or relaunching 
national social dialogue on lifelong learning’, 4 examples of ‘organising European 
events to share good practices with social partners from other Member States’, and 
had produced ‘joint translation and dissemination of the European text’ in almost all 
European countries. 
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5.3.4 The European Commission’s substantive findings 
 
An appraisal of the substantive effect of the Telework Agreement was also 
conducted by the Visser report. This involved assessing the eleven clauses of the 
Telework Agreement and establishing the effect they had achieved in national 
regulatory contexts. Although it was stated that guaranteeing the coverage of all 
workers via the Telework Agreement was highly unlikely given the non-legally 
binding nature of the Agreement and the differing rates of trade union and employer 
association membership density within European member states, cautious optimism 
was nevertheless expressed concerning the extent to which the implementation of the 
Agreement had improved levels of employment protection for teleworkers across 
Europe. The argument was made that given that teleworking is a form of work that 
‘normal’ workers engage in on an often part-time basis then it was a topic suitable 
for regulation via a non-legally binding framework agreement. Further, it was 
contended that the status of teleworking as a mostly ‘non-distributive’ issue made it 
most suitable for the development of social dialogue in those countries where the 
social dialogue was emerging. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
As has been outlined and as tables 1 and 2 demonstrate, a range of policy tools were 
used to implement the Framework Agreements within European member states. The 
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selection of the four countries that are the subject of study in the following chapters 
represents this diversity. Belgium represents a country which uses the erga omnes 
principle to regulate industrial relations, where collective negotiations are 
centralized, and in which the Telework Agreement was implemented via the law and 
the Work-related Stress Agreement was implemented on a de facto basis. Countries 
that are similar to Belgium in terms of industrial relations system and the tools used 
to implement the Agreements are France, Italy and Spain.  Denmark represents a 
Scandinavian system in which levels of trade union density are high, collective 
negotiations are conducted largely at the sectoral level, and the Framework 
Agreements were implemented primarily via sectoral collective agreements.  Certain 
central European countries such as Germany also resemble Denmark in that the 
sector is the primary level at which collective negotiations take place and the 
European Agreements were primarily implemented via collective agreement.  The 
UK represents a liberal system of industrial relations (Hall and Soskice, 2001) in 
which levels of collective negotiations are de-centralized, and the Framework 
Agreements were implemented via non-legally binding guidelines. A country that is 
similar to UK in terms of industrial relations system and the tools used to implement 
the Agreements is Ireland. The UK’s status as a key Liberal Market Economy 
according to Hall and Soskice’s typology also ensures that the potential effects of the 
Agreements and texts upon LME style countries will become apparent.  The Czech 
Republic represents a new member state system in which the Framework 
Agreements were implemented via legal mechanisms. Countries that are similar to 
Czech Republic in terms of industrial relations system and the tools used to 
implement the Agreements include Hungary and Poland. 
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Chapter 6: Implementation in Belgium 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will present the data collected in the course of the fieldwork in Belgium. 
The chapter will open with (i) a brief description of the system of industrial relations 
in Belgium, a description of the key actors, and its record with regard to the 
implementation of the European social partner Framework Agreements of the 1990s 
and European Social Policy more generally. Then, the chapter will (ii) describe the 
process of the procedural implementations of the Agreements in Belgium and the 
related issue of actors’ reading of national ‘procedures and practices’ in the context 
of the Belgian system. Here, it emerged that the procedural implementations that the 
Agreements were subject to differed greatly on the basis of the level of pre-existing 
regulation on teleworking and work-related stress in Belgium, and also that there was 
little debate on the constitution of national ‘procedures and practices’ for social 
dialogue in Belgium. Then, the chapter will (iii) set out the data collected on the 
substantive impact of the Agreements in Belgium. Here, it emerged that the impact 
of the Telework Agreement appears to have been more considerable than that of the 
Work-related Stress Agreement, even though there were several social and cultural 
factors that were likely to have quite steeply precluded the impact of the Telework 
Agreement in Belgium. Finally, the chapter will (iv) analyze the impact achieved by 
the Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the Banking Sector in Belgium. Here, 
it emerged that although the text inspired no specific policy activity, it had some 
coordinating influence upon the work of the Belgian banking sector social partners in 
the field of lifelong learning policy and also led to significant indirect effects.  
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6.1.1 Industrial Relations in Belgium 
 
The Belgian system of industrial relations is characterized by relatively high rates of 
trade union and employment association density, a relatively centralized wage setting 
system in which collective bargaining coverage is close to 100%, and a 'pyramid' of 
negotiating levels in which collective agreements are concluded on a framework 
basis at the national inter-sectoral level and then implemented and supplemented for 
sector and firm specific contexts by actors at lower levels (Arcq et al, 2010). In 
recent years, the sector level has increased in importance and substantial negotiations 
between the Belgian social partners occur at this level that complement negotiations 
at the inter-sectoral level. In recent decades, the Belgian Government has intervened 
to a greater degree in private sector actors' negotiations in order to preserve the 
competitiveness of firms, and the lower levels of negotiations have also become 
more important. However, the Belgian model of industrial relations is still a very 
centralized and organized one when compared to other European countries. The key 
forum in which national private inter-sectoral industrial relations is conducted is the 
National Labour Council (NLC). The NLC consists of twenty-four seats that are 
representative of the Belgian social partner organizations, and possesses the mandate 
to conclude collective agreements on wages and other topics related to the 
employment relationship that are applicable to the whole of the Belgian private 
sector. These agreements are then made legally binding by virtue of royal decree. 
Generally speaking, a NLC Agreement followed by a royal decree would be 
considered as national ‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue in the private-
sector in Belgium. In the Belgian public sector, a parallel system of collective 
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negotiations exists in which agreements are reached at the national, regional and 
local levels. A federal-level General Committee is established in which agreements 
may be concluded that apply to the Belgian public sector as a whole and is chaired 
by the Belgian Prime Minister. 
 
On the trade union side, there are three main trade union organizations in Belgium 
that are also divided along political, religious, and social lines. Firstly, there is the 
Catholic trade union, ACV-CSC that is the largest in Belgium, and has a membership 
of approximately 1.7 million and six seats on the NLC. Then, there is the socialist 
trade union, ABVV-FGTB, that has a membership of approximately 1.4 million and 
six seats on the NLC. Finally, there is the liberal trade union ACLVB-CGSLB. This 
union is the smallest of the three and has approximately 260,000 members and one 
seat on the NLC. 
 
On the employer side, the main employer body is FEB-VBO. FEB-VBO represents 
30,000 firms and has eight seats on the NLC. There is also UCM-Unizo, a Flemish 
organization for SMEs that represents 82,000 small and medium sized firms and has 
3 seats on the NLC. The smaller employers organizations FWA-Boerenbond, 
representing employers in the agricultural sector and CSPO/CENM, representing 
employers in the health-care, socio-cultural and educational sectors also have a seat 
each on the NLC. 
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6.1.2 The Belgian system and European social policy 
 
In Belgium the three Directive backed European social partner Framework 
Agreements of the 1990s were implemented by Government laws and their 
implementations were also not subject to substantial delays in implementation 
(Falkner et al, 2005). Further, there were no major political debates that surrounded 
their implementation within Belgium. This is possibly due to the fact that much of 
the content of the Directives was present within Belgian regulation prior to their 
implementation. 
 
6.2 The Procedural Implementations of the Telework and Work-related Stress 
Agreements in Belgium 
 
This section of the chapter will address the procedural implementation of the 
Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements. Also, it will address the related issue 
of actors’ interpretations of national ‘procedures and practices’ in the Belgian 
context. Given the differing regimes of industrial relations in the private and public 
sectors, the section will distinguish between the private and public sector procedural 
implementations of the Agreements in Belgium. 
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6.2.1 The Telework Agreement 
 
Private-sector 
 
The European Telework Agreement was implemented in Belgium as NLC collective 
agreement number 85 in November 2005. Shortly after the conclusion of the 
European Agreement in 2002, a debate was conducted between the Belgian social 
partners on the most appropriate means by which the Agreement should be 
implemented in Belgium. FEB/VBO argued that given that the European Agreement 
did not have legally binding status at the European-level then it would be most 
appropriate to implement the Agreement via non-legally binding guidelines in 
Belgium. The rationale of FEB/VBO in proposing such a route was to minimize the 
level of extra regulation upon Belgian employers. Furthermore, FEB/VBO were 
concerned that Belgium would be one of the only European states in which the 
Agreement had been implemented via legally binding means and did not wish the 
country to assume such a status. Belgian trade unions opposed FEB/VBO’s advocacy 
of such an implementation route. Belgian trade unions advocated implementation of 
the European Agreement via a NLC collective agreement. The grounds of the unions 
in advocating such a route lay in their desire to afford teleworkers the maximum 
level of employment protection, and also in the belief that national ‘procedures and 
practices’ for the implementation of the Agreement in Belgium should consist of an 
NLC collective agreement. The Belgian Government did not assume a position on 
the debate. Their stance was that the Agreement had been signed by the Belgian 
social partners at the European level, and that its implementation was thus a matter 
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for the Belgian social partners. An FGTB official explained what happened 
subsequently. 
 
‘After the Belgian employers refused to implement the Agreement as an NLC 
agreement because they viewed it as non-legally binding guidelines, discussions 
stalled for months. However, at the national inter-sectoral level in Belgium issues 
are always inter-related, and there is normally a lot of horse-trading. In this 
instance, they agreed to implement the Telework Agreement as an NLC agreement, 
because we made it a precondition on engaging in discussions on another unrelated 
topic.’ (FGTB) 
 
According to a CGSLB official, FEB/VBO also became more willing to accept 
implementation via a NLC agreement after ‘benchmarking’ implementation 
outcomes in other states and seeing that the Telework Agreement was being 
implemented in legally binding forms in many other countries. 
 
The content of the NLC Agreement to implement the Telework Agreement mirrored 
the content and wording of the European Agreement in areas such as the definition of 
teleworking, its voluntary character, the health and safety of teleworkers, data 
protection, training and career development, and the collective rights of teleworkers. 
The NLC Agreement also went further than the European Agreement in certain 
areas. In that the Belgian Agreement required a detailed written agreement between 
teleworker and employer, specifically excluded work in employers’ satellite offices 
from the definition of teleworking, and detailed how the costs of teleworking should 
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be calculated, it surpassed the content of the European Agreement (Visser and 
Martin, 2008). The two sides of industry had specific concerns related to the practice 
of teleworking in the course of the negotiations. The issues that troubled Belgian 
trade unions concerned maintaining the revocable nature of teleworking 
arrangements between employees and employers, ensuring that teleworkers were 
treated in the same manner as ‘normal’ workers working at the site of the 
teleworker’s employer, upholding the health and safety conditions in which 
teleworking was practiced, and controlling the costs of teleworking. The fear of 
Belgian trade unions in these regards was that workers would be coerced into 
teleworking against their wills, that teleworkers would become isolated from workers 
engaged at the employers’ sites and would potentially be deprived of key collective 
rights, that teleworkers would suffer from inferior health and safety conditions, and 
that teleworkers would bear a disproportionate element of the costs of teleworking. 
Representatives from the Belgian trade unions stated however that the Agreement 
had been concluded in such a way as to assuage these concerns. On the employer 
side, Belgian employers were particularly afraid of losing the ability to monitor 
workers engaged in teleworking, and had fears about the costs that teleworking was 
likely to entail for employers. 
 
The 2005 NLC Agreement also triggered a change in Belgian labour law. An act 
passed by the Belgian Government in July 2006 amended the pre-existing 1996 law 
on homeworking to ensure that workers covered by the Telework Agreement were 
no longer covered by the 1996 law and classified as homeworkers. This revision 
stemmed from concerns within the Belgian trade union movement that classifying 
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teleworkers as homeworkers would lead to them being treated in a different way to 
normal workers. An FGTB official stated, 
 
‘In Belgium we have a system where homeworkers are not subject to the same 
working time regulations as normal workers. But the law that exists about 
homeworking is an older act for workers who are engaged in piece-working. This is 
not the same as teleworking! So, we wanted to alter Belgian law to ensure that 
teleworkers were considered as normal workers.’ (FGTB) 
 
Public sector 
 
Within the Belgian public sector, the Telework Agreement was implemented by a 
November 2006 royal decree on teleworking. However, the royal decree was 
applicable only to those workers employed in the Belgian federal-level public 
administration and thus did not apply to those workers employed in other areas of the 
Belgian public sector. The decree itself followed closely the content and wording of 
the 2005 NLC Agreement, yet contained specific references to the workplace level 
information and consultation bodies that are established in the Belgian public sector. 
Through this example, the Belgian Government hoped to encourage autonomous 
local and regional authorities to implement the Agreement in a similar form in their 
jurisdictions. However, a representative from FGTB stated that there was no 
information on the number of local public sector bodies who had taken action to 
implement the Agreement, and that, furthermore, it was thought that the number who 
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would have implemented the Agreement would be very small. This was attributed to 
a lack of interest in the teleworking topic in the Belgian context and to the non-
legally binding nature of the European Agreement. A 2006 sectoral collective 
agreement for the Flemish civil service contained provisions on teleworking related 
to its voluntary character, and the provision of equipment and coverage of costs by 
the employer. However, the extent to which this was inspired by the European 
Agreement was unclear (Visser and Martin, 2008). 
 
6.2.2 The Work-related Stress Agreement 
 
Private Sector 
 
Unlike the Telework Agreement, the Work-related Stress Agreement was not subject 
to implementation by National Labour Council Agreement in Belgium.  Indeed, the 
Agreement was not subject to any form of formal implementation process in the 
private sector, and was implemented in a ‘de facto’ form. This was due to the 
existence of a 1999 National Labour Council Agreement on the topic of work-related 
stress that was regarded as innovatory in that it had dealt with the subject of stress as 
a collective rather than an individual problem, had developed enterprise level 
procedures for dealing with the condition, and had also acted as the inspiration for 
the European-level Agreement on the topic. This ‘de facto’ implementation route 
specifically involved the Belgian social partners reporting to the European social 
partners that the 1999 Agreement covered the content of the European Agreement 
and that a ‘de facto’ implementation had subsequently occurred in the Belgian 
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private sector. There was also relative consensus on this implementation route 
between the Belgian Social partners. An official from the Belgian trade union 
CGSLB stated,  
 
‘The Work-related Stress Agreement was different to the Telework Agreement. Here, 
we had a pioneering agreement that had acted as the inspiration for the European 
Agreement. So, we had the content of the European Agreement already present 
within our collective regulation and there was no debate about implementing the 
European Agreement as implementation was de facto.’ (CGSLB) 
 
An official from Unizo stated, 
 
‘The position of Belgian employers was that we had a very advanced existing 
Agreement on Work-related Stress and that the issue at hand was the implementation 
of that Agreement rather than the content of the existing Agreement. We knew that 
we had to implement what we had rather than do anything new.’ (Unizo) 
 
Although the CGSLB official did not allude to the existence of any conflict over the 
most appropriate implementation methods, it was alluded to by an Unizo official that 
there were in fact ‘sections’ within the Belgian trade union movement who wished to 
use the existence of the European Agreement to strengthen the existing Belgian 
Agreement and to put extra obligations upon employers. However, these elements 
appear to have been within the minority and the choice of a ‘de facto’ 
implementation route was formally supported by all of the Belgian social partner 
organizations involved in the implementation process.  
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Although it did not trigger any formal activities on the part of the inter-sectoral level 
Belgian social partners, the existence of the European Work-related Stress 
Agreement nevertheless inspired activities to raise awareness about the condition of 
work-related stress. An Unizo official stated, 
 
‘Our organization held a lot of workshops and information sessions because of the 
European Agreement. And the media also picked up a lot on the topic of stress 
because of these sorts of events.’ (Unizo) 
 
Also, the existence of the European Agreement acted as an added stimulus to efforts 
to promote the quality of the implementation of the Belgian Agreement at enterprise 
level. It was stated by an FEB/VBO official that the European Agreement had been 
concluded when the Belgian Social partners were evaluating the impact of their 1999 
Agreement, and that efforts to improve the implementation of the Belgian Agreement 
had been encouraged by the existence of the European Agreement. As part of the 
evaluation process of the 1999 Agreement, the Belgian Social partners on the 
National Labour Council published an information brochure on the application of the 
Belgian Agreement in firms and also published guidelines that were intended to help 
firms and trade unions deal with the phenomenon of work-related stress. At least 
indirectly, these measures were inspired by the European Agreement (European 
Social partners, 2008). 
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Public sector 
 
The existence of the European Agreement also encouraged the Belgian social 
partners on the National Labour Council to issue an opinion calling for the 
implementation of the 1999 NLC Agreement within the Belgian public sector. The 
existence of this opinion led to a Royal Decree in May 2007 on the prevention of 
psychosocial burdens caused at work that applied to the Belgian federal-level public 
administration. This decree placed upon employers the obligation to identify areas 
where psychosocial burdens may exist, including areas such as work content, work 
organization and work relationships. The extent to which the European Agreement 
precipitated agreements or policies on work-related stress in other areas of the 
Belgian public sector is unclear. 
 
6.2.3 National ‘Procedures and Practices’ 
 
The chapter will now address the interpretation of Belgian actors of the national 
‘procedures and practices’ implementation clause and its implication in the Belgian 
context. This will be done in order to explore more deeply the rationales of the 
Belgian social partner organizations for the implementation routes they advocated, 
and also to establish the robustness of the national ‘procedures and practices’ 
implementation clause in the Belgian context. 
 
There was little debate regarding the constitution of national 'procedures and 
practices' for social dialogue in the Belgian private sector. All of the social partner 
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organizations in the private sector took the national 'procedures and practices' clause 
of the European Agreement to imply implementation via a legally binding NLC 
agreement. An Unizo official stated, 
 
'National 'procedures and practices' in the Belgian context was interpreted as a 
National Labour Council Agreement. There were no alternative routes discussed as 
we have a tradition of collective agreements at this level.' (Unizo) 
 
An FGTB official stated, 
 
'There was no debate on the wording of the national 'procedures and practices' 
implementation clause. Very simply, we advocated a collective agreement.' (FGTB) 
 
Although a debate about the legally binding status of the European Telework 
Agreement was conducted between the Belgian social partners, alluded to above, the 
existence of this debate was conceived of by the Belgian social partners as a separate 
issue to that of the nature of Belgian national 'procedures and practices'. It was 
stressed by the Belgian social partners that this debate took place prior to the 
implementation of the Telework Agreement in Belgium, and that, furthermore, the 
debate centred around the legal status of the European Telework Agreement, rather 
than the constitution of Belgian national 'procedures and practices'. 
 
Despite the fact that the Work-related Stress Agreement was also not implemented 
via a NLC agreement in Belgium, the Belgian social partners were keen to 
emphasize that the implementation route that had taken place nevertheless 
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conformed to national 'procedures and practices' in the context of Belgium. The 
argument was made by the social partners that the content of the Work-related Stress 
Agreement had already been subject to an NLC agreement within Belgium and that 
subsequently a de facto implementation of the European Agreement had taken place.  
 
Summary 
 
In summary, the Telework Agreement was subject to a comprehensive 
implementation in the Belgian private sector that implemented the European 
Agreement via legally binding means and also elaborated upon the content of the 
European Agreement in certain regards. By contrast, the Work-related Stress 
Agreement had been proceeded by an innovative national agreement in 1999, and 
was not formally implemented in the private sector. It did, however, trigger 
promotional activities on the part of the Belgian social partners. The differing 
procedural implementations that the Agreements were subject to within the private 
sector were largely attributable to the differing levels of regulation concerning the 
topics of teleworking and work-related stress in the Belgian private sector prior to the 
conclusion of the European Agreements. In the Belgian public sector, both 
Agreements were subject to implementation by royal decree in the Belgian federal 
administration. However, the extent to which they were implemented in other areas 
of the Belgian public sector is unclear. On the question of national ‘procedures and 
practices’, there was very little debate on this in the Belgian private sector. National 
‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue were unanimously viewed as an NLC 
agreement followed by a royal decree making the NLC agreement legally binding. 
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6.3 The Substantive impact of the Telework and Work-related Stress 
Agreements in Belgium 
 
This section of the chapter will present the data collected on the substantive impact 
of the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements in Belgium. It will address the 
two Agreements separately, and will outline the extent to which the Agreements and 
their implementation added value to the content of Belgian regulation on the 
teleworking and work-related stress issues, the data that is available upon their 
impact within Belgian sectors and companies, and the level of potential impact that 
the Belgian social partners regard them as likely to achieve. 
 
6.3.1 Telework Agreement  
 
Content 
 
Prior to the 2005 NLC Agreement implementing the European Telework Agreement, 
there was very little regulation concerning teleworking in Belgium, either at the 
national inter-sectoral or at the sectoral level. At the inter-sectoral level, the only 
regulation that pertained to the topic of teleworking prior to the European Agreement 
was a 1996 Belgian Government act on homeworking. This act specified a series of 
rights for those workers who worked at home, particularly in the domain of health 
and safety regulation. The 2005 Agreement was thus in virgin territory at the national 
inter-sectoral level when it addressed the topic of teleworking and the issues that 
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related specifically to it such as the definition of teleworking and the costs of 
teleworking. An Unizo official stated, 
 
‘Before the 2005 Agreement there were parts of Belgian regulation that related to 
health and safety, accidents at work, and working at home or at a different place. But 
with the 2005 Agreement it was the first time that all of the elements related to 
teleworking were presented in one place and regulated through a legally binding 
Agreement.’ (Unizo) 
 
At the sectoral level, there was also little evidence of any regulation of teleworking 
preceding the 2005 inter-sectoral agreement. In the Belgian banking sector, there was 
no sectoral level policy on teleworking prior to the 2005 Agreement. It was also not 
thought by interviewees that many firm level policies had existed on the topic.  This 
was attributed to concerns that trade unions had about the isolation of workers, 
concerns that employers had about the control of workers, and to the fact that many 
occupational groupings within the sector who worked closely with customers would 
be unsuited to teleworking arrangements. 
 
Within the local Government sector, no comprehensive policies or agreements on the 
topic of teleworking were known of outside of an instance in the Flemish police 
force. In this case, a major administrative upheaval had taken place in the Flemish 
police force that had required many employees to relocate to sites far from their 
homes. The option of teleworking was offered to some of those employees affected 
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in this manner. The existence of a central police force computer system that was able 
to measure teleworkers working time was also able to solve the problem of the 
measurement of teleworkers working time that was potentially problematic in other 
teleworking schemes. Elsewhere in the Belgian local Government sector, no other 
examples were known of. This was attributed by trade union officials within the 
sector to concerns that existed on the issues of worker isolation, the covering of the 
costs of teleworking, and the fact that Belgium was a very small country in which 
people were unlikely to live far away from their workplace. 
 
Data and perspectives on impact  
 
As of January 2008, there was a NLC exercise being conducted to monitor the 
impact of the 2005 Agreement. It was stated by interviewees that this was likely to 
yield significant data on the impact that the Agreement had achieved. However, as of 
January 2008, no data had been published on the results obtained by this exercise. On 
an individual organizational level, none of the inter-sectoral social partner 
organizations interviewed had engaged in any exercises to monitor the impact of the 
2005 NLC Agreement on Telework. This was attributed to the existence of the NLC 
exercise and also to the fact that none of the organizations had the resources to 
engage in an exercise that they would not obtain discernible added value from. 
Further, a CGSLB stated that the organization saw the value of the Agreement in its 
potential to lessen disputes over the correct procedures to be followed in the case of 
the adoption of teleworking policies. The official stated, 
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'The added value of the collective agreement is that there is no more discussion at 
the level of the enterprise. An enterprise that wants to introduce teleworking may 
take the collective agreement and formulate a solution. There are no more 
confrontations then, because the rules are clear. Since the adoption of the collective 
agreement, we have seen a massive change in enterprises in this regard.' (CGSLB) 
 
 The inter-sectoral level social partner organizations were not particularly optimistic 
about the extent to which teleworking was likely to be adopted in Belgium as a result 
of the 2005 NLC agreement. This was attributed to several factors. Firstly, it was 
thought that many occupational categories were unsuited to the adoption of 
teleworking policies. Whilst it was considered that in sectors like I.T and sales 
teleworking was likely to be reasonably popular, it was also acknowledged that in 
occupations where there was a great deal of customer contact teleworking solutions 
were very likely to be unsuitable. An FGTB official stated, 
 
‘For low skilled workers, it is more difficult to engage in teleworking. In Belgium, 
there are some jobs where workers are able to engage in teleworking, but there are 
also many where the solution is not viable.’ (FGTB) 
 
Secondly, it was thought that the loss of managerial control potentially entailed by 
the practice of teleworking was likely to make it unattractive to employers. Thirdly, 
trade unions were concerned that the risk of the isolation of teleworkers would have 
negative consequences with regard to the propensity of workers for collective action, 
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the level of social contact that teleworkers were likely to have with other workers, 
and the potential availability of training and lifelong learning opportunities to 
teleworkers. Belgian trade unions were also concerned about the potential health and 
safety risks of teleworking, the potential for teleworkers to incur extra domestic costs 
as a result of teleworking, and the risk of teleworkers not following working time 
regulations. A CGSLB official stated, 
 
‘One big danger associated with teleworking is the danger of isolation. For a 
teleworker it is more difficult to have access to a trade unionist who can defend their 
rights. It is also more difficult to make a teleworkers aware of trade union activity 
within an enterprise. We also are worried about the potential implications of 
teleworking for the measurement of working time and health and safety issues.’ 
(CGSLB) 
 
At the Belgian sectoral level, there was also skepticism about the number of 
teleworkers that the Agreement was likely to facilitate. Within the banking sector, 
BVB/ABB, the sectoral employers' association, stated that the level of uptake was 
likely to vary between individual banks, but added that the potential of social 
isolation for teleworkers, coupled with the problem of the control of teleworkers by 
management, was likely to preclude the level of impact. With particular regard to the 
sectoral context, the official stated that the large amount of 'customer facing' roles in 
the sector was also likely to preclude the level of impact of the 2005 NLC Agreement 
within the sector. However, it was also stated that for occupational groups like 
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project leaders and translators teleworking was likely to be more viable. A 
BVB/ABB official stated, 
 
‘The popularity of teleworking in our sector really is likely to depend on the 
occupational context. If you are a branch worker who is in regular contact with the 
client then it is very difficult to engage in teleworking. However, a project leader for 
example could engage in teleworking and then sometimes have contact with 
colleagues in the bank.’ (BVB/ABB) 
 
Setca, the sectoral trade union organization, were particularly skeptical about the 
likely impact that the Agreement was likely to have in the sector. Arguing that the 
social isolation entailed by teleworking went against the deeply engrained collective 
mentality of Belgian workers, the official stated, 
 
'Trade unions are there to collectively help the workers! If you separate workers you 
can't help them, so that would undermine our core goal. We are against teleworking 
and its uptake as it potentially undermines our key mission of collective action.' 
(Setca) 
 
There was also doubt about the number of agreements and policies that the 2002 
European Agreement would achieve in the Belgian local Government sector. Trade 
unionists in the sector stated that Belgium was a very small country, and that in small 
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communities people lived very close to their place of work, and that in big cities 
there were normally very good public transport systems. An FGTB official stated, 
 
‘Belgium is a very small country and most local Government employees live within 
15km of their workplaces. Also there are very good public transport systems in cities 
like Antwerp and Ghent and in small communities employees normally live very 
close to the office.’ (FGTB) 
 
6.3.2 Work-related Stress Agreement 
 
Content 
 
Prior to the European Work-related Stress Agreement being concluded in 2004, the 
topic of work-related stress was comprehensively covered in the Belgian private 
sector by a 1999 NLC Agreement on work-related stress. Indeed, the 1999 NLC 
Agreement on work-related stress partly acted as the inspiration for the 2004 
European Agreement. All inter-sectoral interviewees reported that the Belgian 
Agreement set high standards for the regulation of the condition of work-related 
stress within the Belgian private sector. Further it was stated that the Agreement was 
innovative in that it defined work-related stress as a collective, rather than an 
individual, condition. An FEB/VBO official detailed the process that firms 
complying with the 1999 Agreement went through, 
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‘Typically, companies go through their communications processes first, and try and 
identify whether stress in the company is due to a lack of clear information and 
communication. Then, a risk analysis is conducted, to attempt to identify within the 
company what factors can potentially cause stress. Then, an evaluation process is 
conducted in the company to assess what the company has done to tackle stress.’ 
(FEB/VBO) 
 
In Belgium, there was also the 1996 Welfare at Work Act. This covered the Belgian 
public and private sectors, and imparted the obligation upon employers to formulate 
yearly plans for health and safety conditions within their enterprises. The definition 
of health and safety used by the act included ‘psycho-social aggression’, and this 
potentially included the condition of work-related stress. A range of other work was 
also conducted on the topic of work-related stress by the Belgian social partners prior 
to the European Agreement. An FGTB official stated that his organization had 
engaged in a great deal of work on the organization of work in workplaces and work-
related stress, and had also trained union representatives in ways to deal with the 
phenomenon of work-related stress.  
 
At the Belgian sectoral level, various policies were also in place on work-related 
stress prior to the European Agreement. Within the banking sector, the NLC 
Agreement of 1999 had inspired the sectoral social partners to produce a major 
sectoral questionnaire on work-related stress in 2000 that had cost one million Euros 
and had sought to identify the scale of work-related stress within the sector. A 
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representative from BVB/ABB stated that policies on work-related stress differed in 
firms within the sector, and depended upon what steps individual banks had deemed 
it appropriate to take. A representative from Setca was skeptical about the quality of 
the measures taken by individual firms within the sector to manage work-related 
stress, 
 
‘Companies are willing to acknowledge the existence of stress but not the fact that it 
is down to them! They won’t own up to the problem of stress. In our view, the general 
problem is that there is too much work in the various firms for the employees.’ 
(Setca) 
 
Within the Belgian local Government sector, there was no general sectoral collective 
agreement on work-related stress and policy on work-related stress was generally 
determined at the level of individual boroughs. However, the 1996 Welfare at Work 
Act, described above, was applicable in the Belgian local Government sector. A 
representative from the local Government sector branch of FGTB stated that, owing 
to the lack of a public sector-level agreement on work-related stress and the very de-
centralized nature of employment regulation in the Belgian local Government sector, 
approaches to the topic of work-related stress differed at the level of the borough. It 
was also added that the quality of regulation on work-related stress was likely to be 
contingent upon the quality of social dialogue within individual boroughs.  
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Data and perspectives on impact  
 
Owing to the fact that the European Agreement was not formally transposed within 
the Belgian private sector at all, the impact of the implemented European Agreement 
within the Belgian private sector cannot be discussed directly. However, the 
promotional activities that were organized by the Belgian Social partners to raise 
awareness of the topic of work-related stress had varying levels of impact within 
Belgium. An Unizo official was optimistic that the activities had achieved an impact, 
and stated that awareness of work-related stress in Belgium had been raised as a 
result. Crucially, the awareness raising activities also helped inspire a royal decree on 
work-related stress that was applicable to employees in the federal level Belgian 
public sector. However, an FGTB official in the local Government sector stated that 
he thought that the awareness raising activities carried out by the Belgian private 
sector social partners had achieved no impact within the sector. The official stated, 
 
‘Nothing has been done as a result of the EU Agreement and its promotion in our 
sector. The reason for this is that if you get a “soft” law you get a “soft” reaction.’ 
(FGTB) 
 
Summary 
 
In summary, the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements achieved a level of 
substantive impact within Belgium that was consistent with the procedural 
implementations that they were subject to, and with the level of regulation that 
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existed on the topics in Belgium prior to the conclusion of the European Agreements. 
Very little regulation existed on teleworking prior to the European Agreement, and 
the European Agreement was implemented within Belgium as a legally binding 
collective agreement. Subsequently, the Telework Agreement had a key influence 
upon the content of Belgian employment regulation. By way of contrast, 
comprehensive regulation existed on work-related stress prior to the conclusion of 
the European Agreement, and the European Agreement was not formally 
implemented in Belgium. Thus, the European Work-related Stress Agreement 
exercised little influence on the content of Belgian employment regulation. However, 
the promotional activities the European Agreement inspired appear to have had some 
level of impact, not least in inspiring a royal decree on work-related stress in the 
Belgian federal-level public sector. 
 
6.4 Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the European Banking Sector 
 
The Belgian Banking Sector Social partner organizations BVB/ABB and FGTB were 
both involved in the negotiation of the European Banking sector text Joint 
Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the European Banking Sector at the European 
level as members of EBF and Uni-Finance. The organizations had also been involved 
for many years prior to the negotiation of the text in policy work on lifelong learning 
in the Belgian banking sector. Both organizations emphasized that the content of the 
European text was already covered by lifelong learning policy within the Belgian 
banking sector. Further, it was emphasized that the state of lifelong learning policy 
within the sector was very advanced, and in many regards superior to other sectors in 
Belgium and to the majority of other banking sectors in Europe. An official from 
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BVB/ABB emphasized that the average level of salary per worker within the Belgian 
banking sector dedicated for lifelong learning purposes was 2.61% in 2005, whilst 
the average in other Belgian sectors was 1.09%. Officials from both BVB/ABB and 
Setca also referred to the work that the organizations had carried out in 
implementing, within the Belgian banking sector, a Belgian social partner initiative 
to dedicate 0.10% of the average salary per worker within sectors for the lifelong 
learning of ‘risk groups’. These ‘risk groups’ were defined as older workers with a 
low level of qualification. 
 
Whilst the Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the European Banking Sector 
did not specifically precipitate any policy within the Belgian banking sector, officials 
from BVB/ABB and FGTB both noted its significance in shaping the context in 
which lifelong learning policy was framed and in exerting an indirect effect upon 
lifelong learning policy in the sector. A BVB/ABB official stated, 
 
'Before the existence of the declaration we did a lot on lifelong learning and 
education policy with the trade unions. And after the declaration we did not say that 
the various policies that we were carrying out were executions of the declaration. We 
think that by doing what we did before and continuing along the same path then we 
are fulfilling our obligations to the text. But what the declaration did was put the 
topic of lifelong learning in the picture more. It made people in Belgium think about 
it a little more.' (BVB/ABB) 
 
A Setca official stated, 
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'We concluded a 2003 agreement on lifelong learning within the sector, and I cannot 
say it was unrelated to the European text, but we were looking at this area anyway. 
The inspiration for the Agreement was a mix of various influences; there were the 
trade unions who wanted this Agreement anyway, and there was the influence of the 
European text.' (Setca) 
 
The sectoral social partner organizations also derived benefit from being involved in 
the OMC style governance processes associated with the European text. A BVB 
official reported that involvement in the text had led to the development of a small, 
informal group of European banking sector employers’ associations who met 
occasionally to informally discuss developments in their different national contexts. 
A Setca official stated that being involved at the European level in texts such as the 
Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning had led to the development of informal 
networks between national unions in which valuable information had been 
exchanged between the unions on topics such as lifelong learning and competence 
development. Through this informal network, the official stated that Setca had 
developed a Belgian agreement on leavers’ certificates in the banking sector that 
would help banking sector employees who were mobile on an European scale.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the data gathered on the Belgian implementation of the 
Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements, and Joint Declaration on Lifelong 
Learning in the Banking Sector. Many points are notable in summary. Firstly, the 
contrast between the implementations of the Telework and Work-related Stress 
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Agreements in the Belgian private sector was particularly marked. The Telework 
Agreement was implemented via a NLC collective agreement, whilst the Work-
related Stress Agreement did not receive a formal implementation. The reason for 
this largely relates to the level of regulation which the topics of teleworking and 
work-related stress were subject to in Belgium prior to the conclusion of the 
European Agreements. The topic of teleworking was by and large unregulated prior 
to the European Agreement, and the European Agreement therefore triggered a key 
new national inter-sectoral private sector collective agreement. By contrast, the topic 
of work-related stress was comprehensively covered in the Belgian private sector by 
an earlier agreement prior to the conclusion of the European Agreement, and the 
European Agreement did not therefore trigger a NLC collective agreement as did the 
Telework Agreement. It is particularly notable that this pre-existing agreement led to 
a ‘de-facto’ implementation of the European Agreement. This was not a trend 
anticipated by the European social partners or European Commission prior to the 
conclusion of the European Agreement. A further notable trend regarding the general 
difference in implementation outcomes is that even in a state such as Belgium with a 
centralized, inter-sectoral negotiating system that mirrors that established at the 
European-level, the implementation of the two Agreements was not consistent 
between the two. Thus, even in the most favourable of institutional circumstances, 
procedural implementation outcomes are far from automatic or predictable.   
 
Both Agreements were implemented via royal decree that was applicable to the 
Belgian federal-level public administration. However, there are only isolated 
examples of either of the Agreements precipitating specific policies within other 
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areas of the Belgian public sector. This is likely to be attributable to the de-
centralized nature of employment regulation within the Belgian public sector. In the 
Belgian private sector, national ‘procedures and practices’ for the implementation of 
the Agreements were subject to very low levels of debate. All parties who had been 
signatory to the Agreements concurred that national ‘procedures and practices’ for 
the implementation of the Agreements should consist of an NLC Agreement 
followed by a legally binding royal decree. Although Belgian employers initially 
opposed an NLC Agreement for the implementation of the Telework Agreement and 
the Work-related Stress Agreement was implemented in a de facto manner, these 
episodes were attributed to specific conditions rather than dispute over the actual 
constitution of Belgian national ‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue. 
However, the fact that Belgian employers interpreted the Telework Agreement as 
falling outside the remit of Belgian national ‘procedures and practices’ is remarkable 
given that it demonstrates a separate interpretation of the status of EU-level 
regulation. 
 
The Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements both had differing levels of 
substantive impact upon employment relations in Belgium. Given that there was little 
to no regulation on teleworking prior to the European Agreement being concluded, 
the implementation of the Telework Agreement in Belgium imparted key new rights 
to the Belgian context. By way of contrast, the issue of work-related was 
comprehensively regulated in Belgium prior to the conclusion of the European 
Agreement. Thus, the Work-related Stress Agreement was unable to achieve a 
notable impact upon the content of employment regulation within Belgium. With 
regards to the impact of the implemented Agreements at lower levels, it is reasonable 
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to assert that a range of factors are likely to have impeded the impact of the Telework 
Agreement in Belgium in this regard. On the trade union side, there were major 
concerns of the potential of teleworking to isolate individual workers, and to present 
problems with regard to the health and safety of teleworkers and the measurement of 
working time. On the employer side, there were concerns about losing control of 
workers who engage in teleworking. As the Belgian social partners stated, these 
factors were likely to preclude the impact of the Telework Agreement in Belgium. 
Owing to the fact that the Work-related Stress Agreement was not implemented in a 
formal way in Belgium, it is very difficult to talk about the specific impact of the 
Agreement in Belgium. However, the promotional activities that the Agreement 
triggered in Belgium would appear to have been influential to some degree. Although 
the Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the European Banking sector did not 
inspire any specific policy activity in Belgium, it appears to have had at least an 
indirect effect on the activity of the Belgian banking sector social partners in this 
field, despite the fact that lifelong learning was comprehensively regulated in 
Belgium prior to the inception of the text at the European level. Further, the OMC 
style processes associated with participation in the text also appear to have had key 
indirect effects on the banking sector social partners’ engagement on an European 
scale. 
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Chapter 7: Implementation in Denmark 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter will present the data collected in the course of our fieldwork in 
Denmark. The chapter will open with (i) a brief description of the system of 
industrial relations in Denmark and its record with regard to the implementation of 
the European Social Partner Framework Agreements of the 1990s and European 
Social Policy more generally. Then, the chapter will (ii) describe the process of the 
procedural implementations of the Agreements in Denmark and the related issue of 
actors’ reading of national ‘procedures and practices’ in the context of the Danish 
system. Here, it emerged that the processes of procedural implementation were 
highly contingent upon the Agreement, sector, and level in question and that 
interpretations of national ‘procedures and practices’ in Denmark diverged at the 
sectoral and inter-sectoral levels. Then, the chapter will (iii) describe the data 
collected on the substantive implementation of the Agreements in the Denmark. 
Here, it emerged that the impact of the Telework Agreement appears to have been 
more considerable than that of the Work-related Stress Agreement. Finally, the 
chapter will (iv) analyze the impact achieved by the Framework of Actions on 
Lifelong Learning and Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the Banking Sector 
in the Denmark. Here, it emerged that the impact of both texts had been limited by 
the advanced nature of existing lifelong learning policy in Denmark yet had initiated 
some indirect policy activity in Denmark. 
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7.1.1 Industrial Relations in Denmark 
Traditionally, the Danish model of industrial relations is characterized by the 
institutionalization of conflicts, high membership rates of trade unions, and a well-
established pattern of cooperation fostering industrial peace and stability (Due and 
Madsen, 2008). Levels of regulation of health and safety, working conditions and the 
working environment are also very high when compared to other countries, and 
social dialogue assumes a key role in maintaining such standards (Hasle and 
Petersen, 2004). Two further notable characteristic of the Danish model are the 
traditional absence of the state from the arena of industrial relations and labour law, 
and the existence of an inter-sectoral ‘Basic Agreement’ that is concluded between 
the inter-sectoral social partners and ensures that lower level collective agreements 
are in effect compulsory codes (although not legally enforceable). In line with these 
features, the Danish system of industrial relations has also been conceived as one 
demonstrating a mixture of voluntarist and corporatist characteristics (Due and 
Madsen, 2008).   
 
The main Social Partners in Denmark are the employer association Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening (DA) and the trade union confederation Landsorganisationen 
(LO). DA is composed of thirteen employer organizations from different sectors with 
a membership of 29,000 Danish private companies, whilst LO has 25 affiliated trade 
unions and trade union cartel organizations in which approximately 1,300,000 
workers are members. On the trade union side, there are also the inter-confederal 
level trade union organizations FTF and Akademikernes Centralorganisation (AC). 
FTF is primarily a public sector trade union confederation (although it has some 
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affiliated trade unions in the private sector), and has a membership of approximately 
ninety affiliated trade unions in which 450,000 workers are members. AC is a trade 
union confederation for trade unions that represent professional and managerial 
employees working in the private and public sectors. Since the late 1980s, there has 
been a tendency towards the de-centralization of collective bargaining and social 
dialogue, yet social dialogue in Denmark remains relatively centralized and 
coordinated and the pre-dominant level at which collective relations between the 
Social Partners take place is at the sectoral level. Generally, scholars (Due and 
Madsen, 2008) have characterized Danish national ‘procedures and practices’ for 
social dialogue as consisting of sectoral collective agreements concluded between the 
Social Partners. 
 
7.1.2 The Danish system and European Social Policy 
 
European Social Policy Directives exercised a key impact upon the way in which 
Danish industrial relations operated from a procedural perspective (Falkner et al, 
2005). Owing to the fact that the implementation of the Working Time Directive via 
the usual voluntarist mode of Danish Social Partner regulation could not guarantee 
the erga omnes coverage of the Danish workforce required by the Council, the 
Danish Social Partners and Government were forced to formulate an innovative 
implementation route. This involved the Social Partners in various sectors being 
granted a period of time to implement the Directive in their sectors, before the 
Danish inter-sectoral Social Partners concluded a ‘follow-up’ agreement to cover the 
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firms that were members of DA and who were not covered by a sectoral collective 
agreement (Falkner et al, 2005). Finally, the Danish Government passed a law to 
cover those workers who were still not covered by the terms of the Working Time 
Directive. This mode of implementation was also used to implement the three 
European Social Partner agreed Social Policy Directives of the 1990s. The decision 
to adopt such an implementation route was not without controversy. Various 
commentators (Due and Madsen, 2008) regarded the use of the law by the Danish 
Government to regulate industrial relations as representing a major departure from 
the state’s traditional voluntarist approach to Danish labour law. Indeed, the Danish 
social partner organizations worried that the state’s regulation of an area that was 
traditionally a prerogative of the social partners would upset the balance of the 
Danish model (Falkner et al, 2005). 
 
7.2 The Procedural Implementations of the Telework and Work-related Stress 
Agreements in Denmark 
 
This section of the chapter will address the procedural implementation of the 
Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements. Also, it will address the related issue 
of actors’ interpretations of national ‘procedures and practices’ in the Danish context. 
The section will distinguish between the inter-sectoral and sectoral procedural 
implementations of the Agreements. 
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7.2.1 The Telework Agreement 
 
The conclusion of the European Telework Agreement was welcomed by the Danish 
Social Partners. The stance of the Social Partners was that the non-legally binding 
Telework Agreement would be more likely to preserve the integrity of the Danish 
model of industrial relations, and that the conclusion of the Telework Agreement 
represented the imitation of the Danish system at the European level. 
 
Inter-sectoral procedural implementations  
 
The DA-LO implementation  
 
After the conclusion of the Telework Agreement at the European level in 2002, a 
series of meetings were held by DA and LO to discuss the most suitable way to 
implement the Agreement in Denmark. The decision taken by the organizations was 
to allow their sectoral affiliates a period of time of approximately three years in 
which to implement the Telework Agreement autonomously within their sectors. 
This decision was then communicated by the organizations to their members. DA 
and LO also agreed to review the implementations that had taken place after three 
years and consider whether further action at the inter-sectoral was required. The 
rationale of the organizations in advocating this implementation route lay in the fact 
that they viewed sectoral collective agreements as the ‘normal’ way to regulate 
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employment relations in Denmark, and also that they wished to promote an 
implementation route that would preserve the integrity of the Danish model of 
industrial relations rather than threatening it, as the implementation of previous 
European Social Policy Directives had been perceived to do. Further, a DA 
representative also stated that DA advocated this route due to their desire to 
demonstrate to the European-level Social Partners that the existing Danish system of 
collective agreements could adequately implement EU-level collective agreements. 
However, as of January 2008 within the Danish private sector only three Agreements 
in the industrial, finance and commerce sectors had been concluded by affiliates of 
DA to implement the Telework Agreement. An LO official attributed this lack of 
uptake to a deficit of interest in the content of the European Agreement from Danish 
trade unions and also to the fact that some employer organizations were likely to 
question the legal value of the European Agreement. 
 
The second aspect of the DA-LO implementation of the Telework Agreement 
involved the conclusion of an inter-sectoral ‘follow up’ agreement that would apply 
to those affiliates of DA who had not concluded a sectoral agreement implementing 
the Telework Agreement within their sectors. The decision to affect such an 
implementation route was taken after a review of the sectoral implementations of the 
Agreement that had occurred. An LO official explained the rationale of LO in 
concluding this, 
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‘As affiliates of ETUC, we had to make sure that the agreement covered every 
workplace in Denmark in which there is a DA member enterprise… in the private 
sector, we saw that many sectoral agreements hadn’t been concluded, and we said 
that we have to make an agreement with DA to cover those sectors that had not 
concluded agreements.’ (LO) 
 
This ‘follow up’ Agreement was inserted in September 2006 into the pre-existing 
DA-LO ‘cooperative’ Agreement that dealt with enterprise level information and 
consultation issues. DA and LO regarded this implementation strategy as innovative 
given that it was the first time that a non-legally binding European Agreement had 
been implemented in such a manner in Denmark. LO and DA had a protracted 
dispute with regards to the legal form that the ‘follow-up’ agreement should assume. 
LO argued that full implementation of the European Agreement should consist of the 
terms of the Agreement entering the ‘cooperative’ Agreement in full, whilst DA 
argued that it would be appropriate to merely include the terms of the Telework 
Agreement within the ‘cooperative’ Agreement as recommendations. A compromise 
was eventually reached after the topic became part of a broader series of DA-LO 
discussions on the content of the parties ‘cooperative’ agreement that was being 
negotiated simultaneously to the Telework ‘follow up’ agreement. An LO 
representative stated that the compromise reached satisfied ‘most’ of LO’s original 
demands with regards to the whole content of the European Agreement entering the 
‘cooperative’ Agreement. 
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DA-AC implementation 
 
The inter-confederal sector trade union organization AC advocated implementing the 
Telework Agreement in Denmark via a private sector collective agreement with DA 
in order to maximize the coverage of the Telework Agreement with regards to those 
AC members working in the private sector. Although AC and DA do not 
traditionally conclude collective agreements to cover the private sector, the position 
of AC was that both organizations had been signatory to the Agreement at the 
European level and that, subsequently, DA were duty bound to implement the 
Agreement in Denmark. As of January 2008 however, and following several attempts 
by AC to engage DA in negotiations, such an Agreement had not been concluded 
between the parties. An AC official stated, 
 
‘We took part in the negotiations with DA in Brussels but apparently things are 
different in Brussels than they are in Denmark. In Denmark, it has been difficult to 
make them see that we need this Agreement to be a reality to our members as well.’ 
(AC) 
 
The position of DA on an AC-DA Agreement was that a collective agreement with 
AC in Denmark would not be in keeping with national ‘procedures and practices’ 
and that they were subsequently not compelled to conclude such an Agreement. 
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The public sector 
 
The public sector trade union confederation FTF advocated the implementation of 
the Telework Agreement via a series of sectoral collective agreements on the part of 
their public sector affiliates. This was due to the fact that FTF do not possess a 
mandate to conclude collective agreements within Denmark, yet wanted to maximize 
the coverage of the Agreement that they had been signatory to at the European-level. 
The organization formed negotiating groups to aid their public sector affiliates in 
implementing the Agreement, and reported that the majority of their sectoral 
affiliates in the public sector had implemented the Agreement. According to an FTF 
representative, approximately 400,000 out of the 450,000 Danish public sector 
employees who were members of a trade union affiliated to FTF had been covered 
by the Agreement. A representative from AC also stated that implementation of the 
Telework Agreement in the public sector had not been problematic.  
 
Summary 
 
In summary, the picture was therefore mixed at the inter-sectoral level. Although a 
DA-LO ‘follow up’ Agreement was concluded to implement the Telework 
Agreement, this did not occur between AC and DA. FTF also did not possess a 
mandate to conclude a collective agreement implementing the European Agreement 
at the inter-sectoral level. 
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Sectoral procedural implementations  
  
As stated above, the Danish inter-sectoral social partners reported that in only a 
minority of sectors in the private sector was the Telework Agreement implemented 
via a sectoral collective agreement. In the finance sector, the Telework Agreement 
was implemented in April 2003 as part of the general sectoral collective agreement 
between the Social Partner organizations FA and FF. Prior to the European 
Agreement, there had been a sectoral agreement on distance working that the sectoral 
social partners regarded as partly fulfilling the content of the European Agreement. 
Implementing the European Agreement subsequently became a matter of updating 
the content of the existing Agreement to incorporate further points that were present 
in the European Agreement. According to an FA representative, the trade union FF 
put forward a ‘small’ number of proposed changes to the sectoral Agreement 
regarding health and safety issues. These proposed changes were subsequently 
accepted by FA. An FA official reported that, 
 
‘There were no real points of disagreement over the proposed changes. We agreed 
on FF’s proposals because they did not have any significance that would be of any 
negative effect to our companies, and we wanted our collective agreement to be in 
line with the European Agreement.’ (FA) 
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In the Danish insurance sector, there was no prior Agreement on distance working, 
yet the Telework Agreement was not implemented in the sector. This is despite the 
fact that the finance employers’ association FA also collectively bargain with trade 
unions in the insurance sector. A DFL official stated that this had occurred because, 
 
‘We wanted the implemented Telework Agreement to cover all of our members, 
including those working as mobile insurance salesman. However, FA were 
concerned that the inclusion of this group of workers in the Agreement would lead to 
employer incurring higher costs, and they didn’t want that. They said the Agreement 
would be implemented if these members were excluded, but we said no, all of our 
members have to be included in the Agreement.’ (DFL) 
 
In the industrial sector, the Social Partner organizations DI and CO had concluded 
prior agreements on homeworking. Subsequently, the implementation of the 
Telework Agreement involved the extension of the existing agreements on 
homeworking to include provisions that specifically related to the teleworking issue. 
Due to the perception that the content of the Telework Agreement and the existing 
agreements on homeworking were not greatly dissimilar, the implementation of the 
Agreement in the sector was not characterized by great debate between these sectoral 
Social Partners, who, according to an LO official, took ‘pride’ in implementing EU 
Directives and Agreements fully and with alacrity. 
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As outlined above, it was reported by an FTF official that in the majority of sectors 
in the Danish public sector the Telework Agreement was implemented via a series of 
sectoral agreements. The FTF official also alluded to the existence of a ‘culture’ of 
implementation and compliance with EU regulation within the Danish public sectors. 
In the Danish state railway sector, the Telework Agreement was implemented in 
December 2002. A HK rail official reported that this implementation had been 
achieved without a high level of debate. In the Danish local Government sector, by 
way of contrast, the Agreement was implemented in 2005 after a protracted debate 
between the sectoral Social Partners. A prior 1997 Agreement had existed on the 
topic of teleworking, and, after a year of discussion on the relationship between the 
content of the Danish and the European Agreement, implementation within the sector 
merely consisted of the social partners stating that the existing Danish Agreement 
fulfilled the content of the European Agreement. KL, the sectoral employers’ 
association, had advocated simplifying the operation of the existing Agreement at 
firm level by minimizing the role of unions at this level. KTO, the trade union cartel 
for the sector, resisted this proposal on the grounds that it would entail a 
downgrading of sectoral employment standards, and, according to a KTO 
representative, also regarded the provisions in the Danish Agreement safeguarding 
the voluntary nature of teleworking for the employee as stronger than in the 
European Agreement. KTO advocated the insertion of extra rights regarding training 
and education of teleworkers into the existing Agreement on the grounds of a clause 
in the European Agreement, but this was resisted by KL as a result of KTO’s 
resistance to their proposals to make the initial Agreement more flexible. The result 
of this stalemate was that the sectoral social partners ended by simply stating that the 
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contents of the European Agreement were already present in their existing collective 
agreement. 
 
7.2.2 The Work-related Stress Agreement 
 
Inter-sectoral procedural implementations  
 
LA-DO implementation                     
 
After the conclusion of the Work-related Stress Agreement at the European-level in 
October 2004, DA and LO also held a series of meetings regarding the most 
appropriate way to implement the Agreement. As with the Telework Agreement, the 
policy of DA and LO was to grant their sectoral level affiliates a period of time in 
which to autonomously implement the European Agreement within their sectors for 
the same reasons as was the case with the Telework Agreement. It was stated by both 
DA and LO that, as of January 2008, they were only aware of a private sector 
Agreement within the industrial sector to implement the Work-related Stress 
Agreement. A representative from LO attributed the lack of sectoral implementations 
of the Agreement to the deficit of specifically worded clauses contained within the 
European Agreement, and also to the fact that many employers’ organizations saw 
the Agreement as ‘voluntary’. An official from DA also noted that the existence of 
several sectoral collective agreements and general legislation on the topic of work-
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related stress in Denmark might preclude the conclusion of many sectoral collective 
agreements on the topic given that the issue was in many cases regulated prior to the 
European Agreement. 
 
Unlike with the Telework Agreement an LO-DA inter-sectoral ‘follow up’ 
Agreement was not concluded on the Work-related Stress Agreement in Denmark. 
From the outset, the argument of DA was that the content of the Agreement was 
already present in Danish labour law and that subsequently there was no need for a 
‘follow up’ agreement to be concluded given that this would merely become a 
burden on Danish firms. A DA official stated, 
 
‘We did not conclude a [‘follow up’ Agreement] to implement the Work-related 
Stress Agreement as we did with the Telework Agreement because what was in the 
European Agreement was already covered by Danish legislation.’ (DA) 
 
After a period of internal deliberation in which the added value of concluding such a 
‘follow up’ Agreement was debated, LO decided that their position was also that 
there was not a need for a ‘follow-up’ agreement. This was based on the view that 
the topic of work-related stress was already comprehensively regulated in Danish 
labour legislation, and that the conclusion of a ‘follow up’ Agreement on the 
European Agreement, that contained little in the way of specific clauses in any case, 
would add very little in the Danish context. An LO representative further justified the 
approach by citing the example of the Danish Government’s previous declarations 
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that EU Social Policy Directives need not be implemented given that their content 
already existed in Danish legislation. 
 
Owing to the fact that DA and LO decided not to conclude a ‘follow up’ Agreement, 
a series of promotional activities were organized by the parties to promote awareness 
of the issue of work-related stress in Denmark. Both organizations advocated these 
activities as they were seen as an useful way of highlighting the problem of work-
related stress in the absence of a DA-LO ‘follow up’ Agreement to implement the 
European Agreement. An AC official stated that AC had not attempted to engage DA 
in collective negotiations for an agreement to cover AC members in the private 
sector, 
 
‘Since we don’t have a general agreement with DA about negotiating in the private 
sector, they would probably answer as they did with the proposed negotiations on the 
Telework Agreement. Also, if there is a lack of binding formulation within the 
Agreement, then it becomes difficult to persuade them for the need for an 
implementation of the Agreement.’ (AC) 
 
The public sector 
 
An LO official reported that the organization’s policy was to allow its affiliates in the 
public sector a period of time in which to conclude autonomous implementations of 
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the Agreement, as was the policy of the organization in the private sector. It was 
further stated that in the majority of sectors in the public sector collective agreements 
had been concluded, although it was added that the extent to which value had been 
added to sectoral contexts was questionable given the weak content of the European 
Agreement. The policy of FTF was also to allow its affiliates scope to implement the 
Agreement autonomously for the same reasons as such an approach was adopted in 
the case of the Telework Agreement. An FTF representative stated that, as in the case 
of the Telework Agreement, the number of sectors in the public sector implementing 
the Agreement had been considerable. This was attributed to the aforementioned 
culture of ‘duty’ in the public sector with regard to the implementation of European 
Agreements.  
 
Summary 
 
In summary, a key difference was evident between implementation outcomes in the 
private and public sectors. Whilst only one sectoral implementation of the Work-
related Stress Agreement was affected in the private sector and there was no ‘follow-
up’ Agreement concluded, in the public sector the majority of sectors implemented 
the European Agreement. 
 
Sectoral procedural implementations 
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In the Danish industrial sector, the implementation route chosen to implement the 
Work-related Stress Agreement was via the DI and COI cooperative agreement that 
was agreed during the 2007 bargaining round. This implementation route was 
selected given that this was perceived as the ‘normal’ way of regulating a topic such 
as stress within the sector, and entailed the content of the European Agreement being 
inserted in the part of the existing cooperative agreement that dealt with bullying and 
sexual harassment. This would then be subject to use in workplace cooperation 
committees that were regulated by the DI and COI cooperative agreement, and that 
formulated workplace specific policies on topics such as bullying and sexual 
harassment and work-related stress. It was also stated by DI and COI officials that it 
was normal practice within the sector to implement European Directives and 
Agreements precisely and efficiently.   
 
Within the finance and insurance sectors, the Work-related Stress Agreement had not 
been implemented as of January 2008. A representative from the employers’ 
organization FA stated that FA had not advocated the implementation of the 
Agreement in either the finance or insurance sector, owing to the fact that the topic 
of work-related stress was regarded as more appropriately managed at the company 
level rather than the sectoral level. An FF representative stated that FF were rather 
indifferent to whether the Agreement was implemented or not,  
 
‘We believed that we were doing work that was far beyond what the European 
Agreement could provide. We didn’t believe it was a very good Agreement, and we 
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thought that we were carrying out work far in advance of the European Agreement.’ 
(FF) 
 
A representative from DFL stated that DFL wished to implement the European 
Agreement within the insurance sector, but that FA had refused to do this thus far.  
 
The social partners in the Danish state rail sector implemented the Work-related 
Stress Agreement within their sectoral cooperative agreement in 2004. As in the 
industrial sector, the agreement was then intended for further use within work-place 
cooperative committees that set work-place specific policies on issues like work-
related stress in workplaces within the sector. The process was markedly conflict free 
given that the content of the European Agreement had been present in sectoral 
regulation prior to the implementation of the Agreement. A HK rail official stated, 
 
‘When the Agreement was implemented in the sector, I was surprised that there was 
even a need. I thought that this was already covered within our existing agreement!’ 
(HK Rail) 
 
 In the local Government sector, the European Agreement was also implemented via 
a cooperative agreement, in 2005. After the experience of the deadlock with the 
implementation of the Telework Agreement, the sectoral Social Partners delayed 
regulation that had been planned on the work-related stress issue until after the 
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European Agreement was concluded. This was in order to avert another dispute over 
the relationship between the content of the European Agreement and existing 
regulation.  
 
Summary 
 
In summary, the procedural implementations to which the Agreements were subject 
to were often contingent upon the level of existing regulation on the topic in 
question, and on the degree of existing contestation between the parties to 
implementation. The key reason for the decision of the inter-sectoral Danish social 
partners to decide to conclude a ‘follow-up’ agreement on the Telework Agreement 
but not on the Work-related Stress Agreement lay in the existing levels of regulation 
on the topics in Denmark. Also, in the cases of the DA-AC dispute over the 
implementation of the Telework Agreement, the DA-LO ‘follow-up’ Agreement on 
the Telework Agreement, and the local Government sector implementation of the 
Telework Agreement, the degree of contestation between the social partners often 
played a crucial role in determining implementation outcomes. It was also notable 
that implementation outcomes were more complete in the public sector in 
comparison to the private sector. Further, within the private sector, the 
implementation outcomes secured by LO were more ‘effective’ than those secured 
by AC. Finally, implementation outcomes within differing sectors within the private 
sector diverged. The industrial sector performed particularly well with regard to the 
extent it implemented the Agreements ‘effectively’. 
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7.2.3 National ‘Procedures and Practices’ 
 
The chapter will now address the interpretation of Danish actors of the national 
‘procedures and practices’ implementation clause and its implication in the Danish 
context.  
 
The interpretation of inter-sectoral level actors 
 
At the Danish inter-sectoral level, the interpretation of Danish trade unions of 
national ‘procedures and practices’ in Denmark centred around an appreciation of the 
key and primary role of collective agreements between parties in regulating industrial 
relations in Denmark. The trade union confederations FTF and LO emphasized the 
pivotal role of collective agreements in the Danish system, and stated that, in the 
context of Denmark, national ‘procedures and practices’ could not mean anything 
other than collective agreements between social partners at various levels. Despite 
the fact that LO did not advocate the conclusion of an inter-sectoral collective 
agreement to implement the Work-related Stress Agreement given that the content of 
the Agreement already existed in Danish regulation, an LO official stated that this 
stance could nevertheless be understood as national ‘procedures and practices’ given 
previous examples of the Danish Government declaring that EU Social Policy 
Directives need not be implemented because their content was already present within 
Danish labour law.  AC also conceived of national ‘procedures and practices’ for 
social dialogue as consisting of collective agreements between social partners. 
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Specifically, in the case of the proposed DA-AC private sector collective agreement 
to implement the European Agreement, AC argued that the lack of a precedent for 
such an Agreement was not relevant given that both DA and AC had been signatory 
to the Telework Agreement at the European level. 
 
The interpretation of DA of national ‘procedures and practices’ for the 
implementation of the Agreements was rather more nuanced. A DA official stated 
that the implementation of the Telework Agreement that had taken place, where 
affiliates of DA had been granted the autonomy to conclude collective agreements 
within their respective sectors, reflected national ‘procedures and practices’ in 
Denmark given that similar methods had been used by DA and LO to implement EU 
Social Policy Directives. However, it was also emphasized that the DA-LO ‘follow 
up’ Agreement, that was placed in the Social Partners’ cooperative agreement for 
information and consultation for lower level affiliates, was in itself an innovation, 
and it was therefore difficult to describe this implementation method as Danish 
national ‘procedures and practices’. Furthermore, it was said by DA that the 
Telework Agreement was itself a new form of European regulation, and that it was 
potentially problematic to specify that such an Agreement be implemented in 
accordance with national ‘procedures and practices’ when the Agreement itself was 
an innovation. The stance of DA that the Work-related Stress Agreement need not be 
the subject of an inter-sectoral ‘follow-up’ Agreement was also used as ammunition 
for the argument that national ‘procedures and practices’ were not in themselves 
fixed, and should be selected on an ad hoc basis.  
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The interpretation of sectoral level actors 
 
Within the sectors studied, all of the trade union organizations who had affected 
implementations of the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements asserted that 
national ‘procedures and practices’ within their sectoral contexts could consist of 
nothing else than sectoral collective agreements. It was asserted that no other means 
would reflect the ‘normal’ mode of social dialogue within the sector, and that 
subsequently, no other tools for implementation had been considered by the social 
partners within the sector. Although the Work-related Stress Agreement had been 
subject to implementation via cooperative agreement rather than via the core 
collective agreement in the local Government and industrial sectors, trade unionists 
within the sector asserted that this merely implied a variation of collective relations 
between the sectoral social partners rather than a ‘new’ way of interpreting 
‘procedures and practices’.  
 
As was the case at the inter-sectoral level, the interpretation of sectoral employers’ 
associations of national ‘procedures and practices’ was more subtle. In the case of 
the Telework Agreement, employers’ associations shared the view that the national 
‘procedures and practices’ implementation clause implied sectoral collective 
agreements. This was based on the view that a topic such as teleworking was 
traditionally regulated via such an instrument. However, in the case of the Work-
related Stress Agreement, certain sectoral employers’ associations emphasized that 
the nature of the work-related stress issue made it lie outside the scope of ‘normal’ 
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Danish national ‘procedures and practices’. This formed the basis of an argument 
that it was more appropriate to interpret the national ‘procedures and practices’ 
implementation clause on a contextual basis rather than on a fixed interpretation of 
the clause. A representative from the local Government sector employers’ association 
KL stressed that the implementation that occurred within their sector was an 
innovatory one and one that differed from the means used to implement the Telework 
Agreement, whilst the industrial sector employers’ association DI also asserted that 
the fact that a different implementation route was appropriate for the Work-related 
Stress Agreement as opposed to the Telework Agreement demonstrated that national 
‘procedures and practices’ was best interpreted on a ‘case-by-case’ basis.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, there appears to have been more conflict over the interpretation of the 
national ‘procedures and practices’ implementation clause in the case of the Work-
related Stress Agreement. Although Danish trade unions consistently adopted a 
definition of national ‘procedures and practices’ that emphasized collective 
agreements between Social Partners, certain Danish employer associations used the 
case of the Work-related Stress Agreement to advance the argument that national 
‘procedures and practices’ were not in themselves something fixed and should be 
interpreted on a case by case basis. 
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7.3 The Substantive impact of the Telework and Work-related Stress 
Agreements in Denmark 
 
This section of the chapter will present the data collected on the substantive impact 
of the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements in Denmark. It will address the 
two agreements separately, and will discuss the data that is available upon their 
impact within Danish sectors and companies, the level of potential impact that the 
Danish Social Partners regard them as likely to achieve, and the extent to which the 
Agreements and their implementation added value to the content of Danish 
regulation on the teleworking and work-related stress issues. 
 
7.3.1 Telework Agreement  
 
Content 
 
At the inter-sectoral level, representatives of the social partners reported that many 
aspects of the European Telework Agreement were present within sectoral level 
collective agreements prior to the Telework Agreement being implemented in 
Denmark. An AC official stated that in the majority of Danish public sector 
collective agreements there were clauses on homeworking that covered the major 
provisions of teleworking such as health and safety and the provision of equipment 
for teleworkers. LO and DA officials also noted that, in many private sector 
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collective agreements in Denmark, many of the terms of the Agreement had either 
been the subject of pre-existing sectoral agreements on teleworking or homeworking. 
However, a DA official stated that one key value of the Agreement lay in the manner 
in which it had consolidated existing regulation and had provided potential 
teleworkers with a coherent frame of reference to develop future teleworking 
arrangements. An LO representative also reported that the Telework Agreement had 
contained a certain number of clauses, such as those pertaining to the duty of the 
employer to provide equipment, that had not inconsiderably strengthened the position 
of teleworkers in Denmark. 
 
At the sectoral level, the extent to which the Telework Agreement contributed to the 
substantive regulation of teleworking varied. An official from HK Rail stated that 
although the pre-existing 1997 sectoral agreement on teleworking had been specific 
on the duty of employers to ensure a safe work environment, it had not been specific 
with regard to the regulation of the work load and working time of teleworkers, and 
the implementation of the European Agreement had thus improved the sectoral 
regulation of teleworking in this regard.  In the finance sector, the terms of the 
European Agreement had been largely present within a 1997 collective agreement on 
distance working. According to a representative from FA, implementation of the 
European Agreement had merely consisted of slightly altering the existing agreement 
to take into account the stipulations of the European Agreement regarding the health 
and safety of teleworkers. In the local Government sector, the position of KTO was 
that the contents of a pre-existing sectoral Agreement on teleworking had been 
superior in terms of the protection it afforded to workers to the European Agreement. 
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KTO subsequently resisted, successfully, the attempts of the sectoral employers’ 
association KL to affect an implementation of the European Agreement that would 
allow employers and employees to organize teleworking arrangements directly and 
without consulting local trade unions. The clause in the Telework Agreement that 
forbids using the Agreement to downgrade national employment standards was cited 
by KTO. KTO did, however, regard one aspect of the Telework Agreement that 
stated the right of teleworkers to receive appropriate training and education as 
surpassing the content of the Danish Agreement, but were unable to persuade KL to 
implement this clause given the refusal of KTO to agree to the implementation of the 
clauses advocated by KL. In the Danish industrial sector, two collective agreements, 
covering blue collar workers and white collar workers, existed that specified a set of 
rights for homeworkers. It was reported by officials from DI and COI that many of 
the terms of these Agreements largely anticipated the terms of the European 
Agreement. However, it was also reported that the implementation of the European 
Agreement had been valuable in that it had provided a simplified and streamlined set 
of rules for prospective teleworkers to refer to. 
 
Data and perspectives on impact  
 
None of the Danish social partner organizations at the inter-sectoral or sectoral levels 
interviewed reported engaging in any formal monitoring exercises to appraise the 
impact of the implemented Telework Agreement. A KTO official stated that KTO 
had informally requested its lower level affiliates to provide the organization with 
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details of any local agreements concluded, but reported that no information had been 
received by the organization as of January 2008. The rationale of the social partner 
organizations in not conducting such exercises lay in the fact that they did not have 
the resources to conduct monitoring exercises on the impact of the Agreement and 
also did not see sufficient added value in conducting such an exercise. An LO official 
stated that a monitoring exercise would be superfluous given that any major 
transgressions of the implemented Agreement would attract the attention of the social 
partners via the self-monitoring mechanisms that characterize Danish collective 
agreements. DA concurred with this view, as did the social partners in the industrial 
sector. A DI official stated, 
 
‘The Telework Agreement now forms part of our general collective agreement with 
CO Industri so trade unions now have the right to complain if something is done that 
is in breach of the collective agreement. There’s a monitoring mechanism built into 
the collective agreement, so we don’t see the point in conducting further exercises.’ 
(DI) 
 
Despite there being no actual data on the impact of the Telework Agreement in 
Denmark, the Danish social partners had various perspectives regarding the level of 
impact that the Agreement was likely to achieve in terms of its ability to regulate 
teleworking in Denmark and its ability to increase the uptake of teleworking in 
sectors and companies. Although it was acknowledged that the Agreement and its 
implementation was likely to stimulate and encourage teleworking in many cases, it 
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was also stated that the impact of the Agreement in terms of the number of 
teleworkers it was likely to inspire would be precluded by the nature of work within 
many sectors. A DA official cited the construction sector as an example of a sector 
where teleworking would not be viable for the majority of employees, whilst an LO 
official highlighted the example of the public sector where many employees were 
engaged in frontline services and teleworking would subsequently not be viable. 
However, it was also recognized that in many professions, such as white collar 
professions, the use of teleworking as a way of flexible working was likely to 
become more popular as a result of the Agreement. A DA official stated that DA 
were not overtly concerned about the number of teleworkers the Agreement was 
likely to produce. For DA, the significance of the implemented Agreement lay in the 
fact that it provided employees and employers wishing to engage in teleworking with 
an appropriate framework of reference rather than in the number of teleworking 
arrangements that the Agreement would be likely to influence. 
 
In the finance sector, a FF official stated that FF doubted that the uptake of 
teleworking in the sector had been widespread due to the Agreement. This was 
attributed to the existence of many jobs within the sector that were based upon 
interaction with customers and that were subsequently not suited to teleworking, and 
the fact that many employees dealt with confidential information that it would not be 
appropriate to store on teleworking equipment kept in the homes of employees. The 
FF official stressed however that teleworking had been popular amongst IT workers 
and employees in managerial positions. An FA representative also stated that 
teleworking was ‘quite’ popular within the sector.  
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It was also noted by the Danish social partners that the impact of the European 
Agreement was likely to be less as a result of the pre-existing regulation of the 
teleworking issue that has been described above. It was argued that the prior 
existence of numerous sectoral agreements on teleworking and distance working 
would mean that the impact of the European Agreement was likely to be less than if 
the Agreement had addressed entirely virgin ground. 
 
7.3.2 Work-related Stress Agreement 
 
Content 
 
Inter-sectoral level interviewees were rather pessimistic regarding the degree to 
which the European Work-related Stress Agreement was likely to contribute to the 
general level of Danish regulation of work-related stress. Representatives from the 
trade union confederations AC and LO argued that the clauses within the European 
Agreement were very vague, and that subsequently there were no specifically 
worded clauses that could be actually implemented within Denmark. An AC official 
stated, 
 
‘[If you read the Work-related Stress Agreement] then there is nothing which can be 
implemented! If you don’t have any binding formulation but only recommendations 
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and considerations then employers will rightly query whether there is actually 
anything concrete in the Agreement that can be implemented.’ (AC) 
 
Inter-sectoral social partners also commented upon the high degree of prior 
regulation of the work-related stress issue in Denmark. Officials from DA and LO 
stated that the content of the European Agreement was already fulfilled in Danish 
health and safety legislation. Indeed, the main reason why an inter-sectoral ‘follow-
up’ agreement was not concluded to implement the European Agreement was that 
LO and DA considered that the European Agreement had little to offer the Danish 
context in the form of new regulation. 
 
At the Danish sectoral level, the extent to which the Work-related Stress Agreement 
contributed to sectoral regulation varied markedly. There were those sectors in which 
it was reported that the European Agreement had added a negligible amount to 
sectoral regulation. In the state rail sector, a HK rail official stated that the European 
Agreement had added almost nothing to the regulation of work-related stress in the 
sector. This was attributed to the fact that work-related stress had already been 
regulated through collective agreement in the sector, and had also been the subject of 
considerable promotional activity by the social partners within the sector. In the 
insurance and finance sectors, the Work-related Stress Agreement was not 
implemented because the sectoral social partners did not consider that its 
implementation would add anything to the sectoral regulation of the issue. An FF 
official stated, 
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‘We didn’t implement the European Agreement because we believed that we were 
carrying out activity in Denmark that was far beyond what the European Agreement 
had to offer us.’ (FF) 
 
In the local Government sector, the Work-related Stress Agreement exercised a 
considerable impact upon the sectoral regulation of the issue. Prior to the European 
Agreement, the topic of work-related stress had not been regulated by the social 
partners, and the European Agreement provided a chance for the sectoral social 
partners to conclude an agreement on the topic. Given that sectoral representatives 
reported that concern over the work-related stress issue was growing, and that the 
topic was a priority for the Presidents of both KTO and KL, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the European Agreement acted as a stimuli to a major piece of 
regulation in the sector. Within the industrial sector, the Work-related Stress 
Agreement also appears to have stimulated a key new agreement on the topic. A COI 
official stated that the Agreement that the social partners in the sector had concluded 
to implement the European Agreement entailed an innovative new way of managing 
work-related stress in the sector. 
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Data and perspectives on impact 
 
As of January 2008, none of the Danish social partner organizations had conducted 
any comprehensive monitoring exercises on the impact of the Work-related Stress 
Agreement. The local Government trade union organization KTO had, however, 
collected tentative statistics and estimated that in the Danish local Government sector 
and healthcare sector between 5% and 8% of local co-operative committees had 
concluded agreements on procedures to handle work-related stress that were inspired 
by sectoral level agreements. The rationale of the Danish social partners for not 
conducting exercises on the monitoring of impact was the same as was advanced in 
the case of the Telework Agreement; the organizations did not have the resources to 
conduct an exercise that they saw dubious added value from, and also believed that 
the Danish system of industrial relations had inbuilt mechanisms for the monitoring 
of collective agreements that meant that the Social Partners at higher levels would 
hear of breaches of the Agreement. 
 
In place of actual data on the impact of the Agreement, a expectations were advanced 
by social partner organizations regarding the level of impact they expected the 
Agreement to achieve. The inter-sectoral social partners were rather pessimistic 
about the potential of the Agreement to achieve a significant level of impact. This 
was due to their view, described above, that the wording of the European Agreement 
was ‘weak’ and contained very little that could be unambiguously interpreted by 
lower-level negotiators. DA and LO were more positive about the extent of influence 
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that their promotional activities to raise awareness of the topic of work-related stress 
could achieve. Officials from both organizations stated that their promotional 
activities would be likely to inspire a fair level of activity on the topic of work-
related stress in Denmark through awareness raising about the condition of work-
related stress and through alerting the Danish social partners about the existing 
regulation surrounding the issue. An LO official stated, 
 
‘Legally speaking, the Work-related Stress Agreement offers very little to Denmark. 
However, practically speaking, if we do a lot of awareness raising on the subject of 
work-related stress with DA then it will have a very positive impact.’ (LO) 
 
At the Danish sectoral level, the social partners also made predictions about the level 
of impact that the Agreement would be likely to achieve in their sectors. In the state 
rail, insurance and finance sectors, those sectors in which prior regulation had existed 
on work-related stress, the fact that the content of the European Agreement offered a 
minimal level of value to the sectoral social partners, described above, meant that the 
social partners within the sectors predicted that the European Agreement would 
achieve a minimal level of impact within their sectors. In those sectors where there 
had not been comprehensive regulation of the work-related stress issue prior to the 
European Agreement and the European Agreement had subsequently triggered the 
conclusion of innovative agreements within the sectors, described above, then the 
sectoral social partners predicted that the Work-related Stress Agreement would be 
likely to achieve a far more significant impact. A COI official described the 
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implemented Agreement as an useful tool that had the potential to significantly 
reduce stress levels within the sector. In the local Government sector, an official 
from the trade union cartel KTO stated that the existence of the Agreement made it 
more acceptable for employees to talk about stress, and also alluded to the evidence, 
presented above, of local cooperative committees concluding agreements for the 
management of work-related stress as a result of the sectoral Agreement.  
 
7.4 Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning and Joint Declaration on 
Lifelong Learning in the European Banking Sector 
 
The chapter will now consider the impact of the Framework of Actions on Lifelong 
Learning and the Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the European Banking 
Sector in the Denmark. Owing to the fact that the texts are not Article 138-9 
Agreements and thus do not have to be implemented in specified procedural forms, 
only the substantive impact of the texts in Denmark, rather than the procedural 
implementation of the texts will be considered.  
 
7.4.1 Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning 
 
Danish actors, on both sides of industry, stated that the advanced nature of the 
regulation of lifelong learning within Denmark precluded the European text from 
exercising a substantial impact in Denmark. An official from the organization AC 
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compared the non-legally binding nature of the EU text unfavourably with the 
‘binding formulations’ of Danish collective agreements on lifelong learning, whilst a 
DA official stressed that the content of the European text had been present within 
Danish social partner regulation for decades prior to the negotiation of the European 
text. Subsequently, actors reported that the impact of the Framework of actions on 
Lifelong Learning had been limited within Denmark. An AC representative stated 
that the value of the text for AC had been negligible given the limited form of the 
content and its non-legally binding nature, and reported that all participation in the 
text had implied for AC was annually compiling a list of activities on lifelong 
learning that AC were engaging in independently of the European text. An AC 
official stated, 
 
‘We have obtained no value from participating in this exercise. Of course we report 
on the activities that we are engaged in, but there are no bridges or links between 
European and national activities.’ (AC) 
 
 The employer organizations DA and KL also stated that participation in the 
European text had imparted no new obligations onto their organizations, and 
participation in the text had merely consisted of annually compiling a list of national 
policies that derived their inspiration from elsewhere. The organizations attributed 
this situation to the fact that lifelong learning policy was highly developed in the 
Danish context. Representatives from both organizations acknowledged that the text 
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may have had a slight coordinating and indirect role in the formation of lifelong 
learning policy within Denmark however. 
 
A representative from KL also reported that the Framework of Actions on Lifelong 
Learning had had one significant indirect effect within the Danish local Government 
sector. Traditionally, human resource managers within the sector had regarded 
lifelong learning as a policy to be managed at the firm level. The KL official reported 
that the existence of the Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning had helped 
contribute to the development of a new attitude in which lifelong learning policy was 
seen as also being legitimate subject matter for sectoral agreements. The existence of 
the text gave sectoral representatives the opportunity to justify sectoral level work on 
lifelong learning as fulfilling part of their obligations to the European level.  
 
7.4.2 Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the European Banking Sector 
 
Within the Danish finance sector, a 2003 collective agreement was concluded on 
educational funds that was, to an extent, inspired by the European Banking sector 
Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning. This agreement aimed to facilitate the 
employability of workers within the sector by establishing special funds for the 
competence development needs of workers. According to representatives from the 
Danish banking sector social partners, the existence of the European text partly 
inspired and shaped the content of the Danish Agreement, without having a pivotal 
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or primary influence on the decision of the sectoral social partners to conclude the 
Agreement. An FF official stated,  
 
‘Education and competence development is extremely important so whether or not 
this Agreement would have happened anyway is difficult to say… but I believe we 
derived a lot of inspiration from the joint declaration.’ (FF) 
 
An FA official also stated that the European text had exercised a fair degree of 
influence upon the Danish Agreement. Further, it was emphasized by the FF 
representative that the fact that FA and FF had both been closely involved in the 
European-level drafting and negotiation of the text meant that a sense of ‘ownership’ 
was felt regarding the text and that the parties subsequently felt an ‘obligation’ to 
engage in some sort of activity within Denmark that would reflect the influence of 
the text. To illustrate the latter point, the existence of a joint statement by the 
Presidents of FA and FF emphasizing that the Danish Agreement specifically 
addressed the points raised by the European-level text was alluded to. Finally, the FF 
representative asserted that FA’s membership of the European Banking Federation 
and non-membership of Business Europe meant that they had been more likely to 
take the European Banking sector text more seriously than the inter-sectoral level 
European Agreements. 
 
However, the influence of the European text within the sector should not be 
overstated. According to an FA representative, the impact of the European text upon 
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the decision to conclude the Danish Agreement was ‘quite small’, and the Agreement 
would have been concluded anyway without the existence of the European text. An 
FF spokesperson also stressed the pivotal status of the debates around education and 
competence development within the sector prior to the European text, and 
acknowledged that the European text had played a coordinating, rather than a 
precipitating, role. Furthermore, the impact of the Danish collective agreement upon 
industrial relations within the sector appears to have been modest. Representatives 
from both sectoral social partner organizations noted that there had been a limited 
uptake of the training initiative from employees in the sector. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the data gathered on the Danish implementation of the 
Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements, and Framework of Actions on 
Lifelong Learning and Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the European 
Banking sector. With regard to the procedural forms in which the two Agreements 
were implemented, these varied in relation to three factors; these were the Agreement 
being implemented, the level at which the implementation was affected, and the 
sector in question. The Telework Agreement was subject to an inter-sectoral ‘follow 
up’ Agreement whilst the Work-related Stress Agreement was not. This is an 
example of the content of the Agreement exercising a key influence over the 
implementation strategy preferred by social partners, and in several sectors the 
content and topic of the Agreement played a crucial role in determining the 
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implementation strategy eventually chosen. Implementation outcomes also became 
enmeshed in existing processes of contestation occurring between the Danish social 
partners. The case of the DA and AC dispute over the implementation of the 
Telework Agreement is an instance of this, as is the manner in which the content of 
the DA-LO ‘follow up’ Agreement to implement the Telework Agreement became 
part of a wider series of discussions conducted by DA and LO. With regard to the 
issue of the Danish social partners’ interpretation of the national ‘procedures and 
practices’ implementation clause, a clear difference is evident between the 
interpretation of Danish trade unions and employer associations, and this difference 
also became more pronounced when considering the implementation of the Work-
related Stress Agreement. Danish trade union organizations consistently adopted an 
interpretation of national ‘procedures and practices’ that was based on an 
interpretation of the clause as implying collective agreements between the social 
partners, whilst Danish employer associations advocated a more contextual 
implementation of the clause, and in some cases argued that a topic such as work-
related stress was not appropriate for implementation via traditional collective 
agreement. 
 
In terms of the substantive impact of the Agreements in Denmark, the overall picture 
is somewhat mixed. Whilst it is clear that the implementation of the Telework 
Agreement in Denmark generally added an useful set of new rights to Danish 
industrial relations and also is likely to have inspired a number of new teleworkers 
and protected existing ones, it is also true that the area was regulated to a fair degree 
prior to the implementation of the European Agreement, and also that the issue of 
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teleworking is generally not pivotal to the debates that are conducted upon industrial 
relations in Denmark. The Work-related Stress Agreement would appear to have had 
less of an impact. Not only did Danish trade unionists regard the content of the 
European Agreement as ‘weak’, but the topic of work-related stress was also fairly 
comprehensively covered in Denmark prior to the implementation of the Agreement. 
The exceptions are the industrial and local Government sectors in which the 
Agreement appeared to achieve a rather better level of impact. Finally, the impact of 
the Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning and Joint Declaration on Lifelong 
Learning in the European Banking Sector appear to have been rather minimized by 
the existence of substantial prior regulation on the topic of the texts prior to their 
inception. Both texts did, however, play a role in coordinating and very indirectly 
influencing the work of Danish Social Partners in the field of lifelong learning 
policy. 
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Chapter 8: Implementation in UK 
8.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will present the data collected in the course of the fieldwork in the UK. 
The chapter will open with (i) a brief description of the system of industrial relations 
in the UK and its record with regard to the implementation of the European Social 
partner Framework Agreements of the 1990s and European Social Policy more 
generally. Then, the chapter will (ii) describe the process of the procedural 
implementations of the Agreements in the UK and the related issue of actors’ reading 
of national ‘procedures and practices’ in the context of the UK system. Here, it 
emerged that these processes were somewhat technocratic and characterized largely 
by the absence of conflict between the parties to implementation. Further, it emerged 
that, given the ‘disorganized’ nature of national ‘procedures and practices’ in the 
UK, actors’ interpretations of national ‘procedures and practices’ were contested. 
Then, the chapter w ill (iii) describe the data collected on the substantive 
implementation of the Agreements in the UK. Here, it was found that there was 
generally a deficit of information on the impact of the Agreements, and that, 
although the Agreements appear to have been the subject of interest at lower levels, it 
is doubtful that a major impact was achieved. Finally, the chapter will (iv) analyze 
the impact achieved by the Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning and Joint 
Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the Banking Sector in the UK. Here, it emerged 
that both texts had initiated very limited specific policy activity in the UK.  
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8.1.1 Industrial Relations in the UK  
 
Historically, the UK system has been described as the classic voluntarist system of 
industrial relations (Hyman, 2003; Dickens and Hall, 2006). This system entailed the 
state abstaining from becoming involved in relations between trade unions and 
employers, and merely establishing a minimum level of workplace health and safety 
regulation. In the post-war years, there were several multi-employer sectoral 
agreements in the private sector, but these have almost completely disappeared after 
they were abandoned by employers in the 1980s. Further, these differed from multi-
employer sectoral agreements in other European countries in that they were neither 
legally enforceable nor subject to regulation by peak-level social partner 
organizations. The UK also differs from other Western European states in that, aside 
from a brief period in the 1960s and 1970s, there is no tradition of inter-sectoral 
concertation by the social partners.  
  
After the 1997 victory of the New Labour Party, a series of New Labour 
Governments regulated, via the law, substantive aspects of the employment 
relationship for the first time. Most notably, a national minimum wage was 
introduced, and the implementation of the European Working Time Directive, 
although with a clause allowing individual workers to ‘opt-out’ of the regulations, 
regulated working time in the UK. National 'procedures and practices' in the UK is 
now characterized by a range of trends, and has been described by scholars as 
representing a bifurcated model (Kersley et al, 2005). Sectoral collective agreements 
exist within areas of the public sector, yet the private sector is characterized by firm-
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level collective agreements and, in many cases, unilateral managerial authority. The 
role of the law has also grown since 1997 and some have commented that the UK 
system is moving in a statist direction (Hyman, 2003; Dickens and Hall, 2006).  
 
The main UK Social partner organizations are the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI). TUC is the confederal umbrella trade union 
organization for 58 UK trade unions, whilst CBI represents UK businesses. In 
addition to TUC and CBI, the Social partner organizations CEEP UK, who represent 
UK public sector employers, the Forum for Private Business (FPB), who represent 
small businesses in the UK, and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), an arm of 
the UK public authorities concerned with health and safety regulation, were involved 
in the implementation of the Agreements. The UK Government Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) were also involved in the implementation of the Agreements.  
 
8.1.2 The UK system and European Social Policy 
 
The Major Conservative Government secured a UK ‘opt-out’ from the Social 
Protocol that was annexed to the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. This ‘opt-out’ was then 
reversed by the New Labour Government that assumed power in 1997. As a result of 
this, the European social partner agreed 1995 Parental Leave Directive was not 
implemented in the UK until after the UK ‘opt-out’ was reversed. The Parental 
Leave Directive was then implemented in the UK by the UK Government as were 
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the Part-time Work Directive and Fixed-term Work Directive. Along with other EU 
social and employment regulations, the implementation of these social partner agreed 
Directives formed a cornerstone of the Blair Government’s strategy of setting a 
‘floor’ of legal rights in the sphere of industrial relations. As a result of the legalistic 
implementation of these Directives, the issue of national ‘procedures and practices’ 
for social dialogue in the UK did not arise during the implementation process. 
Worries about the compatibility of UK national ‘procedures and practices’ for social 
dialogue with the Working Time Directive did, however, motivate policymakers in 
the UK to secure the individual ‘opt-out’ from these regulations. The concern of the 
UK Government was that the derogations contained in the Directive available via 
collective agreement would be difficult to trigger in the context of the UK system.  
 
The 2002 conclusion of the Telework Agreement was met with skepticism in some 
trade union circles in the UK. This attitude may have partly reflected the success of 
the Directive-based approach in the UK context, and also the suspicion that the ‘dis-
organized’ nature of social dialogue in the UK would ensure that such agreements 
would achieve minimal impact within the UK.  
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8.2 The Procedural Implementations of the Telework and Work-related Stress 
Agreements in UK 
 
This section of the chapter will address the procedural implementation of the 
Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements. Also, it will consider the related 
issue of actors’ interpretations of national ‘procedures and practices’ in the UK 
context.  
 
8.2.1 Telework Agreement  
 
The Telework Agreement was implemented in the UK in August 2003 as a non-
legally binding UK social partner text entitled ‘Telework Guidance’. The content of 
the text was agreed upon by CBI, CEEP UK, and TUC, and was published by the UK 
Government Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The text referred heavily to 
the European Agreement, and cited the content of the European Agreement whilst 
demonstrating how UK legal regulation already covered many of the clauses of the 
European Agreement. There were also references to what was regarded as ‘good 
practice’ concerning the operation of teleworking policies.  
The implementation of the Telework Agreement in the UK was not particularly 
marked by conflictual relations between the UK social partners, and was primarily 
characterized by the desire of the UK social partners to affect an implementation that 
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would satisfy their obligations to the European level. DTI were particularly keen that 
the UK social partners’ meet the requirements of the European Agreement, and, to 
this end, took the initiative in organizing meetings between the UK social partners 
and providing logistical and financial support to the social partners in the course of 
the implementation process. DTI did not express a desire for any particular type of 
implementation form, and saw their role as ensuring the production of ‘some sort of 
agreement’ that would satisfy the UK’s obligations to the European-level. The DTI 
also did not assume a role in negotiating the content of the text and regarded this as 
the task of the social partners.  
 
Although the process of implementation of the Telework Agreement in the UK was 
not particularly marked by conflict between the social partners, there was a 
disagreement between the social partners regarding the form in which the Agreement 
should be implemented in the UK. According to a TUC official, the CBI’s attitude 
was ‘difficult’ with regard to their refusal to countenance the TUC’s proposal for a 
national inter-sectoral collective agreement on telework. This confirms Larsen and 
Andersen’s report (2007) that the CBI had threatened to leave the negotiations 
should their demand for guidelines rather than a national inter-sectoral Agreement be 
refused. However, in other respects, the implementation process was conducted 
without controversy. Aside from the debate over the form in which the Agreement 
should be implemented, the TUC official described the process of implementation as 
pragmatic and ‘friendly’. CBI and CEEP UK officials reported that the negotiation 
process had been conducted in a ‘pragmatic’ and ‘common-sensical’ fashion. The 
fact that the process took such a form was attributed by the employers’ groups to the 
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perception that the Agreement was a ‘voluntary’ or ‘non-legally binding’ agreement 
rather than an autonomous one, and also to the fact that TUC had already agreed to 
this non-legally binding mode of implementation given that they had signed the 
Agreement at the European level. Also, it was regarded by the organizations that the 
issues touched upon by the topic of teleworking were relatively uncontroversial. 
  
Various rationales underpinned the implementation routes advocated by the UK 
social partners. The UK employer associations CBI and CEEP UK strongly favoured 
the adoption of a non-legally binding text. The CBI assumed this position for several 
reasons. Firstly, the organization viewed the Telework Agreement as a voluntary 
instrument rather than an autonomous agreement that was subsequently to be 
implemented via non-legally binding means. Also, given CBI’s view that the rights 
of teleworkers were already protected by existing regulation, the organization 
regarded anything more than a non-legally binding implementation as ‘excessive’. 
Finally, CBI were opposed to TUC’s proposition for a inter-sectoral collective 
agreement on telework on the grounds that they regarded such a procedural 
development as undesirable, and also that teleworkers in firms with no unions would 
be potentially excluded from such an agreement. This approach to the development 
of national inter-sectoral social dialogue structures is in line with the organization’s 
consistent opposition to the development of such mechanisms within the UK. CEEP 
UK assumed a similar position to that of CBI. The view of the CEEP UK was that 
the topic of teleworking did not require legal regulation or an inter-sectoral collective 
agreement given the topic was largely covered by existing regulation, and that it 
would have been disproportionate to implement a non-legally binding EU instrument 
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through more than non-legally binding means. Although both CBI and CEEP UK 
were opposed to anything other than the production of a non-legally binding text, 
both organizations nevertheless had a strategic interest in the implementation of the 
Telework Agreement by some means. This was due to the desire of both 
organizations to demonstrate to the European social partners and European public 
authorities that non-legally binding EU-level instruments could be implemented 
efficiently and effectively within the UK, and were thus a viable means of regulating 
social Europe. A CEEP UK official stated,  
 
‘As an employer association, we are very favourable to these sorts of Agreements as 
opposed to Directives. So, we wanted to demonstrate that they could be implemented 
effectively and efficiently in the UK.’ (CEEP UK) 
 
The TUC advocated a UK national inter-sectoral collective agreement on Telework. 
A TUC official stated what this would have entailed and why the organization 
advocated it,  
 
‘[A UK national collective agreement] would have been a bit harder edged. It would 
have obliged us to consult with our members, although we did, and it would have 
obliged CBI and CEEP UK to consult with their constituent parts, and go through a 
rather more formal negotiated process… if it was an agreement we [also] feel it then 
would have been used more by companies and then if they had converted it into 
  
212
collective agreements that would have been incorporated into individual contracts of 
employment.’  (TUC) 
 
The TUC abandoned this idea in the face of strong employer opposition to the 
proposition. TUC’s relative willingness to abandon the proposal was attributed by a 
TUC official to the lack of importance that the organization attached to the topic of 
teleworking. The official stated that teleworkers were typically workers who enjoyed 
a relatively privileged position in the labour market and also that the demand for 
teleworking often came from employees rather than employers. Further, the TUC felt 
that the EU Agreement made a clear distinction between teleworking and 
homeworking, the latter of which the TUC did consider a key employment relations 
issues. A legal implementation route was not considered by the TUC. Although the 
organization ‘would not have opposed a law’ had it been proposed by the UK 
Government, the TUC thought that a non-legally binding EU instrument implied a 
non-legally binding implementation method.  
 
Although it was estimated by CBI and CEEP UK officials that the Telework 
Agreement had inspired firm level teleworking policies, only in one instance was a 
case of a collective agreement specifically referring to the European Agreement 
known of. This case was in the local Government sector, where the sectoral social 
partners were planning to update an existing collective agreement on distance 
working to refer to the existence of the European Agreement. The apparent lack of an 
uptake in other sectors and firms was attributed to a lack of interest in the 
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teleworking issue, and to the dis-organized nature of collective relations between the 
social partners in the UK.  
 
8.2.2 Work-related Stress Agreement  
 
The Work-related Stress Agreement was also implemented in the UK as a non-
legally binding set of guidelines in July 2005 that was entitled ‘Work-related Stress: 
A Guide’. The text was concluded by the UK Social partner organizations CBI, 
TUC, CEEP UK, FPB, and HSE. As was the case with the Telework Agreement, the 
meeting in which the implementation was discussed and negotiated was hosted by 
the DTI. The text that was agreed by the parties referred to many of the issues raised 
by the European Agreement and discussed how these were covered by existing UK 
legislation and also by a HSE document entitled Management Standards for Work-
related Stress.  
The implementation process of the Work-related Stress Agreement in the UK was 
not a radically different one to that of the Telework Agreement. No UK social 
partner interviewees alluded to the existence of any overt conflict between the parties 
and the process was described as a pragmatic one. A CEEP UK official reported that 
more time was spent discussing the graphic design of the text that was to be 
published than was spent negotiating the content of the text. A number of smaller 
differences in the processes of the implementation of the two Agreements were 
evident. Firstly, there was less discussion on the content of the text on work-related 
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stress than on the text on teleworking. This was attributed to the fact that there was 
more existing literature and regulation on work-related stress in the UK than on 
teleworking and that it was thus easier to draft the document given the existence of 
several precedents. Also, the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and Forum of 
Private Business (FPB) were involved in the implementation of the Work-related 
Stress Agreement yet had not been involved in the implementation of the Telework 
Agreement. The former organization was invited to partake in the process owing to 
the substantial work they had done in the field of work-related stress, whilst the latter 
participated after requesting to DTI that they be involved in the process. The FPB’s 
involvement in the process of implementation is also significant in that there was 
greater representation on the employer side in the course of the implementation of 
the Work-related Stress Agreement than there was during the implementation of the 
Telework Agreement.  
 
There would also appear to have been a ‘learning effect’ in the case of the 
implementation of the Work-related Stress Agreement whereby the parties to 
implementation felt more comfortable with the process and subsequently took on 
more tasks. For example, whilst DTI still provided logistical support to the social 
partners, the social partners drafted the text of the text on work-related stress whereas 
the DTI had done this with the text on teleworking. A CEEP UK official stated,  
 
‘I think there was [a learning effect] to the extent that it brought around the table 
more or less the same people [as the Telework Agreement] and it helps that you meet 
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and build up trust with them the more often you meet and make these agreements. 
The more you meet, the more you can trust each other to draft various sections and 
then it’s easier to reach agreements’ (CEEP UK)  
 
The strategies adopted by the UK social partner organizations with regard to their 
preferred implementation route for the Work-related Stress Agreement were not 
greatly different to those adopted with regard to the Telework Agreement. As was 
the case with the Telework Agreement, the employer associations CBI and CEEP 
UK strongly advocated the route of non-legally binding guidelines that was 
eventually adopted. The rationale of the organizations was that the European 
Agreement was non-legally binding, or, in the words of the CBI, ‘voluntary’, and 
that the existence of existing regulation on the topic of work-related stress meant that 
more was undesirable. Further, CBI did not wish to conclude a national inter-sectoral 
collective agreement implementing the Agreement for the reason that it would set a 
procedural precedent that would be advantageous to the agenda of TUC. The FPB 
also assumed the view that further regulation of the work-related stress issue was 
unnecessary, and took part in the negotiations with the goal of minimizing the burden 
that would be placed upon the small businesses that constitute the organization’s 
membership. The TUC’s stance was also similar to that it had taken on the 
implementation of the Telework Agreement. Although the organization proposed a 
national inter-sectoral collective agreement, the strength of the employers’ 
associations’ assertions forced it to accept the implementation route that was 
eventually adopted. The HSE also advocated the voluntary implementation route that 
was eventually taken. This was due to its desire to promote the non-legally binding 
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approach to work-related stress that was set out in their Management Standards for 
Work-related Stress.   
 
Although it was thought by CBI and CEEP UK officials that ‘Work-related Stress: A 
Guide’ was likely to have inspired several firm level policies on the management of 
work-related stress, in no instances was a case of a sectoral or firm-level collective 
agreement specifically referring to the European Agreement known of. This was 
attributed to the dis-organized nature of collective relations between the social 
partners in the UK and non-legally binding nature of the text.  
 
8.2.3 National ‘Procedures and Practices’  
 
The various implementation strategies that were proposed by the parties were 
underpinned and informed by specific interpretation of the national ‘procedures and 
practices’ clause by which the Agreements were to be implemented in accordance 
with. As was stated at the beginning of this chapter, there are no established forums 
for national inter-sectoral social dialogue in the UK. This problem was highlighted 
by all interviewees, who stated that the lack of such a forum made it particularly 
arduous, in the case of European Agreements that had to be implemented by the 
national inter-sectoral social partners, to identify the ‘correct’ national ‘procedures 
and practices’ for their implementation. A reading of implementation by national 
‘procedures and practices’ that incorporated the variety of firm and plant level 
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collective negotiations and sectoral level public sector negotiations evident in the UK 
was not embraced by the parties to the implementation and was considered 
‘disproportionate’. A CEEP UK official stated,  
 
‘The only way [the Telework Agreement could be implemented in the UK via 
established national ‘procedures and practices’] would be to take it to sectoral level 
in the public services and to sub-sectoral level in the private sector. It might end up 
in individual workplace agreements, and that would be completely disproportionate 
to the issue involved.’ (CEEP UK)  
 
Given the variety of legislation that UK Governments have passed since 1997 on 
substantive aspects of the employment relationship, it is possible to conceive of UK 
national ‘procedures and practices’ as consisting of legal regulation. ETUC also read 
national ‘procedures and practices’ as incorporating the role that national 
Governments usually play within national systems of employment regulation. None 
of the UK social partner organizations interpreted the national ‘procedures and 
practices’ implementation clause to imply this or were aware of the ETUC’s reading. 
The Agreements were perceived primarily as non-legally binding Agreements and 
thus not intended for legal implementation within member states.  
 
Owing to the fact that there were no identifiable established institutional mechanisms 
with which the UK social partners were able to interpret UK national ‘procedures 
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and practices’, the actual interpretations of national ‘procedures and practices’ in the 
UK by the social partners took place in a vacuum. In this vacuum, the social partner 
organizations assumed different positions as to what was constitutive of national 
‘procedures and practices’. UK employers’ associations offered an interpretation of 
national ‘procedures and practices’ that centered on voluntary guidelines and was 
consistent with their existing relationships with their affiliates. CBI stressed their 
existing relationships with TUC on non-legally binding policies that the two 
organizations had worked on together,  
 
‘We’d already had very strong relations with the TUC in the employment area, for 
example we’d already worked a couple of years ago on a major report that we did 
with the TUC on skills and productivity… We also have good relations between the 
director generals and good relations between the staff… So we have a strong history 
of working together and producing joint publications.’ (CBI) 
 
CEEP UK and FPB interpreted UK national ‘procedures and practices’ for social 
dialogue as consisting of the inter-sectoral forum that had been established to 
implement the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements. This forum was 
further conceived of by the organizations as a very ‘informal’ and ‘temporary’ 
institution that had been established solely to implement the European Agreements 
via non-legally binding guidelines. DTI and TUC also both adopted distinct positions 
on the constitution of national ‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue in the 
UK. For DTI, the matter was solely a question for the UK social partner 
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organizations and was not deemed an issue which the UK public authorities should 
occupy themselves with. TUC understood national ‘procedures and practices’ for 
social dialogue in the UK to consist of a national inter-sectoral collective agreement 
between the parties to implementation. It was considered by the organization that this 
would give the implementations a ‘harder edge’ and would lead to a greater 
likelihood of the European Agreements inspiring lower-level collective agreements 
in the UK.  
 
Summary 
 
In summary, the implementations of the Telework and Work-related Stress 
Agreements in the UK were not characterized by particularly high levels of conflict 
between the UK social partners. This was attributable to the view that the 
Agreements were non-legally binding and therefore to be implemented in a non-
legally binding form, and also, in the case of the Telework Agreement, to the view of 
the UK social partners that teleworking was not an issue of high priority. Concerning 
national ‘procedures and practices’ in the UK, it emerged that the UK social partners 
regarded national ‘procedures and practices’ as unidentifiable in the context of the 
UK system. In the resulting void, interpretations of national ‘procedures and 
practices’ were advanced that differed between the social partner organizations. 
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8.3 The Substantive Impact of the Agreements  
 
This section of the chapter will address the substantive impact of the Telework and 
Work-related Stress Agreements in the UK, in addition to the substantive impact of 
the Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning and Joint Declaration on Lifelong 
Learning in the European Banking sector in the country.  
 
8.3.1 Telework Agreement  
 
Content  
 
There was no specific legal regulation or national inter-sectoral collective agreement 
concerning teleworking in the UK prior to the conclusion of the European Telework 
Agreement. However, as the UK social partners recognized, much of the content of 
the European Agreement was already covered in existing UK regulation. The health 
and safety aspect of teleworking was covered by the 1974 Health and Safety at Work 
Act, the issue of data protection for teleworkers by the 1998 Data Protection Act, and 
the potential for teleworkers to be discriminated against by the body of UK 
employment law that prevents discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and religion. 
A TUC official stated,  
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‘[The TUC] felt that because telework in the UK is already regulated through health 
and safety laws and discrimination laws that the territory for us was relatively 
uncontroversial.’ (TUC) 
 
The position of the DTI was also that the topic of teleworking was largely covered by 
existing UK legislation. Also, the DTI had issued a non-legally binding set of 
guidelines on teleworking that had been published prior to the implementation of the 
European Agreement in the UK and that covered much of the same ground as the 
European Agreement.  
 
There were also policies on teleworking in the UK local Government sector that 
existed prior to the implementation of the European Agreement. A CEEP UK official 
said that he was aware of UK local authorities who had formulated teleworking 
policies at the level of their authority. At the national local Government sector level, 
there was also a document related to teleworking included in the sectoral collective 
agreement. The document, entitled ‘Finding the balance’, was non-legally binding 
and made several recommendations with regard to ‘best practice’ regarding 
teleworking. However, data from the CBI’s Employment Trends Survey would 
suggest that in the majority of firms teleworking schemes were not in operation prior 
to the social partner text. Their 2004 survey revealed that in 2004 only in 11% of 
cases did firms have teleworking schemes in operation. This point was also stressed 
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by other employer-side interviewees, who stated that in many firms, particularly 
SMEs, there were no policies on telework in operation.  
 
Data and perspectives on impact  
 
None of the UK social partner organizations had conducted specific monitoring 
exercises on the impact of ‘Telework Guidance’. A variety of reasons were cited for 
this. CBI and CEEP UK stated that they did not see an added value in conducting 
such an exercise given that the purpose of the agreed text had been to provide a ‘soft’ 
framework for interested parties, and also added that it would be methodologically 
difficult to attribute a rise in teleworking to the existence of the document. CEEP UK 
also stated that they did not have the resources at the disposal of their organization to 
engage in such an exercise. A TUC official stated that the organization did not 
perceive teleworking to be important enough an issue as to merit committing scarce 
resources to such a project. DTI also did not conduct such an exercise. A DTI official 
stated that DTI regarded such a potential exercise as coming under the remit of the 
UK social partners rather than the DTI given that ‘Telework Guidance’ was viewed 
as primarily a document of the UK Social partners.  
 
In place of specific data on the impact of the implemented Agreement, social 
partners alluded to various other sources that contained data on general trends 
regarding the use of teleworking in the UK labour market. Specifically, the UK 
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Government’s Labour Force Survey and the CBI’s Employment Trends Survey were 
mentioned. Despite the difficulty in establishing a causal link between ‘Telework 
Guidance’ and the data within such sources, the surveys provide a rich level of data 
on teleworking in the UK. The 2008 CBI Employment Trends Survey found that 
46% of all employers surveyed offered teleworking to staff. This figure was 14% in 
2006, and 11% in 2004. Although it is very problematic to attribute this rise to the 
influence of ‘Telework Guidance’, it is fair to say that the existence of the text has 
formed part of the overall political and social context in which such a rise has taken 
place. UK social partner organizations also had anecdotal information on the impact 
of the text. A CEEP UK official referred to ‘several’ of their member organizations 
who had developed teleworking policies that had been inspired by the text. A CBI 
official also stated that the organization had received feedback, particularly from 
smaller firms, stating that the text had led to the development of teleworking policies. 
  
In the absence of substantial data on the impact of the implemented Telework 
Agreement, the UK social partners made a variety of hypotheses about the level of 
impact that ‘Telework Guidance’ would be likely to achieve in the UK. CBI and 
CEEP UK stated that although the existence of the text was unlikely to revolutionize 
the practice of teleworking in the UK, the text would nevertheless be likely to raise 
awareness about teleworking and also be likely to inspire those parties who were 
interested in teleworking. A DTI official concurred that the text was likely to achieve 
this effect. A CBI official also expressed the view that the ‘soft’ approach of the text, 
where ‘best practice’ on teleworking was presented by the social partners rather than 
the UK Government imposing regulation on the topic, would be more likely to lead 
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to a more enthusiastic level of uptake of the text in many firms. CBI and CEEP UK 
also contended that the text was likely to have more impact in small organizations 
than large ones. This was attributed to the fact that larger organizations were likely to 
have had teleworking policies in existence prior to the publication of ‘Telework 
Guidance’. In the local Government sector, an LGA official hypothesized that the 
text was likely to have a fair level of impact in the sector as it provided an ‘useful 
frame of reference’ for teleworkers. However, it was also stated that there were many 
occupational groups within the sector such as teachers and refuse collectors for 
whom teleworking policies were very unlikely to be developed due to the ‘frontline’ 
nature of the occupations.  
 
The TUC were rather less optimistic about the potential impact of the text. Firstly, an 
official expressed the view that there appeared to be only limited levels of interest in 
teleworking amongst employees who were members of TUC affiliated unions. It was 
argued that this would preclude the level of potential impact that the text was likely 
to have. Also, the fact that the text was not a legal instrument meant that TUC were 
skeptical as to the level of impact it was likely to achieve given the de-centralized 
nature of collective bargaining in the UK. An official stated,  
 
‘We feel that in Britain that to get an impact, at the lower than national level, you 
need legislation, not just voluntary texts… We don’t know quite frankly whether 
employers are taking these things very seriously. At the moment we’re 
skeptical.’ (TUC) 
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8.3.3 Work-related Stress Agreement  
 
Content  
 
Prior to the implementation of the European Work-related Stress Agreement in the 
UK, there was no single legal regulation or national inter-sectoral collective 
agreement on the issue of work-related stress in the UK. However, in practice, the 
topic of work-related stress came under the remit of the 1974 Health and Safety at 
Work Act. This Act imparted upon employers the obligation to ensure the mental 
wellbeing of their employees. Various ‘soft’ policies also covered the topic of work-
related stress. Specifically, there was the HSE’s 2004 Management Standards for 
Work-related Stress. This document drew on four years of scientific research after 
consultation with the UK social partners and public authorities, was non-legally 
binding, and enjoyed a very high profile within the UK context. Interviewees 
stressed that the HSE document had a higher profile than the European Agreement. 
A CEEP UK official stated,  
 
‘With [the implementation of the Work-related Stress Agreement] we said that the 
UK management guidelines covered more or less the same ground as the European 
agreement, so let’s just throw our weight behind the UK management guidelines, and 
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refer in passing to a contemporary EU-level agreement that covers the same 
ground.’ (CEEP UK) 
 
In the course of the research in the UK local Government sector it emerged that the 
HSE document also enjoyed a higher profile than the European Agreement within 
the sector. Officials from the trade union Unison and the employers’ association 
Local Government Association (LGA) both stated this. Further, other regulatory 
approaches to work-related stress existed at the level of the UK local Government 
sector. A non-legally binding document entitled ‘Correcting stress in the workplace’ 
had been produced by the LGA years earlier, and, according to an LGA official 
many local authorities had individual policies designed to tackle and prevent work-
related stress for years prior to the European Agreement. However, it should also be 
emphasized that many firms did not have a work-related stress policy prior to the 
implementation of the European Agreement, and that the topic of work-related stress 
as an area of concern in UK employment relations is relatively recent. A CBI official 
stated that many of their member firms, particularly the smaller firms, did not have 
policies in place.  
 
Data and perspectives on impact  
 
As was the case with ‘Telework Guidance’, no formal monitoring exercises were 
conducted by the UK Social partners to assess the impact of ‘Work-related Stress: A 
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Guide’. The rationales for the decision not to undertake monitoring exercises were 
largely the same as those advanced for the decision not to undertake monitoring 
exercises for the text on teleworking. CBI stated that they did not perceive an 
advantage in undertaking such an exercise given that, in their view, the value of the 
text lay in that it merely provided a framework for parties seeking to formulate 
policies on work-related stress. CEEP UK took a similar view of the text, stated that 
they did not have sufficient resources to undertake such an exercise, and that the 
organization’s rationales for being involved in the process of the negotiation and 
promotion of the UK text did not extend to participating in an exercise that they 
regarded as unnecessary. As was the case with the Telework Agreement, DTI did not 
engage in an impact monitoring exercise as they viewed such an exercise as the task 
of the UK social partners. Whilst HSE did not conduct a specific monitoring exercise 
on the impact of ‘Work-related Stress: A Guide’, as of January 2008 the organization 
were in the process of conducting substantial research on the impact of the 
Management Standards for Work-related Stress. A HSE official stated that, given 
that they saw the European Agreement and the Management Standards as sibling 
texts, the HSE did not see the need to conduct specific research on the impact of the 
European Agreement. A HSE official stated however that the organization regarded 
the data they were collecting on the incidence of work-related stress in the UK and 
on the impact of the Management Standards as a proxy for the level of impact that 
the European Agreement was likely to have in the UK.   
 
In the absence of actual data on the impact of ‘Work-related Stress: A Guide’ in the 
UK, the UK Social partners made various hypotheses about the likely effect of the 
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text. CEEP UK and CBI officials emphasized that work-related stress was a major 
issue in the UK for employers, and stated that, although there was a fair level of 
existing regulation on the issue, the rising profile of the topic was likely to lead to the 
text achieving a fair level of impact. A CEEP UK official stated that the text was 
likely to be more popular amongst CEEP UK members than the text on teleworking, 
owing to the fact that many of CEEP UK’s members did not have policies on work-
related stress yet did have policies on teleworking. Both CBI and CEEP UK also 
stated that the text had gone through two printing runs, and offered this as evidence 
of the text’s popularity. A CBI official also noted that the text was likely to achieve a 
greater impact in smaller firms. This was attributed to the brevity and practicality of 
the text that was, according to the official, likely to appeal to smaller firms. 
However, an official from FPB stated that the text was not likely to have a great 
impact in the small firms that comprise FPB’s membership. According to the FPB 
official, the complexity of the document was likely to make it unappealing for small 
business owners.  
 
The extent of the potential impact of the text was also placed in a wider context. A 
CBI official stated,  
 
‘Stress is a big issue in the UK and I think that’s why we thought that this was 
exactly the right issue we needed to address at the European level. So have they 
given us an extra bit of stimulus and were they helpful to the smaller firms? Yes. 
Have they themselves driven this agenda? I’ll have to be honest and say no they’re 
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not doing that because we didn’t need that but they are another milestone in a sense 
to increasing awareness.’ (CBI) 
 
Representatives from DTI and HSE contended that, although it would be very hard to 
hypothesize the exact impact of the text, the fact that it existed and that the UK 
Social partner organizations had been signatory to the document would ensure that 
the European Agreement would have at least some influence upon the policy context 
in which work-related stress was managed in the UK. However, as did CEEP UK 
and CBI, both organizations noted that the potential for the text to change practice in 
UK workplaces was somewhat limited given its status as one of many tools used to 
regulate work-related stress in UK.   
 
A TUC official was rather less sanguine about the likely impact of the text. Arguing 
that the non-legally binding nature of the instrument would entail a very small impact 
in the context of the de-centralized UK system, the official stated:  
 
‘[Employers associations] don’t tell their members that this is something that they 
should do something about. They inform them that they’ve reached a text through 
negotiating, and just say that their members might find it useful. One suspects that 
they just put it in the bottom draw of their filing cabinet.’ (TUC) 
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The level of impact that the text was likely to achieve in the UK local Government 
sector was also viewed skeptically by an LGA official. The official stated that the 
fact that ‘Work-related Stress: A Guide’ had assumed a role of secondary importance 
behind the HSE’s Management Standards meant that the impact of the text in the 
sector was likely to be rather limited. Further, when questioned on the text, an 
Unison official who worked on the topic of work-related stress in the local 
Government sector stated that he had never heard of the text. This would suggest that 
the status and potential impact of the text within the sector is rather limited.   
 
Summary 
 
In summary, the Telework Agreement added modestly to the content of UK 
regulation. Despite the fact that the topic of teleworking was regulated indirectly by 
UK law prior to the implementation of the European Agreement, there was no 
coherent national inter-sectoral policy that specifically pertained to the teleworking 
issue prior to the implementation of the European Agreement. By contrast, the 
existence of the more high profile HSE Management Standards for Work-related 
Stress and the existence of UK health and safety law pertaining to the issue of work-
related stress meant that the Work-related Stress Agreement contributed little to the 
levels UK regulation. It emerged that the impact of the Telework Agreement was 
also greater than the Work-related Stress Agreement in the UK. This was also 
attributable to lower existing levels of regulation on teleworking than work-related 
stress.  
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8.4 Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning and Joint Declaration on 
Lifelong Learning in the EU Banking Sector 
  
The final section of the chapter will present the data collected on the work done on 
the Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning and Joint Declaration on Lifelong 
Learning in the European Banking Sector in the UK.  
 
8.4.1 Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning  
 
Interviewees were unable to identify an instance in which the European Framework 
of Actions on Lifelong Learning precipitated a specific policy initiative in the UK. 
This was partly attributed by interviewees to the high level of pre-existing work on 
the topic of lifelong learning and skills evident in the UK. All of the social partner 
organizations interviewed stated that they were active in the field of lifelong 
learning, and that, subsequently, they had fulfilled the content of the European text 
prior to its conclusion at the European level. Interviewees also reported that 
participation in the exercise was detached from the course of normal lifelong 
learning policy in the UK, and that participation in the text largely entailed compiling 
a retrospective list of existing policies on lifelong learning. A TUC official stated 
that the compiling of the annual reports required by the European text often merely 
involved the exchange of emails between the UK Social partner organizations. An 
FPB official also stated,  
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‘[On the Framework of Actions] we all did our own thing, and then realized we had 
to put a report together.’ (FPB) 
 
The relatively weak impact of the text in the UK context was attributed by a CEEP 
UK official to the de-centralized nature of collective negotiations in the UK. 
According to the official, the lack of coordination of collective bargaining levels in 
the UK, when compared to other European states, meant that there was a 
comparatively low level of awareness about the text in the UK.   
 
However, some social partner interviewees stated that the text had been useful in that 
it had made their organizations aware of good practice in other European countries 
and that it had reinforced existing policies on lifelong learning. A CBI official stated 
that the text had focused the organization’s attention on the issue of skills, and also 
alluded to several instances where CBI had learned valuable lessons on the topic of 
lifelong learning from social partner organizations in other countries. A CEEP UK 
official stated,  
 
‘By getting everyone singing from the same EU hymn sheet I think [the text] does 
add value. It legitimizes good practice. And if you’re legitimizing it in a joint 
employer and union document that is valuable.’ (CEEP UK) 
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8.4.2 Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the European Banking Sector  
 
The Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the European Banking Sector had a 
very limited impact in the UK banking sector. As was the case with the Framework 
of Actions on Lifelong Learning, no interviewee was able to identify a policy that 
had been specifically developed as a result of the text. The UK banking sector trade 
union Amicus stated that their motivation for participating in the text had been 
primarily to raise EU-wide, rather than UK specific, standards in the EU banking 
sector. The Amicus official also stated that the main reason why the text had not 
achieved a greater impact was because all of the firms in the UK banking sector had 
very advanced policies on lifelong learning in existence prior to the agreement of the 
text. The official stated,  
 
‘I know of [no policies directly inspired by the text]. What I’d say is that conditions 
in all of the major banks are ahead of the text. That’s why the social dialogue in the 
European banking sector is not given a high priority by trade unions in the 
UK.’ (Amicus) 
 
The Amicus official also stated that the de-centralized nature of collective bargaining 
within the UK banking sector also limited the potential impact of the text. As was the 
case with Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning, the lack of coordination of 
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collective bargaining processes within the sector meant that trade unions and 
employers in the sector had limited levels of knowledge about the text.  
 
8.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has presented the data collected in the course of the UK fieldwork. In 
summary, a few general remarks on the trends evident in the data collected should be 
made. Firstly, the procedural implementations of the Telework and Work-related 
Stress Agreements in the UK are remarkable for the relatively few signs of conflict 
that occurred between the UK social partners during the implementation processes. 
Aside from a dispute between the TUC and CBI over the precise form in which the 
Telework Agreement should be implemented, the implementations consisted of little 
more than the UK Social partners agreeing upon the most pragmatic way in which 
the Agreements could be implemented in the context of the UK system. That the 
implementations took these forms seem to be attributable to the widespread view that 
the Agreements were ‘voluntary’, and that the content of the Agreements was not 
particularly controversial. A ‘learning’ effect in the case of the Work-related Stress 
Agreement, where the UK social partners took on more tasks than had been the case 
with the Telework Agreement, was evident, yet on the whole the implementation of 
the Work-related Stress Agreement was not particularly different from that of the 
Telework Agreement. With regard to the issue of national ‘procedures and practices’, 
the lack of an institutional forum for national inter-sectoral social dialogue in the UK 
had a major impact upon the forms of implementation strategies advocated by the 
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UK social partners. In the absence of such a forum and the resulting vacuum, 
interpretations of national ‘procedures and practices’ varied markedly between the 
UK social partners and public authorities and led to minor conflict during the 
implementation process.  
 
In terms of the substantive impact of the Agreements in the UK, a couple of trends 
are particularly evident. Firstly, the topics of telework and work-related stress were 
not specifically the subject of UK legislation prior to the implementation of the 
European Agreements, and, according to our interviewees and official data, there 
also appears to have been a great many firms who did not have policies in place on 
either of the topics. However, much of the content of the Agreements was, in 
practical terms, covered by existing UK legislation and there were also important, 
pre-existing ‘soft’ policies on the topics in place prior to the implementation of the 
Agreements in the UK. With regard to the level of impact that the implemented 
Agreements have achieved or are likely to achieve in the UK, the picture is also 
mixed. Whilst many interviewees, particularly from employer associations, stated 
that the implemented Agreements provided useful frameworks for interested parties 
and were likely to be the subject of some interest at lower levels, union interviewees 
were less optimistic. Their stance was that, as non-legally binding instruments, the 
Agreements would be unable to achieve a comprehensive impact in the context of the 
UK system. The picture was also rather bleak with regard to the texts on Lifelong 
Learning. Neither text was able to precipitate a specific policy in the UK, and both 
would seem to have had a low profile within the UK. 
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Chapter 9: Implementation in Czech Republic 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will present the data collected in the course of the fieldwork in Czech 
Republic. The chapter will open with (i) a brief description of the system of 
industrial relations in Czech Republic, before describing the process of the 
procedural implementations of the Agreements in Czech Republic and the related 
issue of actors’ reading of national ‘procedures and practices’ in the context of the 
Czech system. Then, the chapter will (iii) set out the data collected on the substantive 
impact of the Agreements in Czech Republic. As stated in chapter four, the 
implementation of the Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning and Joint 
Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the Banking Sector were not studied in Czech 
Republic. Finally, the chapter will (iv) offer a conclusion. 
 
9.1.1 Industrial Relations in Czech Republic 
 
Trade union density is low at 22% in Czech Republic, and collective bargaining 
coverage is also low at 35% (Bluhm, 2008). Social dialogue is also typically de-
centralized, with the majority of collective negotiations taking place at firm or 
workplace level. Sectoral level collective agreements exist in certain areas of the 
private sector however, and data collected by the trade union CMKOS revealed that 
there were 18 sectoral collective agreements covering approximately 5,634 
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employers and 607,952 employees in 2008. Should a sectoral collective agreement 
cover a certain sector then the minimum terms established by the agreement are 
binding upon lower-level negotiators. Accession to the European Union had a major 
impact on industrial relations and labour law in Czech Republic. The Czech labour 
code was systematically revised in the late 1990s to meet European Union standards, 
and the process of accession to the European Union had the effect of substantially 
lifting social and employment standards within the state. The Czech Labour Code 
establishes legally binding minimums in the sphere of employment whilst collective 
agreements typically concern themselves with topics such as wages and working 
time. The Czech Council for Economic and Social Agreement is the key tripartite 
body that exists at the inter-sectoral level. There are seven representatives from 
employers, trade unions and the Czech public authorities on the council, and it is 
consulted by the Czech Government on issues which include economic policy, 
labour relations, social policy and collective bargaining. It was also responsible for 
drafting the Czech Labour Code 
 
The main actor on the trade union side in Czech Republic is the trade union 
confederation CMKOS, which in 2004 had 34 affiliated trade unions with 611,000 
members and is a member of ETUC. On the employer side, the two main employers’ 
organizations are SPCR and KZPS CR. The main difference between the two is that 
SPCR’s membership is composed of firms of all size, whilst KZPS CR’s is 
composed mainly of large firms. The two are both similar in size, but only SPCR is a 
member of Business Europe. Subsequently, KZPS CR was not involved in the 
process of the implementation of the Framework Agreements 
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9.2 The Procedural Implementations of the Telework and Work-related Stress 
Agreements in Czech Republic 
 
This section of the chapter will address the procedural implementation of the 
Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements in Czech Republic. Also, it will 
address the related issue of actors’ interpretations of national ‘procedures and 
practices’ in the Czech context. 
 
9.2.1 The Telework Agreement 
 
The European Telework Agreement was implemented in Czech Republic via a range 
of mechanisms. Firstly, implementation was affected via Sections 317-9 of the Czech 
Labour Code that came into force on January 1st 2007 and that had been drafted by 
the Czech social partners and Government in years prior to this. After the conclusion 
of the European Agreement, SPCR and CMKOS had conducted internal 
consultations with labour law experts within the organizations on the best way to 
implement the European Agreement. Subsequently, the heads of SPCR and CMKOS 
agreed that the Agreement should be implemented via the Czech Labour Code and 
jointly approached the Czech Ministry of Labour. Owing to the fact that the practice 
of teleworking was perceived as a ‘positive-sum’ working practice by the Czech 
social partners that was both flexible and employee-friendly, and that the topic of 
teleworking was not particularly controversial given the already enshrined principle 
of equal treatment of workers in Czech Republic and the relatively small number of 
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teleworkers within the country, the process of the implementation of the Agreement 
was not marked by conflict between the Czech social partners. A CMKOS official 
stated,  
 
‘There were no real points of tension or disagreement in the negotiation process 
because teleworking is not very popular in Czech Republic. Only about 2.25% of the 
workforce are engaged in it, and it is so scarce therefore that the topic does not have 
much scope to create conflict! Also, in Czech legislation, there is a tradition of the 
equal treatment of workers, whether they are part-time or full-time, or whether they 
work in the workplace or at home. So, the principles and ideas of the Telework 
Agreement didn’t seem strange to us.’ (CMKOS) 
 
In terms of the content of the part of the labour code that addressed the Telework 
Agreement, Sections 317-9 of the code did not specifically mention teleworking, but 
made provisions for workers who wanted to work away from the site of their 
employer. The provisions included arrangements for workers organizing their own 
working time, and for those employees who worked away from the site of the 
employer on a public holiday.  
 
The Czech social partners also implemented the Telework Agreement via other 
mechanisms. The Czech social partners viewed the existence of the European 
Agreement as a potential means of helping to stimulate the development of a 
bipartite social dialogue within the Czech Republic. To this end, a bipartite, non-
legally binding, agreement that was concluded between CMKOS and SPCR in 
November 2004 cited the existence of the Telework Agreement and stated that both 
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organizations would attempt to encourage their affiliates to implement it. The two 
organizations then unilaterally issued recommendations to their respective members 
to attempt to encourage them to implement the Agreement at lower levels in forms 
that were sector and firm specific. A series of promotional activities were also 
undertaken by CMKOS and SPCR to attempt to raise awareness of the European 
Agreement. These included the publication of the Agreement in mediums such as the 
organizations’ websites, internal social partner bulletins, and social partner 
publications that are regularly distributed to members. 
 
9.2.2 Work-related Stress Agreement 
 
The Work-related Stress Agreement was implemented via Sections 101-2 of the 
Czech Labour Code that took effect from 1st January 2007. After the Agreement was 
concluded at the European level, the Czech social partners translated the Agreement 
into Czech and, during this process, discussed the best means to implement the 
Agreement. During 2006, the Czech Social partners drafted the form in which the 
European Agreement was to be incorporated into the Czech Labour Code. As was 
the case with the implementation of the Telework Agreement, the wording with 
which the Work-related Stress Agreement was implemented within the labour code 
did not bear great resemblance to the wording of the European Agreement. Rather, 
the labour code mentions the need for employers to create safe working conditions 
and to ensure the dignity of workers and equal conditions. The actual existence of the 
work-related stress issue is not specifically referred to. According to SPCR and 
CMKOS officials, the Work-related Stress Agreement held less appeal for the Czech 
social partners than the Telework Agreement. An SPCR official stated, 
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‘The teleworking issue was an example of a ‘win-win’ issue for companies and 
employees. But stress is a different issue, and frankly it is not such a high priority for 
our member companies. This is because we are still in a transformational economic 
process and our companies do not think that the topic of stress is particularly 
important.’ (SPCR) 
 
As with the Telework Agreement, the Czech social partners also attempted to 
stimulate social dialogue within Czech Republic via the promotion of the Work-
related Stress Agreement to their affiliates. CMKOS included the topic of work-
related stress in their 2008 guidelines for collective negotiations, whilst SPCR 
attempted to raise awareness of the condition in sectors such as the retail and hospital 
sector in which the organization perceived stress to be a particular problem. Further, 
a series of promotional activities were engaged in by CMKOS to publicize the 
existence of the Agreement. This included the publication of manuals on work-
related stress and the translation and publication of an ETUC guide for the 
implementation of the Agreement. However, according to an SPCR official, the level 
of bipartite activity to promote and implement the Work-related Stress Agreement 
did not occur to the same degree as it had with the Telework Agreement. This was 
due to the existence of tension between the Czech social partners on discussions 
concerning the content of the Czech Labour Code. The official stated, 
 
‘There were no such bilateral activities to promote the Work-related Stress 
Agreement as there were with the Telework Agreement. This is because from 2005 to 
2007 bilateral relations between SPCR and CMKOS were placed under strain 
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because of the negotiations we were having on content of the Labour Code regarding 
the appropriate trade off between security and flexibility in Czech labour legislation. 
The atmosphere was not very favourable for bilateral discussions.’ (SPCR) 
 
9.2.3 National ‘procedures and practices’ 
 
Although it was understood that the European Agreements were intended to 
stimulate the existence of bipartite dialogue between employers and trade unions and 
that work had been done towards this end in Czech Republic as a result of both the 
Agreements, it was also stated by officials from the two sides of industry that the 
only way in which the national ‘procedures and practices’ implementation clause 
could be understood in the Czech context was by reference to the tripartite 
consultations and regulatory involvement assumed by employers’ associations, trade 
unions, and the public authorities in Czech Republic. It was thought that bipartite 
dialogue was at too ‘young’ a stage to be considered national ‘procedures and 
practices’ in Czech Republic. A CMKOS official stated,  
 
‘There is no question of another interpretation of national “procedures and 
practices” in Czech Republic than implementation through the Labour Code, and no 
one considered anything different. The tradition in our country is of tripartite 
regulation, and until now the vast majority of labour law has been passed through 
the Labour Code.’ (CMKOS) 
 
An SPCR official stated, 
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‘Social dialogue is at a very early stage in Czech Republic, and although we tried to 
encourage collective agreements at lower levels with the Telework Agreement, the 
only real way to implement the Agreement in Czech Republic was through labour 
regulation.’ (SPCR) 
 
9.3 The Substantive impact of the Telework and Work-related Stress 
Agreements in Czech Republic 
 
This section of the chapter will present the data collected on the substantive impact 
of the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements in Czech Republic. It will 
address the two Agreements separately, and will outline the extent to which the 
Agreements and their implementation added value to the content of Czech regulation 
on the teleworking and work-related stress issues, the data that is available upon their 
impact within Czech sectors and companies, and the level of potential impact that the 
Czech social partners regard them as likely to achieve. 
 
9.3.1 Telework Agreement 
 
Content 
 
There was very little pre-existing policy on teleworking in Czech Republic before the 
implementation of the Telework Agreement, and the existence of the European 
Agreement went some way towards introducing the concept of teleworking into 
policy discourse within the state. Prior to the Telework Agreement there were clauses 
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in the old Czech Labour Code that referred to those employees who worked away 
from the site of employers. However, there was nothing that specifically pertained to 
the teleworking issue. Further, prior to the existence of the European Telework 
Agreement, there was very little ‘soft’ or informal policy activity related to the 
teleworking issue. This was attributed to the lack of teleworkers within Czech 
Republic.  
 
Data and perspectives on impact 
 
As of January 2008, the Czech social partners had no data on the impact of their 
activities to promote the inclusion of the Telework Agreement into lower level 
collective agreements or on the impact of the revisions to the Czech Labour Code 
that related to teleworking. However, an exercise was planned by CMKOS which 
involved studying the data for the collective agreements concluded by CMKOS 
affiliates, and assessing the number of Agreements that had been concluded on the 
topic of teleworking. This monitoring activity was part of a programme that CMKOS 
regularly conducted on the content of their affiliates’ collective agreements, and 
which aimed to establish the extent to which collective agreements incorporated the 
guidelines which CMKOS offered their affiliates on collective bargaining. 
 
In the short term, the Czech social partner organizations were sceptical about the 
extent to which teleworking would become widespread in Czech Republic as a result 
of the implementation of the European Agreement, and it was stressed that there 
were very few teleworkers in Czech Republic. However, the Czech social partners 
were rather more optimistic about the extent to which teleworking would become 
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popular in the future in Czech Republic as a result of the European Agreement. A 
SPCR official stated, 
 
‘I think that if we continue promoting the European Agreement, then companies will 
begin to understand the advantages of teleworking. As they begin to grasp this, we 
will see an increase in the number of teleworkers. For example, there are lots of 
young mothers who use teleworking to balance home and work life, and I think we 
will increasingly see the flexible and progressive benefits of teleworking.’ (SPCR) 
 
A CMKOS official also offered the example of women on maternity leave as a 
potential group for whom teleworking could become very popular, and stated that 
given that maternity leave was for a duration of six months in Czech Republic but 
that women could then remain at home for a further two and a half years then the 
existing legal framework on maternity leave was likely to be conducive to the 
development of teleworking within the country 
 
9.3.2 Work-related Stress Agreement 
 
Content 
 
Prior to the existence of the European Work-related Stress Agreement, the issue of 
work-related stress was partly covered in the Czech Labour Code by a provision on 
health and safety risks. However, the existence of work-related stress as a condition 
was not specifically alluded to. More generally, the topic of work-related stress was 
also not part of mainstream policy discourse in Czech Republic prior to the existence 
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of the European Agreement. According to our interviewees, this was due to the view 
of many firms that work-related stress was not a matter of pressing concern given the 
other economic and social problems within Czech Republic. Given this situation, the 
implementation activities triggered by the European Agreement may well have 
brought the issue of work-related stress for the first time onto the industrial relations 
agenda in Czech Republic. 
 
Data and perspectives on impact 
 
As of January 2008, the Czech social partners had not conducted any specific 
exercises to monitor the impact of the Work-related Stress Agreement. However, as 
with the Telework Agreement, the Czech social partners planned an exercise to 
monitor the content of collective agreements concluded at the lower levels. It was 
stated that this exercise would be included in their general work on the monitoring of 
collective agreements, and would be likely to yield information on the impact that 
the Work-related Stress Agreement had had upon collective negotiations within 
Czech Republic. 
 
Although it was stated that in many Czech companies the management of work-
related stress was not seen as a pressing issue, the Czech social partners forecast that 
the European Agreement would have a more comprehensive level of impact in the 
future. It was felt that work-related stress would become a more visible issue within 
Czech Republic, and understanding of the condition of work-related stress was likely 
to improve. An SPCR official stated, 
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‘The performance of firms is faster and faster so I think that the phenomenon of 
work-related stress will become more visible. So, I think that our Agreement will 
have a good impact as it has a very clear structure for managing work-related 
stress.’ (SPCR) 
 
9.4 Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, several points may be made about the Telework and Work-related 
Stress Agreements and their implementation and impact within Czech Republic. 
Firstly, it is notable that the two both introduced relatively new issues into the Czech 
context. To this end, the existence of the texts was able to stimulate regulation on 
topics where little had existed before. Although the immediate impact of the 
Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements may have been lessened by the fact 
that the subject of both Agreements were new in the Czech context, the longer term 
impact of the Agreements may be enhanced by virtue of this fact. National 
‘procedures and practices’ in the Czech Republic revolved around an emphasis of the 
traditional role of the Czech Government in determining social and employment 
conditions via the use of legal instruments and also the key role of the tripartite 
Council for Economic and Social Agreement in helping to formulate such regulation. 
Although it was stated that an aim of the Telework and Work-related Stress 
Agreements was to help stimulate the development of bipartite social dialogue 
structures in Czech Republic, it was also recognized that, as of the time of the 
implementation of the Agreements, bipartite social dialogue was at too youthful a 
stage to be considered as national ‘procedures and practices’ in the Czech context. 
  
249
However, it is notable that the existence of the European Agreements helped to 
stimulate the development of bipartite social dialogue mechanisms within Czech 
Republic. The Telework Agreement, in particular, encouraged a 2004 inter-sectoral 
bipartite text between the Czech Social partners, and both Agreements also led to 
further attempts by the Czech Social partners to stimulate bipartite social dialogue at 
lower bargaining levels. In this sense, the European Agreements led to quite 
significant procedural effects within Czech Republic. 
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Chapter 10: The Procedural Implementation of the Agreements 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will analyze the data pertaining to the procedural implementations of 
the Framework Agreements.  As stated in chapter three, there are several clear 
rationales for carefully considering the procedural dimension of the implementation 
of the Agreements. To briefly recap, these rationales are (i) the necessity of 
establishing the efficacy of the implementations that took place in European member 
states, (ii) the need to establish the robustness of the national 'procedures and 
practices' implementation clause, (iii) and the theoretical and intellectual challenge of 
comparing the reaction of discrete national and sectoral systems of industrial 
relations to European 'soft' law. 
 
The first section of this chapter will outline the key themes related to the procedural 
implementations of the Agreements that emerged in the data collected and will also 
assess the viability of the national ‘procedures and practices’ implementation clause. 
In the second section of the chapter, the extent to which the data collected 
demonstrates that 'effective' implementation occurred within the member states and 
sectors that were the subject of the study will be outlined. The conditions in which 
'effective' implementation becomes more likely to occur in national and sectoral 
contexts will also be demonstrated. A third section will then review the findings 
outlined in section two of the chapter against the set of variables that were outlined in 
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chapter three of the thesis regarding the extent to which the set of factors advanced in 
the literature explain 'effective' procedural implementation outcomes. Finally, a 
conclusion will be offered. 
 
10.2 The procedural implementations of the Agreements: five key themes  
 
This section will outline the five key themes that emerged in the analysis of the data 
pertaining to the procedural implementations of the Agreements. These five themes 
are (1) the form of procedural implementation that the Agreements received within 
national and sectoral systems, (2) the prevailing definitions of national 'procedures 
and practices' for social dialogue within countries, (3) the stability of national 
'procedures and practices' for social dialogue within countries, (4) the mandated role 
of the signatory organizations to the Framework Agreements in countries and 
sectors, and (5) the issue addressed by the Framework Agreement and its relationship 
to procedural forms of regulation in countries and sectors. The section will end by 
summarizing the viability of the national ‘procedures and practices’ implementation 
clause in the light of the themes outlined. 
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Table 10.1 Implementation outcomes in countries and sectors 
Country/ sector Telework Agreement Work-related Stress 
Agreement 
Actors’ definition of 
national ‘procedures and 
practices’ 
Belgium Implemented in November 
2005 via a legally binding 
National Labour Council 
(NLC) Agreement 
‘De facto’ implementation 
through existence of 1999 
NLC Agreement on topic 
Legally binding NLC 
Agreement 
Belgian banking sector No formal implementation No formal implementation Sectoral collective 
agreement 
Belgian local Government Implemented at federal- Implemented at federal- Collective agreements 
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sector level public administration 
level with 2006 Royal 
Decree. No evidence of 
autonomous 
implementations at local 
authority level. 
level public administration 
level with May 2007 
Royal Decree. No 
evidence of autonomous 
implementations at local 
authority level. 
between trade unions and 
local authorities 
Denmark Implemented through 
autonomous sectoral 
agreements in a minority 
of sectors and through a 
September 2006 DA-LO 
‘follow up’ Agreement 
Implemented through 
autonomous sectoral 
Agreements in a minority 
of sectors. Not subject to 
‘follow up’ Agreement. 
Sectoral collective 
agreements. Ambivalence 
over correct procedures at 
inter-sectoral level 
Danish banking sector Implemented in April No formal implementation Sectoral collective 
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2003 collective agreement agreement 
Danish local Government 
sector 
‘De-facto’ implementation Implemented in 2005 
collective agreement 
Sectoral collective 
agreement 
UK Implemented in August 
2003 through non-legally 
binding guidelines 
Implemented in July 2005 
through non-legally 
binding guidelines.  
No national ‘procedures 
and practices for social 
dialogue at inter-sectoral 
level. Firm-level 
agreements identified as 
most prominent procedure 
for social dialogue 
UK banking sector No formal implementation No formal implementation Collective agreements at 
firm-level, where there is a 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
trade union presence 
UK local Government 
sector 
Implementation in the next 
negotiated sectoral 
agreement planned by 
sectoral social partners as 
of January 2008 
No formal implementation Sectoral collective 
agreement 
Czech Republic Implemented through 
Czech Labour Code in 
January 2007. Also 
implemented through non-
legally binding bipartite 
means. 
Implemented through 
Czech Labour Code in 
January 2007. Also 
implemented through non-
legally binding bipartite 
means. 
Implementation through 
Czech Labour Code 
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10.2.1Forms of procedural implementations of the Agreements within national 
systems 
 
A key theme that emerged in the analysis of the collected data were the forms and 
varieties of implementations that the Framework Agreements were subject to in 
differing national and sectoral contexts. Table 10.1 demonstrates this diversity. In 
Belgium, the Telework Agreement was implemented in the private sector as a 
National Labour Council Agreement in November 2005. As is customary in 
Belgium, the Agreement was then extended by royal decree to cover all workers in 
the Belgian private sector. In the Belgian public sector, the Telework Agreement was 
implemented via a November 2006 Royal Decree that covered only employees in the 
federal-level public administration. Aside from a 2006 collective agreement in the 
Flemish civil service, no other implementations of the Agreement were carried out 
within the public sector. The Work-related Stress Agreement was not implemented 
within the Belgian private sector, owing to the view of actors that a prior 1999 
National Labour Council Agreement that was also extended by royal decree fulfilled 
the content of the European Agreement. In the public sector, a May 2007 Royal 
Decree that covered only employees in the federal-level public administration 
implemented the European Agreement. No other implementations of the European 
Agreement were carried out in the Belgian public sector. 
In Denmark, the Telework Agreement was implemented autonomously within the 
industrial, local Government, commerce and finance sectors. All of these 
implementations took place within the requisite three-year implementation period. At 
the Danish inter-sectoral level, a 'follow-up' Agreement was concluded in September 
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2006 that applied the writ of the European Agreement to those sectors that had not 
autonomously implemented the European Agreement. The Work-related Stress 
Agreement was implemented autonomously only in the Danish state, local 
Government and industrial sectors. All of these implementations took place within 
the requisite three-year implementation period. The Work-related Stress Agreement 
was not subject to an inter-sectoral 'follow-up' Agreement in Denmark, owing to the 
view of inter-sectoral level actors that the content of the European Agreement was 
already present within Danish legal regulation. 
 
In the UK, the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements were both 
implemented at the national inter-sectoral level by the UK social partners as non-
legally binding guidelines. Both implementations also took place within the requisite 
three-year implementation time-scale, with the Telework Agreement being 
implemented in August 2003, and the Work-related Stress Agreement being 
implemented in July 2005. The extent to which the Agreements were implemented 
autonomously at sector and firm levels in the UK was very limited. Aside from the 
anticipated implementation of the Telework Agreement in the UK local Government 
sector sectoral agreement, no social partner interviewees were aware of the existence 
of any other formal autonomous implementations at these levels. The Agreements 
appear only to have inspired managerial policies on the topics of teleworking and 
work-related stress rather than precipitating formal lower level implementation 
agreements. 
 
In the Czech Republic, the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements were 
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implemented via the Czech Labour Code that took effect on January 1st 2007. The 
Work-related Stress Agreement was thus implemented within the requisite three-year 
time period, whilst the Telework Agreement was implemented late. The Agreements 
were also subject to bipartite and unilateral 'soft' implementations by the inter-
sectoral level Czech social partners, who issued recommendations to lower-level 
affiliates with the aim of encouraging implementations at lower levels. No social 
partner interviewees were aware of the existence of any autonomous 
implementations at lower levels however. 
 
10.2.2The identification of national ‘procedures and practices’ by national 
actors 
 
A second theme that emerged in the data collected relates to actors' definitions of 
existing national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue. In the Belgian private 
sector, national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue were unanimously 
described as consisting of a National Labour Council Agreement followed by a 
legally binding royal decree. Officials from all social partner organizations 
considered this to be the established and legitimate mechanism for the conclusion of 
collective agreements within Belgium.  
 
Danish definitions of national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue centered 
on an emphasis of the tradition of collective agreements in regulating industrial 
relations within Denmark. The emphasis was particularly placed upon sectoral-level 
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collective agreements; the main level at which collective agreements have been 
concluded at in the last two decades. The composition of national 'procedures and 
practices' at the Danish inter-sectoral level was rather more contested. It was 
acknowledged that collective relations were indeed conducted between the Danish 
social partners at this level. However, there was a dispute over the conclusion of a 
DA-AC collective agreement at this level, owing to the argument of DA that no 
precedent existed for such an Agreement. Also, there was a disagreement over the 
status of the DA-LO 'follow-up' Agreement for the implementation of the Telework 
Agreement given that the use of such an instrument was not traditional within the 
Danish context. The employer association DA argued for an 'issue by issue' 
interpretation of national 'procedures and procedures' given that the topics of the 
Framework Agreements were liable to differ. Even at the Danish sectoral level, the 
employers' association DI argued for an 'issue by issue' interpretation of national 
'procedures and practices' on the basis of the same rationale.    
 
Within the UK, national actors stated unanimously that were no established 
procedures for national inter-sectoral social dialogue and very few procedures for 
sectoral level social dialogue. This was attributed to the absence of a tradition of 
national inter-sectoral collective agreements within the UK, and also to the 'dis-
organized' nature of social dialogue. Although it was acknowledged that national 
‘procedures and practices’ could be defined as consisting of lower-level collective 
agreements and sectoral agreements in areas of the public sector, it was considered 
that such a definition was unrealistic for the purposes of the implementation of the 
Framework Agreements given the multitude of separate collective negotiations 
  
260
conducted at these levels. 
 
In place of a coherent definition of national 'procedures and practices' for social 
dialogue in the UK, the UK social partner organizations adopted different and 
contesting definitions of national ‘procedures and practices’ for the purpose of the 
implementation of the Framework Agreements. The definition advocated by 
employers involved adopting a procedure that would be ‘fit for purpose’ in the UK’s 
de-centralized industrial relations system and that would involve the organizations 
who had been signatory to the Agreements at the European level. UK trade unions 
conceived of national ‘procedures and practices’ as consisting of a national inter-
sectoral agreement, whilst the UK public authorities regarded the question of the 
constitution of national ‘procedures and practices’ as solely a question for the UK 
social partners. 
 
In Czech Republic, national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue were 
conceived of as consisting of legal implementation via the Czech Labour Code. This 
was the case given that the Labour Code had been the primary instrument for 
regulating working conditions in Czech Republic over the last two decades, and also 
because there was little tradition of autonomous social dialogue or collective 
agreements between the Czech social partners at the national inter-sectoral or sector 
levels. Further, the Czech social partners had been substantially involved in the 
drafting and development of previous labour codes. Although the Czech social 
partners considered that the implementation of the Agreements via bipartite 
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mechanisms would help develop autonomous social dialogue within the state, these 
methods were not considered as national 'procedures and practices' for social 
dialogue as such given the very limited tradition of them in Czech Republic.  
 
In summary then, the data revealed that there were no available national ‘procedures 
and practices’ for implementation within the UK, that national ‘procedures and 
practices’ for implementation were identifiable at the Danish sectoral level but not 
readily at the inter-sectoral level, and that national ‘procedures and practices’ for 
implementation were easily and unanimously identified by social partners within 
Belgium and Czech Republic. 
 
10.2.3 The stability of national ‘procedures and practices’ 
 
A third theme that emerged was the extent to which existing national 'procedures and 
practices' were stable and liable to reform themselves. In Belgium, national actors 
conceived of existing national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue in the 
private sector as basically consisting of a National Labour Council Agreement 
followed by a legally binding royal decree. Actors described the National Labour 
Council as a traditional and entrenched institution within the Belgian private sector, 
and also one that was likely to remain a core feature of the system in future decades. 
In the Belgian public sector, the means of regulating industrial relations via royal 
decree was also considered stable by actors within the sector. 
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Within the Danish context, national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue 
were regarded as stable in the sense that collective agreements between social 
partners regulating working conditions had been and were expected to remain the 
regulatory norm in Denmark. However, it was also stated by actors that the Danish 
model had been substantially reformed through the implementation of EU social 
policy Directives that meant that legal mechanisms were used more extensively than 
previously to regulate industrial relations in Denmark. The Danish social partners 
also regarded the 'follow-up' Agreement that had been utilized to implement the 
Telework Agreement as a new element in the Danish system. 
 
Within the UK, existing national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue were 
conceived of as relatively stable. Although it was acknowledged that the 
implementation of EU social policy Directives and the legislative programme of New 
Labour Governments in the previous decade had meant that the law was used more 
extensively to regulate industrial relations in the UK than previously, it was 
considered by both sides of industry that the basically de-centralized and liberal 
nature of UK industrial relations was unlikely to change in coming years.  
 
The Czech social partners stressed the constant reform that national 'procedures and 
practices' for social dialogue had been subject to and would continue to be subject to 
in the Czech Republic. It was emphasized that the Czech system of industrial 
relations was a young one against the context of Western European states, and that a 
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great deal of economic and social change had occurred within the country in the 
previous twenty years. Although the tradition of legal regulation and tripartite 
engagement was acknowledged, the ongoing process of the development of an 
autonomous bipartite social dialogue at inter-sectoral, sectoral, and firm and 
workplace level was stressed. It was also stated that the influence of the European-
level had done much to bring about these changes to the Czech system.  
 
10.2.4 The mandated role of signatory organizations within national systems  
 
A fourth theme that emerged during the process of data analysis was the mandate 
possessed by the signatories to the European Agreements to conclude collective 
agreements within their respective national systems. The Belgian private-sector 
signatories of the European Agreements (FEB-VBO, ABVV/FGTB, ACV/CSC, 
CGSLB, Unizo) possess mandates to conclude collective agreements at the inter-
sectoral level within Belgium. All of the organizations are represented on the Belgian 
National Labour Council, and the trade unions are also mandated to engage in social 
dialogue and conclude collective agreements at the sector and firm level in Belgium.  
In Denmark, the organizations who were signatory to the Framework Agreements on 
Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements (AC, DA, LO, and FTF) possess 
differing forms of mandates to bargain collectively. In the cases of AC and FTF, 
neither organization are mandated to conclude any sort of collective agreement in 
Denmark. DA and LO have the ability to conclude the 'cooperative agreement' at the 
inter-sectoral level, and also have recent tradition of concluding 'follow up' 
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agreements to implement European social policy Directives at the national inter-
sectoral level. Neither DA nor LO conclude collective agreements at the Danish 
sectoral level however; the level at which collective agreements are typically 
concluded within Denmark.  
 
In the UK, the signatories of the European Agreement at the European level were 
CBI, CEEP UK, FPB and TUC. These organizations do not possess a mandate to 
conclude collective agreements within the UK, neither at the inter-sectoral level nor 
at the sectoral or firm levels. The Czech signatories of the European Agreement 
(CMKOS and SPCR) do not possess the procedural right to conclude collective 
agreements at the national inter-sectoral or sectoral level. 
 
10.2.5 The issue addressed by the Framework Agreement and the degree to 
which the issue is typically regulated by national social partner organizations 
 
The extent to which the issues addressed by the Framework Agreements fell within 
the area of policy in which the signatories to the European Framework Agreements 
had regulatory competence was a fifth theme that became prominent during the 
process of data analysis. In Belgium, the topics of teleworking and work-related 
stress were traditionally regulated by the Belgian social partner organizations that 
were signatory to the European Agreements. In the case of the work-related stress 
issue, a 1999 NLC Agreement had been concluded by the Belgian social partners that 
regulated the topic in the Belgian private sector. In the case of the issue of 
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teleworking, an agreement at the NLC level had not been concluded on the topic 
prior to the implementation of the European Agreement. However, it was traditional 
for NLC collective agreements on forms of work-organization such as teleworking to 
be concluded by the Belgian social partner organizations. In Denmark, the topic of 
teleworking was typically regulated by the Danish sectoral social partners who had 
concluded several collective agreements on the topic. Prior to the implementation of 
the European Agreement, teleworking as an issue had received little attention from 
the inter-sectoral Danish social partner organizations who were signatory to the 
European Agreement. This was also the case with the issue of work-related stress. In 
this instance, the topic had been subject to substantial legal health and safety 
regulation by the Danish state, and had also been regulated in many instances 
through sectoral agreements by the Danish sectoral Social Partner organizations. 
 
In the UK, the topics of teleworking and work-related stress had not typically been 
the focus of policy attention from the UK social partner organizations that had been 
signatory to the Agreements at the European-level. Rather, when the issues were the 
focus of regulatory attention at firm or sectoral level, policies had typically been 
developed by individual firms and/or individual trade unions. The two issues had 
also been the subject of legal and non-legally binding regulation by the UK public 
authorities. In certain cases, the UK public authorities had involved the UK social 
partner organizations in the development of regulation on the topics. In Czech 
Republic, the topics of teleworking and work-related stress had been subject to a 
minimum amount of regulation within the country prior to the implementation of the 
European Agreements. However, typically such issues would have been subject to 
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regulation by the Czech public authorities via the Czech Labour Code and would 
often have involved substantial consultation with the Czech social partners. 
 
10.2.6 Summary: National 'procedures and practices': A weak implementation 
clause? 
 
In summary, the five factors that have been outlined above lead to the conclusion that 
the national 'procedures and practices' implementation clause is a weak 
implementation clause. This finding is supportable on several bases. The data 
demonstrates that it is highly arduous to identify national 'procedures and practices' 
for social dialogue in some national contexts. Despite the fact that actors were able to 
adopt coherent definitions of national 'procedures and practices' in Belgium and 
Czech Republic, this was not the case in UK and Denmark. In the UK, actors 
struggled to define coherently national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue 
owing to the lack of a tradition of national-level social dialogue within the UK, and 
the variety of levels and tools with which employment relations in the UK is 
regulated at and with. As a result of this inability to effectively define national 
'procedures and practices' in the UK, contrasting definitions of national ‘procedures 
and practices’ were adopted by the UK Social Partners en lieu of a coherent 
definition of national 'procedures and practices'. Despite the country's reputation for 
highly coordinated relations between national social partners, national actors also 
struggled to concur over national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue in 
Denmark. This was evident in the cases of the dispute between AC and DA over the 
nature of collective relations between the two organizations at the inter-sectoral 
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level, and the uncertainty amongst DA and LO officials as to the exact constitution of 
national 'procedures and practices' at the inter-sectoral level. In the former case, the 
debate resulted in a stalemate between the two organizations over the implementation 
of the Telework Agreement, whilst in the latter case the debate led to uncertainty 
with regards to the precise tool that should be used to implement the Agreements at 
the inter-sectoral level. 
 
Secondly, the data demonstrates that national 'procedures and practices' for social 
dialogue are liable to shift and reform themselves over a period of time. This was 
especially so in the case of Czech Republic, where the vast economic and social 
reforms that have occurred over the past twenty years and their implications for the 
changing regulation of working conditions were referred to by social partner 
officials. It was also noted that bipartite social dialogue was currently in the process 
of being constructed, and that national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue 
was currently in a period of reform within Czech Republic. In Denmark and UK, it 
was stated by officials that the implementation of EU Directives within national 
systems had had effects on national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue by 
increasing the role of the law in the regulation of working conditions. The 
implications for the viability of the national 'procedures and practices' 
implementation clause are two-fold. Firstly, it becomes theoretically more 
challenging to conceptualize national 'procedures and practices' given their 
propensity to shift. It is also particularly ironic that the European-level has been a 
major precipitator of change in national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue 
in some cases. Secondly, given the propensity of national 'procedures and practices' 
to change over time, national 'procedures and practices' are liable to be subject to 
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various definitions by national actors with different agendas.  
 
Finally, the data demonstrates that the issue addressed by the Framework Agreement 
sometimes lies outside the policy mandate of national social partners or is sometimes 
located within an ambiguous area of their competencies. In turn, this often produces 
ambiguity regarding 'correct' national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue. 
 In Denmark, the topic of work-related stress is primarily and traditionally regulated 
by the Danish state rather than the Danish social partners. This led to ambiguity 
regarding the form in which the Work-related Stress Agreement should be 
implemented by the Danish inter-sectoral social partners given the existence of a 
large body of labour law on the work-related stress issue. In the UK, there was a very 
limited tradition of the inter-sectoral social partners engaging in regulatory activity 
on the topics of work-related stress and teleworking. This also led to ambiguity over 
the relationship between the form of instrument with which the Agreements were 
implemented and the lower levels at which the issues of teleworking and work-
related stress have traditionally been regulated in the UK. 
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10.3 Evaluating and conceptualizing 'effective' implementation  
 
This section presents its findings on the extent to which the Agreements were 
'effectively' implemented in the countries and sectors concerned. It then considers 
three factors that shape the extent to which the Framework Agreements are 
'effectively' implemented within countries and sectors. These are (1) the existence of 
an established national inter-sectoral level tier of social partner collective bargaining 
or policy forum, (2) the existence of congruence between the signatories of the 
Agreements and their roles in national and sectoral systems, and (3) the level of pre-
existing regulation on the topic of the Framework Agreement. 
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Table 10.2 : Did ‘effective’ implementation occur ? 
 
Country/sector Actors’ definition of national 
‘procedures and practices’ 
Telework Agreement Work-related Stress Agreement 
Belgium Legally binding NLC Agreement Yes, national ‘procedures and 
practices’ followed 
Yes – ‘de facto’ implementation 
Belgian banking sector Sectoral collective agreement No implementation affected No implementation affected 
Belgian local Government sector Collective agreements between 
trade unions and local authorities 
No, there is very little evidence of 
authority level implementations 
No, there is very little evidence of 
authority level implementations 
Denmark Sectoral collective agreements. 
Ambivalence over correct 
procedures at inter-sectoral level 
Only in a limited number of cases 
were the Agreements subject to 
autonomous sectoral 
implementations 
Only in a limited number of cases 
were the Agreements subject to 
autonomous sectoral 
implementations 
Danish banking sector Sectoral collective agreement Yes, national ‘procedures and 
practices’ followed 
No implementation affected 
Danish local Government sector Sectoral collective agreement Yes, national ‘procedures and 
practices’ followed 
Yes, national ‘procedures and 
practices’ followed 
UK No national ‘procedures and No, there is very little evidence of No, there is very little evidence of 
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practices’ for social dialogue at 
inter-sectoral level. Firm-level 
agreements identified as most 
prominent procedure for social 
dialogue 
firm or sectoral Agreements 
implementing the Agreement 
firm or sectoral Agreements 
implementing the Agreement 
UK banking sector Collective agreements at firm-
level, where there is a trade union 
presence 
No, there is very little evidence of 
firm-level Agreements 
implementing the Agreement 
No, there is very little evidence of 
firm-level Agreements 
implementing the Agreement 
UK local Government sector Sectoral collective agreement Yes, national ‘procedures and 
practices’ followed 
No implementation affected 
Czech Republic Implementation through Czech 
Labour Code 
Yes, national ‘procedures and 
practices’ followed 
Yes, national ‘procedures and 
practices’ followed 
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10.3.1 Did 'effective' implementation occur?  
 
As outlined in chapter three, two benchmarks will be utilized to assess the procedural 
implementations of the Framework Agreements. The first, and more elementary, 
benchmark will involve assessing whether the Framework Agreements were subject 
to procedural implementations at the national-level within the three year 
implementation timescale stipulated by both Agreements. The second, and more 
complex, benchmark will involve assessing whether or not the Agreements were 
implemented in accordance with national 'procedures and practices' for social 
dialogue. As detailed in chapter three, it is appropriate to use this benchmark to 
gauge cross-national implementation outcomes given that it is clause by which the 
Agreements were to be implemented in accordance with. 
 
If one considers that in all four countries national social partners affected some form 
of procedural implementation of the Agreements and that these implementations 
were mostly carried out within the requisite three-year time period, then, according 
to the first benchmark, the data demonstrates that the Framework Agreements were 
more or less 'effectively' implemented within the four countries. Although the 
Telework Agreement was implemented marginally late in Czech Republic and the 
Belgian public sector, these examples do not constitute major infringements. The 
Visser report on the implementation of the Telework Agreement (2008) and the 
European social partner reports on the European-wide implementation of the 
Framework Agreements (2006; 2008) reveal that this was not the case in all 
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countries. For example in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Malta, Cyprus, Bulgaria and 
Romania, the Telework Agreement had not been implemented as of January 2008.  
 
With regard to the more contested second benchmark, the extent to which the 
implementations of the Agreements followed the definitions of national 'procedures 
and practices' that were offered by national Social Partner officials, the data 
demonstrates that the picture is more mixed and that there are key 'gaps' in the 
implementations that were affected in the countries that were the subject of our 
study. Table 10.2 demonstrates several cases of mismatch between definitions of 
national ‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue and the implementation 
outcomes that actually occurred. As table 10.2 also shows, within the UK the 
Agreements were not implemented in a form that one could describe as in 
accordance with national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue. A sole 
example of either of the Agreements being implemented autonomously at either the 
sectoral or firm or workplace level was cited by respondents. The data leads to the 
conclusion then that the implementations that the actual Agreements were subject to 
in the UK were not ones in accordance with national 'procedures and practices'. In 
Denmark, although the Agreements were implemented via Social Partner collective 
agreements in several sectors, the absence of autonomous implementations in the 
majority of Danish sectors demonstrates that Danish national 'procedures and 
practices' for the implementation of the Agreements were not followed to the letter. It 
is also somewhat difficult to conceive of the LO-DA ‘follow-up’ Agreement by 
which the Telework Agreement was implemented at the inter-sectoral level as 
national ‘procedures and practices’ given that this was seen as a ‘new’ tool in the 
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Danish context. 
 
In Belgium, the data reveals that national 'procedures and practices' for the 
implementation of the Agreements were followed faithfully within the Belgian 
private sector and that the implementations may therefore be considered ‘effective’. 
Despite the fact that the Work-related Stress Agreement was not formally 
implemented in the private sector, it is reasonable to consider that ‘effective’ 
implementation took place in a de-facto form given the existence of a previous 
Agreement at this level that fulfilled the content of the European Agreement. In the 
Belgian public sector, despite the fact that both Agreements were implemented via 
national ‘procedures and practices’ at the level of the federal public administration, 
the absence of autonomous implementations at lower levels within the sector implies 
that the Agreements were not implemented in accordance with national ‘procedures 
and practices’ in this instance. 
 
In Czech Republic, the implementations of the Agreements via the Czech Labour 
Code followed existing national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue. 
Despite the fact that the Czech social partners do not play a primary role in the 
execution of these ‘procedures and practices’, their traditional proximity to this 
process and the fact that alternative social dialogue routes are not well developed 
within the country implies that implementation was carried out in accordance with 
national ‘procedures and practices’ in Czech Republic.  
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10.3.2 Accounting for variance in effective implementation 
 
Having established the extent to which the Framework Agreements were 
implemented ‘effectively’ within the countries that were the subject of the study, it is 
now important to consider those factors that increase the likelihood of ‘effective’ 
implementation outcomes within countries and sectors and that are likely to 
minimize the level of debate over the constitution of national ‘procedures and 
practices’. 
 
The existence of an established national inter-sectoral level tier of social partner 
collective bargaining or an established inter-sectoral policy forum involving social 
partners 
 
In those countries where there is an established forum for national inter-sectoral 
bargaining between social partners or an established inter-sectoral policy forum 
involving social partners, the data demonstrates that ‘effective’ implementation 
becomes more likely and that it is more probable that there will be lower levels of 
debate on the procedural form in which to implement the Framework Agreement. 
This is shown in table 10.2. In such cases, the existence of a centralized, inter-
sectoral mechanism allow social partners to affect implementations that bind lower-
level actors to the Framework Agreements. The case of the implementations of the 
Agreements in the Belgian private sector demonstrates this principle. In this instance, 
all of the Belgian social partner organizations identified implementation via the 
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Belgian National Labour Council as the 'correct' Belgian national 'procedure and 
practice' for the implementation of the Agreements, and were able to act in unison to 
affect an implementation that became binding upon lower level actors within the 
sector. The results of the Visser report (2008) on the implementation of the Telework 
Agreement and the European social partner reports (2006; 2008) on the 
implementation of the Agreements also confirms that ‘effective’ implementation is 
more probable in other countries with similar forums for the conclusion of inter-
sectoral collective agreements. In France, Italy, and Luxembourg, all countries with 
traditions of inter-sectoral collective agreements, the Telework Agreement was 
implemented via routes that utilized existing national 'procedures and practices' for 
inter-sectoral collective agreements (Visser and Martin, 2008) and appear to have 
involved low levels of debate on the constitution of national ‘procedures and 
practices’. 
 
Although there is no inter-sectoral level bargaining within Czech Republic and the 
system is very different to that of Belgium and France, the fact that the Czech social 
partners are involved in national-level tripartite concertation with the Czech public 
authorities and there is a tradition of regulation via the labour code meant that a very 
similar outcome to that of Belgium occurred in the country. In Czech Republic, the 
existence of an established means by which the Czech social partners were able to 
influence the regulation of the employment relationship led to ‘effective’ 
implementation outcomes and also to a lower level of debate on national ‘procedures 
and practices’. The same essential principle was in operation as in Belgium; the 
existence of established national level traditions with the propensity to bind lower-
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level actors to the terms of the Framework Agreements led to ‘effective’ 
implementation and a very low level of debate regarding national ‘procedures and 
practices’.  
 
The data also demonstrates that in those countries where there are no established 
national inter-sectoral forums for the conclusion of collective agreements or an 
established inter-sectoral policy forum involving social partners ‘effective’ 
implementation outcomes are less likely to occur and there is also likely to be greater 
debate over suitable national ‘procedures and practices’ for implementation. This 
effect also becomes more pronounced when social dialogue levels are more de-
centralized and characterized by low degrees of coordination between tiers of social 
dialogue. This is demonstrated by table 10.2. In such cases, the lack of a centralized, 
inter-sectoral mechanism governing employment relations implies that the activities 
of lower-level actors are uncoordinated, and sporadic implementation outcomes 
result. In the UK, the lack of a traditional means for concluding national inter-
sectoral agreements led to ambivalence over a fitting implementation route for the 
Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements. Also, the fact that national 
‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue were de-centralized and not 
coordinated by a centralized organ meant that ‘effective’ implementation did not take 
place in the UK context. The fact that industrial relations in the UK is renowned for 
its de-centralized nature and lack of coordination between bargaining levels meant 
that the effect was particularly pronounced in the case of the UK. A similar effect 
was also manifest in the cases of the Belgian public sector. In this case, the limited 
level of authority that the Belgian federal administration had over lower-level actors 
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within the sector implied that ‘effective’ implementation was not widespread within 
the sector. The case of Denmark lies between Czech Republic and the Belgian 
private sector on the one hand, and UK and the Belgian public sector on the other 
hand. In the instance of Denmark, the conclusion of an inter-sectoral agreement to 
implement the Telework Agreement and the general existence of negotiations 
between LO and DO demonstrates that inter-sectoral social dialogue structures are 
available. However, the fact that the sectoral level is the level at which the social 
dialogue is strongest had key implications. Specifically, the autonomy of sectoral 
level actors and limited authority of the national inter-sectoral social partners led to 
scenarios where the Agreements were only implemented autonomously and 
‘effectively’ in certain sectors.  Given the high levels of coordination between 
bargaining tiers in Denmark and the existence of some form of inter-sectoral social 
dialogue however, the situation was not as extreme as that of the UK. A further 
notable effect in the Danish context was that the relative weakness of the inter-
sectoral level policy forum led to debate about the nature of national ‘procedures and 
practices’ in the Danish context. Secondary sources (Visser and Martin, 2008) also 
demonstrate that similar trends were evident in other countries in which the sectoral 
level is the prevalent level at which the employment relationship is regulated. In 
countries such as Germany, Sweden, Austria and Netherlands, the relative weakness 
of established national inter-sectoral forums for the conclusion of collective 
agreements meant that national inter-sectoral actors were forced to produce 
innovative implementation routes that aimed to coordinate the implementation 
activities of sectoral level actors and that in many sectors there were not autonomous 
implementations of the Agreements.  
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Congruence between the signatories of the Agreements and their role in national 
systems 
  
A second finding is that when the national signatories to the European Agreements 
possess the mandate to conclude collective agreements within their national systems 
or have an established role within the policy process then ‘effective’ implementation 
outcomes become more likely and it becomes less likely that there will be 
contestation over the constitution of national 'procedures and practices'. This finding 
is linked to the one above.  
 
The case of the Belgian implementation of the Agreements illustrates this. The 
Belgian signatories of the European Agreements (FEB-VBO, ABVV/FGTB, 
ACV/CSC, CGSLB, Unizo) possess a mandate to conclude collective agreements 
within Belgium at the National Labour Council level, and the trade union 
organizations possess mandates to bargain collectively at the sectoral and firm levels. 
Owing to the fact that the signatories of the Agreements already had an established 
means by which the Agreements could be implemented, there was subsequently a 
low level of debate over the constitution of national 'procedures and practices' for 
social dialogue in the Belgian private sector and ‘effective’ implementation was 
guaranteed. The principle was also manifest in the case of the implementation of the 
Agreements in Czech Republic. In the Czech Republic, the Social Partner 
organizations SPCR and CMKOS were signatory to the European Agreement. These 
organizations are normally substantially engaged by the Czech Government in 
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consultation over the direction of labour law and social policy. Owing to this, there 
was little debate regarding the implementation of the Framework Agreements via the 
Czech Labour Code.  
 
The case of the implementation of the Agreements within the Belgian public sector 
demonstrates the inverse of the principle. In this instance, the fact that the de-
centralized local authorities that conduct the majority of collective negotiations 
within the Belgian public sector had not been signatory to the European Agreements 
mitigated against the Agreements ‘effective’ implementation within the sector. The 
case of the implementations of the Agreements in Denmark and UK also illustrate 
the inverse of this principle. In Denmark, the Danish organizations who were 
signatory to the European Agreements (AC, DA, FTF, and LO) have a limited 
tradition of conducting and competence to conclude collective agreements with one 
another in Denmark. As a result of this, there was a considerable level of debate over 
the form in which the Agreements should be implemented within Denmark. This was 
evident in the cases of the AC-DA dispute over the implementation of the Telework 
Agreement, and the debate between DA and LO over the conclusion of 'follow-up' 
Agreements for the implementation of the Agreements. The organizations who are 
typically involved in the conclusion of collective agreements in Denmark, namely 
the sectoral employer associations and trade union cartels, were not directly 
signatory to the European Agreements. As a result, implementations of the 
Agreements at the Danish sectoral level were patchy, and the Agreements were not 
implemented ‘effectively’. 
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In the UK, the organizations who were signatory to the European Agreement (CBI, 
CEEP UK, FPB, TUC), do not possess any mandate to bargain collectively in the UK 
and also do not possess statutory rights to be involved in public policy. This led to 
debate over the constitution of national 'procedures and practices' in the UK as the 
organizations who had been signatory to the European Agreements did not possess 
any obvious existing policy mandate by which the Agreements could be 
implemented. The organizations who are typically involved in collective agreements 
and social dialogue in the UK (individual trade unions and individual employers) had 
not been directly signatory to the European Agreements. This led to limited 
awareness of the Agreements at these levels and low levels of implementation. 
Subsequently, ‘effective’ implementation of the Agreements in the UK was not 
achieved. 
 
The level of pre-existing regulation on the topic of the Framework Agreement 
 
A third finding of the study is that another factor that is likely to lead to lower or 
higher levels of debate over the most fitting procedural form with which to 
implement the European Framework Agreement is the level of existing national or 
sectoral regulation on the topic of the European Framework Agreement. Should there 
be a low level of existing regulation on the topic of the European Framework 
Agreement the data demonstrates that there will be a lower level of debate on the 
most fitting procedural form with which to implement the Agreement. Alternatively, 
should there be a high level of existing regulation on the topic of the European 
Framework Agreement the data demonstrates that there will be a higher level of 
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debate on the most fitting procedural form with which to implement the Agreement. 
Various national and sectoral implementations of the Agreements provide several 
instances of this principle in operation. In these cases, the ‘sticking point’ between 
Social Partners was often the relationship between the content of the Framework 
Agreement and that of existing regulation, and there was subsequently disagreement 
over the most appropriate form of procedural implementation given varying 
interpretations of existing regulation.  
 
In Belgium there was a disagreement between the Belgian social partners over the 
most fitting means to implement the Work-related Stress Agreement. The stance of 
the Belgian employers' association was that the content of the European Agreement 
was present in Belgian regulation due to the existence of a 1999 National Labour 
Council Agreement, whereas sections of the Belgian trade union movement 
advocated a revision of the Agreement to incorporate new clauses related to the 
content of the European Agreement on the basis of the argument that the European 
Agreement contained new clauses that were not present in the existing Belgian 
Agreement. Although the European Agreement was eventually implemented in a de 
facto form, the existence of the debate nevertheless illustrates the potential of 
existing regulation to stimulate extra debate over procedural implementation routes. 
The case of the implementation of the Telework Agreement in the Danish local 
Government sector also involved a similar dispute over the content of a pre-existing 
sectoral agreement on teleworking. The Danish local Government trade union 
organization KTO accused the Danish local Government employers' organization KL 
of attempting to downgrade sectoral employment standards through the 
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implementation of the Agreement, and the subsequent result was a year long dispute 
over the implementation of the Agreement.  
 
There are also examples of the converse. In Belgium, the lack of pre-existing 
regulation on the topic of teleworking was one of the reasons why a National Labour 
Council Agreement was immediately identified to implement the Telework 
Agreement. In the Danish local Government sector, the Danish local Government 
sector social partners decided to delay concluding an Agreement on work-related 
stress until after the conclusion of the European Agreement. This was in order to 
avoid the disputes that had occurred over the implementation of the Telework 
Agreement in the sector. In Czech Republic, the lack of existing regulation on the 
issues teleworking and work-related stress underpinned a consensus between the 
Czech social partners that a legal implementation of the Agreements was the most 
fitting implementation route. 
 
10.3.3 Summary 
 
The findings of the thesis regarding the extent to which the Framework Agreements 
had been implemented 'effectively' according to the two benchmarks developed in 
chapter three and the factors that are likely to facilitate 'effective' implementation 
were presented above. In the countries that were the subject of study the Agreements 
received a basic level of 'effective' implementation according to the first benchmark, 
but in the cases of some countries, and in line with the second benchmark developed, 
it was not clear that national 'procedures and practices' for implementation had been 
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followed faithfully. It was also demonstrated that the existence of an established 
national inter-sectoral level tier of collective bargaining, congruence between the 
signatories of the European Agreements and their role in national systems, and a 
lower level of existing regulation on the topic of the Framework Agreement were all 
likely to facilitate 'effective' implementation outcomes. 
 
 
10.4 Independent variables related to the procedural implementations of the 
Agreements  
 
The chapter will now review its findings against the variables advanced in chapter 
three regarding the extent to which the series of factors advanced in the literature 
were likely to explain the forms of procedural implementations that the Agreements 
were subject to and the related issue of the extent of their 'effectiveness'. 
Accordingly, the findings are reviewed against five variables; (1) the existence of a 
'culture of compliance' with EU regulation in countries and sectors, (2) the 
convergence of national and sectoral policy agendas with the topic of the Framework 
Agreement, (3) the degree of existing regulation on the topic of the Framework 
Agreement, (4) prior Social Partner experience of implementing EU-level output, 
and (5) the coordination of social dialogue levels within countries and sectors. 
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Table 10.3 Variables explaining differential procedural implementation outcomes 
Country/ 
sector 
‘Culture’ of 
compliance 
Convergence 
of national 
and sectoral 
policy 
agendas with 
topic of 
Framework 
Agreement 
The degree of 
existing 
regulation on 
the topic of 
the 
Framework 
Agreement 
Prior social 
partner 
experience of 
implementing 
EU-level 
output 
The 
coordination 
of social 
dialogue 
levels 
The existence 
of an inter-
sectoral level 
policy forum 
involving 
national social 
partners 
The 
possession of 
a mandate to 
conclude 
collective 
agreements by 
the national 
social partners 
signatory to 
the European 
Agreement 
 
Belgium 1 2 3 1 1 3 3  
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Belgian 
banking sector 
1 2 2 1 1 3 3  
Belgian local 
Government 
sector 
1 3 2 1 1 3 3  
Denmark 2 2 3 2 2 3 3  
Danish 
banking sector 
1 1 3 2 2 3 3  
Danish local 
Government 
sector 
3 3 3 2 2 3 3  
UK 2 3 3 2 2 3 3  
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UK banking 
sector 
1 1 3 1 2 3 3  
UK local 
Government 
sector 
2 2 2 1 2 3 3  
Czech 
Republic 
1 1 3 1 1 3 3  
 
Key (rankings are ordinal rather than cardinal): 
3 = Strong relationship between existence of factor and implementation outcome 
2 = Medium relationship between existence of factor and implementation outcome 
1 = Weak relationship between existence of factor and implementation outcome
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10.4.1 The ‘culture’ variable 
 
Falkner et al (2005) argued that the 'culture of compliance' that existed in a country 
was crucial in understanding the degree to which 'effective' implementation of EU 
social policy Directives was likely to occur. Falkner et al conceptualized the 'culture 
of compliance' as a 'socio-political mechanism' with which national officials became 
inculcated and which was subsequently likely to guarantee 'effective' 
implementation. Three 'worlds of compliance' were identified; the 'world of 
compliance', in which Directives were always 'effectively' implemented, 'the world 
of domestic politics' in which 'effective' implementation was subject to domestic 
political realities, and the 'world of neglect', in which 'effective' implementation 
almost never occurred. A fourth ‘world of compliance’ was added by Falkner and 
Treib in 2008 after research on the implementation of three EU social policy 
Directives in four new member states. This was ‘the world of dead letters’ and was 
characterized by ‘politicized transposition processes and systematic application and 
enforcement problems’.  The UK and Belgium were classified as belonging to the 
'world of domestic politics', and Denmark to the 'world of compliance'. The 
implication of Falkner and Treib’s 2008 article is that Czech Republic belongs to the 
‘world of dead letters’.  
 
The data demonstrates a modest link between the existence of a 'culture of 
compliance' and the 'effective' implementation of the Framework Agreements in 
countries and sectors. In several instances, it was evident that the existence of a 
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'culture of compliance' within the countries or sector concerned had motivated actors 
to affect measures to implement the Agreements. This 'culture of compliance' was 
evident in several Danish sectors and in this sense validates Falkner et al's 
description of Denmark as belonging to the 'world of compliance' grouping. In the 
Danish industrial sector, it was reported that the sector's status as the 'pattern-setting' 
sector in Danish industrial relations implied that actors within the sector saw it as 
their duty to implement European Agreements 'effectively' and with alacrity. In the 
Danish local Government sector, sectoral officials reported that actors within the 
sector had waited to conclude a collective agreement on the topic of work-related 
stress until after the conclusion of the European Agreement so as to ensure that the 
European Agreement would be 'effectively' implemented. In the Danish public sector 
at large, the existence of a general 'culture of compliance' with European regulation 
was also alluded to. A 'culture of compliance' was discernible in the UK also. This 
was most evident in the case of the actions of the UK DTI, who had taken the lead in 
the implementation of the European Agreements so as to ensure that the obligations 
of the UK towards the European-level were met. A further finding is that this 'culture 
of compliance' did not seem to be contingent upon domestic political factors but was 
rather an entrenched feature of the workings of the DTI as an organization. This 
finding raises questions about the viability of Falkner et al's bracketing of the UK in 
the 'world of domestic politics'. 
 
Further, the findings of the thesis also demonstrate that the ‘world of domestic 
politics’ is a viable analytic category. As will be outlined below, it emerged in the 
course of the analysis of the data that the convergence of national and sectoral policy 
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agendas with the topic of the Framework Agreement was a crucial factor in 
explaining divergent national and sectoral implementation outcomes. The findings of 
the study thus support Falkner et al’s argument that in many countries political 
factors are key in explaining diverging implementation outcomes. In none of the 
countries in which research was conducted was evidence of ‘the world of neglect’ 
found. However, the fact that the Telework Agreement was not implemented in 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Malta, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania (Visser and Martin, 
2008) demonstrates that these countries may belong in this world. The finding that 
‘effective’ implementation by and large occurred in Czech Republic also challenges 
Falkner and Trieb’s view that Czech Republic belongs in the ‘world of dead letters’. 
 
Yet the relationship between 'effective' implementation and a 'culture of compliance' 
also emerges as somewhat tenuous. There are significant methodological hurdles in 
the way of establishing such a link. For example, it is very difficult to gauge and 
quantify 'culture of compliance' as an actual social phenomenon and it is arduous to 
isolate its influence from other factors. Whilst 'effective' implementation of the 
Framework Agreements may be said to have largely taken place within Belgium and 
Czech Republic, the existence of a 'culture' of compliance was never alluded to nor 
were national actors' obligations to the European-level discussed explicitly as they 
had been in UK and Denmark. The rationales for the implementation of the 
Agreements were couched in alternative terms, and it was subsequently very hard to 
establish the extent to which the existence of 'cultural' factors had exerted a major 
impact upon implementation outcomes. Thus, it is a finding of the study that whilst 
'culture' exerts an impact upon implementation outcomes in some cases, it is too 
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methodologically arduous to identify it as the main driver of implementation 
outcomes.   
 
10.4.2 Convergence of national and sectoral policy agendas with the topic of 
Framework Agreement 
 
As discussed in chapter two, a further factor that that is identified in the literature as 
facilitating the extent to which EU-level regulation and 'soft' law are likely to be 
effectively implemented is the extent to which existing national and sectoral policy 
agendas converge with the topic of the EU-level regulation. De La Porte and Pochet 
(2002) and Leonard (2005) advance the argument that where the policy preferences 
and agendas of national actors converge with the topic of the EU-level regulation 
then 'effective' implementation is more likely to take place. The converse is also 
implied; namely that if the topic of the EU-level regulation does not converge with 
the preferences of national-level actors then 'effective' implementation will not take 
place. 
 
The results of the data offer much to support this argument, and demonstrate that this 
factor was often key in stimulating autonomous implementations of the Agreements. 
In the UK, the employers' association CBI were eager to implement the Agreements 
within the UK as they considered that the topics of teleworking and work-related 
stress were becoming of greater concern to their affiliates. In Denmark, the extent to 
which there were autonomous sectoral implementations of the Agreements was often 
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dictated by the extent to which the topics of the Agreement converged with the 
agendas of sectoral level actors. In the sectors in which the Telework Agreement was 
implemented autonomously such as the commerce and industrial sectors, it was 
reported that there were generally higher levels of interest in the topic within the 
sectors than in those sectors where the Agreements had not been implemented 
autonomously. The data also confirms the inverse of this principle. In the Belgian 
public sector and in Czech sectors, there were very low levels of autonomous 
implementations of the Framework Agreements. This was attributed by actors to the 
fact that actors at these levels had little interest in the topics of teleworking and 
work-related stress. 
 
10.4.3 The degree of national and sectoral regulation that exists on the 
Framework Agreement prior to its implementation 
 
As described in chapter two, a further factor that is identified in the literature as 
facilitating the extent to which EU-level regulation and 'soft' law are likely to be 
effectively implemented is the extent to which there is existing national and sectoral 
regulation on the topic of the Framework Agreement. Following De La Porte and 
Pochet (2002) regarding the implementation of the OMC in member states, the 
argument advanced in chapter two is that the greater the level of existing regulation 
in national and sectoral contexts the less likely 'effective' implementation becomes. 
The converse is also implied; that the lesser the level of existing regulation in 
national and sectoral contexts the more likely 'effective' implementation becomes.  
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The data demonstrates that a strong relationship between the extent to which the 
Framework Agreements were implemented 'effectively' and the level of existing 
regulating on the topic of the Framework Agreement exists. In the case of the UK, it 
was evident that differing levels of existing regulation on the teleworking and work-
related stress issues affected the extent to which the individual agreements influenced 
policy at lower levels. Owing to the existence of the HSE ‘Management Standards on 
Work-related Stress’, it was thought by the UK social partners that the European 
Agreement would inspire few policies on work-related stress at firm and sector 
levels. Alternatively, the smaller degree of existing regulation on teleworking in the 
UK implied that there was likely to be a greater number of lower level policies on 
teleworking inspired by the European Agreement. The level of existing regulation on 
the Framework Agreements also exercised a key effect on the extent to which the 
Framework Agreements were 'effectively' implemented in Denmark. The Work-
related Stress Agreement was not implemented in the finance sector or at the inter-
sectoral level as a result of the view of actors that there was a sufficient degree of 
existing regulation on the topic of work-related stress. Alternatively, the major 
reason for the implementation of the Agreement within the local Government sector 
was that there was no regulation on work-related stress within the sector.  
 
The extent of regulation on the topics of teleworking and work-related stress was 
also a crucial factor in explaining the differing forms of implementation that the 
Framework Agreements were subject to in Belgium. In the case of the national 
private inter-sectoral level, the forms of implementations that the two individual 
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Agreements were subject to were primarily contingent upon the level of regulation 
that the issues of teleworking and work-related stress had previously been subject to. 
In the case of the former issue, the lack of regulation on the topic within Belgium led 
to the conclusion of a National Labour Council Agreement to implement the 
European Agreement. In the case of the latter issue, the existence of a National 
Labour Council Agreement on work-related stress led to the Belgian social partners 
carrying out a de facto implementation of the agreement. Within the Belgian public 
sector, the fact that the Work-related Stress Agreement was implemented via royal 
decree was primarily attributable to the lack of existing regulation on work-related 
stress within the sector. The operation of the principle was also evident in the case of 
the Czech Republic. In this instance, the lack of existing regulation on the 
teleworking and work-related stress issues exercised a major effect on the decision of 
the social partners and Government to implement the Agreements via the Czech 
Labour Code and via bipartite means.   
 
10.4.4 Prior social partner experience of similar EU-level initiatives 
 
As considered in chapter two, a further factor that that is identified in the literature as 
facilitating the extent to which EU-level regulation and 'soft' law are likely to be 
effectively implemented is the extent to which social partners have experience of 
implementing prior European-level output. This argument has been advanced by 
Lopez-Santana (2006) with regard to the implementation of the European 
Employment Strategy. The converse is also implied; that the lesser the level of 
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experience of social partners in implementing EU-level output the less likely 
'effective' implementation becomes.  
 
The findings only offer patchy support for this variable. There were some examples 
of the prior experience of social partners in the implementation of EU-level output 
increasing the extent to which 'effective' implementation was likely to occur. In the 
case of the Danish implementation of the Telework Agreement, it was stated that the 
process of the implementation of the Telework Agreement via the method of 
autonomous sectoral Agreements followed by an inter-sectoral 'follow-up' agreement 
was easier given that a similar method had been used to implement legally binding 
EU Social Policy Directives. In the UK, actors stated that, logistically speaking, the 
implementation of the Work-related Stress Agreement was an easier process given 
that national actors had prior experience of implementing the Telework Agreement. 
However, there were scant instances of such an effect in other countries and sectors, 
and it thus becomes difficult to regard the ‘learning effect’ as a key ingredient of 
‘effective’ implementation. 
 
10.4.5 The coordination of social dialogue levels 
 
As elaborated in chapter two, a further factor that that is identified in the literature as 
facilitating the extent to which EU-level regulation and 'soft' law are likely to be 
effectively implemented is the extent to which there is coordination of social 
dialogue levels in the country concerned. The argument advanced by Keller (2003) 
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with specific regard to the implementation of the Telework Agreement is that the 
greater the degree of coordination of social dialogue levels within countries the 
greater the likelihood of 'effective' implementation. The converse is also implied; that 
the lesser the degree of coordination of social dialogue levels within countries the 
less likely 'effective' implementation becomes.  
 
The data reveals that there is not a robust link between 'effective' implementation and 
the degree of coordination between social dialogue levels. In Czech Republic, a 
country in which there is a very low level of coordination between social dialogue 
levels, the data reveals that 'effective' implementation may be said to have by and 
large taken place. In Denmark, a country with a high degree of coordination of social 
dialogue levels, there were many sectors where the Agreements were not 
autonomously implemented and it can thus be said that 'effective' implementation did 
not entirely take place. Although the high degree of coordination of social dialogue 
levels in Denmark allowed the inter-sectoral social partners to coordinate sectoral 
implementations to a degree that was not possible in a state such as the UK, the high 
degree of coordination of social dialogue levels in Denmark was not sufficient to 
ensure comprehensive implementation outcomes. The crucial structural factor that 
explains 'effective' implementation performance is whether or not there is an 
established forum for the conclusion of national inter-sectoral agreements or an 
established policy forum involving all of the national social partners within the state 
concerned. The existence of such forums in Czech Republic and the Belgian private 
sector led to 'effective' implementations in these contexts. However, the absence of 
such forums in the Belgian public sector and the UK led to implementations that 
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were often piecemeal. 
 
10.4.6 Summary 
 
The above section has reviewed the findings of the thesis against the variables 
advanced in the literature on the extent to which EU-regulation was likely to be 
procedurally implemented 'effectively'. It found that (1) there was some evidence to 
support the 'culture of compliance' argument although this was hard to establish 
methodologically, and that there was much evidence to support the variables on the 
(2) convergence of national and sectoral policy agendas with the topic of the 
Framework Agreements and (3) the degree of existing regulation on the topic of the 
Framework Agreement. It was also found that (4) there was only limited evidence to 
support the prior social partner experience of implementing EU-level output variable, 
and (5) that there was little evidence to support the coordination of social dialogue 
levels variable. 
 
10.5 Conclusion 
 
The chapter isolated five discreet strands in the data collected that were key from the 
perspective of the procedural implementations of the Agreements. These were (1) the 
forms of procedural implementations that the Agreements were subject to within 
member states and sectors, (2) the prevailing definitions of national 'procedures and 
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practices' for social dialogue within countries, (3) the stability of national 'procedures 
and practices' for social dialogue within countries, (4) the existing mandated roles of 
the signatory organizations to the European Agreements within countries and sectors, 
and (5) the issue addressed by the Framework Agreement and the level at which it is 
regulated in countries and sectors.  
 
The chapter then outlined the extent to which 'effective' implementation had taken 
place within the countries and sectors that were the subject of the study. It was 
demonstrated that on a basic level the Framework Agreements were implemented 
'effectively' in all of the countries in which the research was conducted. This was due 
to the fact that both the Agreements were implemented in some procedural form in 
all of the countries concerned, and also that the majority of these implementations 
fell within the specified three-year time periods for the implementation of the 
Agreements. However, it was also demonstrated that if one adopted a more stringent 
reading of the national 'procedures and practices' implementation clause (based on 
the given definitions of national actors) that 'effective' implementation had not taken 
place in several national and sectoral contexts. Following this finding, the chapter 
demonstrated shortcoming in the national 'procedures and practices' implementation 
clause on several grounds. These grounds were identified as the frequent difficulty of 
establishing national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue, the liability of 
national 'procedures and practices' for social dialogue to reform themselves, and the 
possible tendency of the issue addressed by the Framework Agreement to fall outside 
the competence area of national social partners. The chapter also identified several 
factors that were likely to enhance the likelihood of 'effective' implementation 
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outcomes within member states. These factors were identified as (1) the existence of 
an established national inter-sectoral level tier of social partner collective bargaining 
or equivalent established inter-sectoral policy forum involving social partners, (2) 
congruence between the signatories of the European Agreements and their role in 
national systems, and (3) the level of pre-existing regulation on the topic of the 
Framework Agreement. 
 
Finally, the chapter reviewed the variables advanced in the literature regarding the 
conditions that were likely to enhance or impede the 'effective' implementation of 
EU-level regulation against the data collected in the course of the study. It was 
concluded that there was a moderately discernible link between the 'culture of 
compliance' with EU-level regulation in a state that was identified by Falkner et al 
and the extent to which the Framework Agreements were likely to be implemented 
'effectively'. However, it was also concluded that it was very hard to establish the 
methodological robustness of this link. It was also concluded that the data provided 
much evidence to support two other variables advanced in the literature; namely that 
'effective' procedural implementation is more likely to occur if national and sectoral 
policy agendas converge with the topic of the EU-level regulation and if there is a 
minimal body of existing national and sectoral regulation on the topic of the EU-
level regulation. With regard to the extent that prior social partner experience of 
implementing European-level output facilitates 'effective' implementation, it was 
found that there was some limited evidence of this principle occurring in sections of 
the data, but that it was not a widespread occurrence. Finally, it was found that the 
degree to which social dialogue levels in countries were coordinated had little to no 
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relationship with the 'effective' implementation of the Agreements. 
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Chapter 11: Evaluating substantive implementation outcomes 
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will analyze the effects that the Agreements and texts had upon 
substantive aspects of employment relations in the countries in focus. As stated in 
previous chapters, the potential of the Agreements and texts to contribute to levels of 
social and employment protection in European member states is a crucial function of 
European social policy; thus, it is pivotal that the study identifies the extent to which 
the Agreements and texts did this.  
 
The chapter will therefore aim to establish the efficacy of the Framework 
Agreements and texts in terms of their substantive effectiveness. As stated in chapter 
three, this will be carried out using two indicators of substantive effectiveness. 
Firstly, (i) the extent to which the content of the Framework Agreements and texts 
added to the content of social and employment regulation across member states will 
be assessed. This will be carried out through an analysis of the extent to which the 
terms of the Framework Agreements and texts were present in various forms of 
regulation in member states prior to the implementation of the European Agreements 
and texts. It will then appraise the extent to which the Framework Agreements and 
texts, as a result of their implementation, added new content to social and 
employment regulation in the member states. 
 
Secondly (ii), the chapter will seek to assess the extent to which the Framework 
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Agreements and texts achieved an impact upon employment relations in sectors and 
firms in member states. This will be done in two ways. Firstly, the chapter will assess 
the extent to which the policy mechanisms used to implement the Framework 
Agreements and texts were likely to bind actors at the sectoral level to the content of 
the Framework Agreement and texts. Assessing this is vital for several reasons. 
Crucially, if the Framework Agreements and texts are implemented via a mechanism 
that has little potential to bind sectoral level actors, then this implies that the impact 
of the Framework Agreement or text has been very limited. Appraising the potential 
of the differing policy mechanisms that have been manifest across European member 
states to implement the Agreements and texts will also allow the thesis to develop a 
typology of the effectiveness of the various policy mechanisms used by social 
partners across Europe to implement the Agreements and texts. This will allow the 
thesis to compare and contrast the differing potential of EU-level 'soft' law to reform 
and change national systems, and will also provide crucial theoretical clues about the 
development of industrial relations systems in member states (Crouch and Traxler, 
1995; Traxler et al, 2001).  To this end, and following Falkner et al (2005), in the 
conclusion the chapter will propose three ‘worlds’ in which countries may be 
classified with regard to the extent that the Framework Agreements and texts became 
binding on sector and firm-level actors and were likely to lead to an increase in 
workplace level policies on the topics of teleworking and work-related stress. 
 
The chapter will also consider the extent to which the Agreements and texts have had 
an impact on employment relations in member states and sectors in terms of the 
extent to which the Agreements and texts are likely to have led to increased firm-
level policies on the topics they addressed. It is vital to consider these aspects as 
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considering merely the extent to which the content of the Agreements and texts 
contributes to national regulation and the extent to which the content is likely to be 
binding upon sector and firm level actors gives only one side of the picture. For 
example, it may be that in country x, Agreement y added comprehensively to national 
regulation, was binding upon all participants, but in reality had very little impact 
upon practical employment relations due to the fact that the topic of the Agreement 
failed to inspire lower level actors. A converse scenario may also be possible. 
Although no actual data on the quantity of workplace level policies on the topics 
addressed by the Framework Agreements and texts was obtained, the fact that a 
comprehensive level of data on the extent to which national social partner 
representatives estimated that the implemented Agreements and texts would impact 
upon firm-level contexts was obtained means that the chapter will at least be able to 
hypothesize the extent to which this was the case. 
 
The chapter will also assess the extent to which the hypotheses advanced in the 
literature, outlined in chapter three, regarding the factors that explain divergent 
substantive implementation outcomes, are supportable on the basis of the findings. 
This will help the thesis identify and analyze the factors that drive differing national 
and sectoral substantive implementation outcomes. Finally, the chapter will offer a 
conclusion. This will assess the main findings of the chapter and will also propose 
the idea of three ‘worlds’ in which European member states may be bracketed with 
regard to the degree of the substantive impact of the Agreements and texts within 
them. 
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11.2 The extent to which the Agreements and texts contributed to the content of 
national and sectoral regulation    
 
Firstly, the chapter will outline the extent to which the Telework Agreement added to 
regulation in member states and sectors, before conducting the same analysis for the 
Work-related Stress Agreement. Then, it will demonstrate the extent to which the 
Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning and Joint Declaration on Lifelong 
Learning in the European Banking Sector added to national and sectoral forms of 
regulation, before briefly analyzing the similarities and differences between the 
Agreements and texts and the differences evident in country and sector specific 
contexts.   
 
11.2.1 Telework Agreement 
 
As stated in chapter five, the Telework Agreement contained the following clauses: 
 
• (2) A specification of the definition and scope of teleworking 
• (3) The voluntary nature of teleworking 
• (4) The right of teleworkers to the same employment conditions as normal 
workers 
• (5) Data protection issues 
• (6) The right of teleworkers to privacy 
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• (7) The issue of the provision and maintenance of teleworking equipment 
• (8) The health and safety of teleworkers 
• (9) The organization of teleworkers' workload 
• (10) The right of teleworkers to training 
• (11) The inclusion of teleworkers in the terms of collective agreements 
applicable to 'normal' workers 
 
The data collected during the course of the fieldwork demonstrates that in the 
countries that were the subject of the study the Telework Agreement often added 
markedly to the content of national and sectoral regulation. In the Belgian private 
sector, teleworking had been previously indirectly regulated by regulation on 
homeworking, but the implementation of the European Agreement for the first time 
led to regulation that tackled problems that were specific to the teleworking issue. In 
Belgium, a 1996 Act on Homeworking had developed guidelines related to the 
contracts of homeworkers and these guidelines had included teleworking as a form of 
homeworking. However, this Act did not specifically refer to issues such as the 
organization of the working time of teleworkers and the provision of equipment, and 
in these fields and others, the implementation of the European Agreement was able 
to contribute to the level of regulation within the sector. The results of the data from 
Belgium are also significant due to the fact that the Belgian private sector 
implementation of the Agreement 'over-implemented' the Agreement in terms of its 
specification, via Article 6 of the 2005 National Labour Council Agreement on 
Telework, that contracts agreed upon prior to the commencement of a teleworking 
arrangement must contain a series of more specific contractual obligations related to 
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the practice of teleworking. Secondary data sources such as the Visser Report (2008) 
demonstrate that the phenomenon of 'over-implementation' was by no means 
confined to Belgium. These sources reveal that in countries such as France and 
Poland, the European Agreement was also 'over-implemented' in terms of its 
specifications regarding the contract of teleworkers.  
 
An analysis of the data also reveals that the Telework Agreement added to the body 
of Danish regulation on the topic of teleworking. This is despite the fact that 
teleworking had been comprehensively regulated in certain sectors within Denmark 
prior to the implementation of the Agreement. Within Denmark, teleworking had not 
been the subject of regulatory attention at the inter-sectoral level or in the majority of 
sectors, but in sectors such as the local Government and finance sectors, prior 
Agreements had been concluded that in certain cases provided greater levels of social 
protection than the European Agreement. In Denmark, the existence of the European 
Agreement eventually led to a 2006 inter-sectoral Agreement between the Danish 
social partners that, for the first time, made the topic of telework and the issues 
particular to it the focus of detailed regulatory attention at the inter-sectoral level. 
Notably in Denmark, the prior issuing of guidelines to sectoral level negotiators also 
led to Agreements in sectors such as the industrial sector and commerce sector that 
took into account sector specific conditions with regard to the regulation of 
teleworking. Secondary sources demonstrate that in other countries with systems 
based on sectoral negotiations between social partners similar outcomes took place 
(European Social Partners, 2006; Larsen and Andersen, 2007). In countries such as 
Sweden and Germany, the issuing of 'soft' guidelines by the peak level social 
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partners in many cases led to sectoral implementations of the Agreement that 
engaged with the teleworking topic in sector specific contexts and subsequently 
added substantial value to sectoral regulatory contexts. 
 
The implementation of the Telework Agreement also added regulatory value in the 
UK despite the fact that certain precedents for the regulation of teleworking existed 
within the state. Various clauses of the Telework Agreement, such as those relating 
to the health and safety of teleworkers, the issue of data protection, and the 
discrimination of teleworkers, were indirectly addressed by existing UK laws. The 
non-legally binding form in which the Telework Agreement was implemented in the 
UK also had certain precedents within the UK. Non-legally binding guidelines had 
been drafted on the teleworking topic by several firms and employers associations, 
and in sectors such as the local Government sector there also existed non-legally 
binding policies on teleworking. However, the implementation of the Telework 
Agreement within the UK consolidated, for the first time, a body of guidance on the 
topic of teleworking that was drafted and signed by the UK social partners and public 
authorities. Its source of regulatory value lay in the fact that it offered this to the UK 
policy context. 
 
In the case of the Czech Republic, the data demonstrates that the implementation of 
the Telework Agreement also added comprehensively to the level of regulation on 
the teleworking issue. Within the country, there was almost no 'soft' policy or 
collective regulation on the topic of teleworking prior to the implementation of the 
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Agreement, and the old Czech labour code contained only references to the topic of 
employees who worked away from the site of employers without mentioning the 
topic of teleworking. As a result of the implementation of the Telework Agreement 
within Czech Republic, teleworking, and the problems specific to it, became 
regulated for the first time via the law and also through the series of 'soft', bipartite 
activities that the Czech Social Partners engaged in to implement the Agreement. 
Secondary sources also demonstrate that this trend replicated itself in certain other 
new member states. According to the Visser report (2008), in Poland and Hungary 
few to none of the clauses of the European Agreement had been subject to regulatory 
attention, and the implementation of the European Agreement via Polish and 
Hungarian law added to the content of national regulation in an evident manner.  
 
Table 11.1: Existing regulation on the topic of teleworking prior to the 
implementation of the European Agreement 
 
 Belgium Czech 
Republic 
Denmark UK 
National-level 
laws/collective 
agreements 
None directly 
regulating 
telework 
None directly 
regulating 
telework 
None directly 
regulating 
telework 
None directly 
regulating 
telework  
Sectoral 
agreements 
One known 
agreement in 
None Comprehensive 
agreements 
None 
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Flemish police 
regarding 
teleworking 
regarding 
practice of 
teleworking in 
local 
government 
and finance 
sectors. 
Agreement on 
distance 
working in 
industrial 
sector. 
Non-legally 
binding 
regulation 
Firm-level 
policies in 
some firms 
Very few 
firm-level 
policies 
Firm-level 
policies in 
some firms 
Several firm-
level policies. 
Employers’ 
associations 
had also 
published 
guidelines on 
topic. 
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Summary 
 
In summary, it must be stated that a major finding of this study was that the 
Telework Agreement contributed to the level of national and sectoral regulation in 
most cases in the countries that were the subject of the study. That the Telework 
Agreement achieved this level of effect upon the content of national and sectoral 
employment regulation is attributable to the fact that the subject of the Agreement 
had not been comprehensively regulated in most of the countries in which the data 
was collected prior to the conclusion of the Agreement, and also because the clauses 
contained within the Agreement were specifically and clearly drafted. In many 
contexts, the key value of the implemented Agreement lay in consolidating existing 
bodies of regulations and unifying them in one regulation on teleworking. Secondary 
data also demonstrates that such outcomes occurred in other EU member states. The 
Visser expert report (2008) on the implementation of the Agreement reveals that 
clauses such as the definition of teleworking (clause 2), the voluntary character of 
teleworking (clause 3), and the collective rights of teleworkers (clause 11) had only 
been indirectly tackled in the great majority of countries, and that the implementation 
of such clauses subsequently added regulatory value in most member states. A 
further finding is that, for the most part, there was not a great degree of divergence in 
outcomes between countries and sectors in terms of the extent to which the Telework 
Agreement added to the body of existing regulation on the teleworking issue. In the 
national and sectoral contexts that were the focus of the study, most of the trends 
were similar. One exception is that of Denmark, where the tendency for regulation to 
be determined at the sectoral level and the generally high degree of existing social 
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protection meant that in many sectoral contexts there was existing regulation on the 
topic of teleworking. 
 
11.2.2 Work-related Stress Agreement 
 
As stated in chapter five, the Work-related Stress Agreement contained the following 
clauses:  
 
• (2) A statement outlining the Agreement's aim to draw attention to the issue 
of work-related stress 
• (3) A description of work-related stress 
• (4) How to identify the problem of work-related stress 
• (5) The responsibility of both managers and workers to manage work-related 
stress 
• (6) The identification of potential measures to prevent, eliminate, or reduce 
work-related stress 
 
In the case of Belgium, the data reveals that the Work-related Stress Agreement did 
not add substantially to the content of employment regulation within the Belgian 
private sector. The entire content of the European Agreement was already present in 
the Belgian private sector via a 1999 Belgian National Labour Council Agreement 
that had partly acted as the inspiration for the 2004 European Agreement. This 
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Belgian Agreement exceeded the content of the European Agreement in that it 
defined work-related stress as a collective condition, and also in that it placed 
specified obligations upon employers to conduct risk assessments on work-related 
stress and to develop policies to manage the condition. In Belgium however, the 
existence of the European Agreement acted partly as a 'trigger' for the conclusion of 
a 2007 Royal Decree that extended the 1999 National Labour Council Agreement to 
the Belgian public sector. Further, the existence of the European Agreement led to 
awareness raising activities in the Belgian private sector that were aimed at 
increasing the quality of the firm-level implementation of the 1999 Agreement. 
 
The case of Denmark was similar to Belgium in that the European Agreement added 
substantially to the content of regulation on the work-related stress topic only in 
certain sectors. The great majority of Danish sectors did not implement the terms of 
the European Agreement, and an inter-sectoral 'follow-up' Agreement was also not 
concluded to implement the Agreement. This was due to the view of the Danish 
social partners that the content of the European Agreement was already present 
within Danish health and safety regulation and several existing sectoral agreements 
and that subsequently the European Agreement had little to offer the Danish social 
partners. However, the European Agreement was implemented in the Danish 
industrial and local Government sectors in forms that contributed markedly to the 
extent of sectoral regulation. In these sectors, the phenomenon of work-related stress 
was clearly identified and defined, and procedures for the work-place level 
management of the condition were set out. Indeed, these Agreements clearly 
improved upon the terms within the European Agreement. Secondary sources 
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(European social partners, 2008) indicated that similar outcomes occurred in 
Sweden, Germany, and Austria; countries that are also characterized by sectorally 
based systems of industrial relations. In these countries, although the European 
Agreement did not add comprehensively to general regulation on the topic of work-
related stress, its existence and the subsequent promotion of it by peak-level social 
partners in these countries led to the Agreement adding to the content of regulation 
on work-related stress in a certain, limited, number of sectors and firms.  
 
The data also demonstrates that the Work-related Stress Agreements did not add 
markedly to national regulation on the topic of work-related stress in the UK. Despite 
the country's reputation for liberal labour market regulation, the issue of work-related 
stress was already covered by UK health and safety law and also by the UK Health 
and Safety Executive's Management Standards on Work-related Stress, a non-legally 
binding set of guidelines on work-related stress. The latter document drew on a 
substantial body of scientific research to identify a series of elaborated, specific steps 
that would aid firms in developing work-place policies to identify and tackle the 
problem of work-related stress. The document also enjoyed a higher profile in the 
UK policy context than the European Agreement. The above factors precluded the 
Work-related Stress Agreement from exercising a major impact upon the content of 
UK regulation on work-related stress. 
 
The data demonstrates that the implementation of the Work-related Stress Agreement 
contributed to the content of employment regulation on a scale in the Czech Republic 
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that it did not in the other three countries that were the subject of the study. Within 
Czech Republic, the topic of work-related stress had been subject to no legal 
regulation prior to the implementation of the European Agreement, and had also 
attracted very little in the way of sector and firm level regulation and non-legally 
binding guidelines. The implementation of the Agreement thus made the topic of 
work-related stress subject to legal regulation in the Czech Republic for the first 
time, and also led to the topic entering mainstream policy discourse through the non-
legally binding bi-partite and unilateral promotional activities that the Czech social 
partners engaged in that addressed all areas of the phenomenon of work-related 
stress. Secondary sources also reveal that the implementation of the Work-related 
Stress Agreement had a key impact upon the content of employment regulation in 
other new member states (European social partners, 2008). Similar outcomes to that 
of Czech Republic occurred in Latvia and Hungary where the Agreement was 
implemented via the law, and Slovenia, where a tripartite agreement was concluded 
between the social partners and the Slovenian Government. 
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Table 11.2: Existing regulation on the topic of work-related stress prior to the 
implementation of the European Agreement 
 
 Belgium Czech 
Republic 
Denmark UK 
National-level 
laws/collective 
agreements 
1999 National 
Labour 
Council 
Agreement in 
private sector 
that regulated 
the topic of 
work-related 
stress in 
greater detail 
than 
European 
Agreement. 
 
Nothing in 
public sector 
Indirectly 
regulated 
through 
health and 
safety 
regulation 
Comprehensively 
covered through 
Danish health 
and safety 
legislation 
Indirectly 
regulated 
through health 
and safety 
regulation 
Sectoral None reported None Comprehensive None reported 
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agreements reported agreements on 
topic in financial 
services and state 
sector 
Non-legally 
binding 
regulation 
Some firm-
level policies 
on work-
related stress 
Very few 
firm-level 
policies on 
work-related 
stress 
Some firm-level 
policies on work-
related stress 
2005 Health 
and Safety 
Executive 
Management 
Standards on 
Work-related 
Stress 
 
Several firm-
level policies 
on work-
related stress 
 
Summary 
 
In summary, it is a key finding of this study that the Work-related Stress Agreement 
did not contribute markedly to the content of national and sectoral regulation in three 
of the countries in which the study was conducted. This is attributable to the 
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existence of prior forms of regulation in the majority of contexts, and also to the fact 
that the content of the European Agreement was viewed as 'weak' by many national 
actors. With regard to the issue of divergence amongst countries, several trends are 
remarkable. Firstly, in UK, Belgium and Denmark, the Agreement contributed, on 
the whole, little to national regulation on the work-related stress topic. However in 
certain sectoral contexts, such as the Danish local Government and industrial sectors, 
the Agreement made a contribution to existing levels of regulation. In Czech 
Republic, the Agreement did contribute to the level of national regulation. This is 
attributable to the lack of existing regulation on the topic of work-related stress 
within Czech Republic prior to the implementation of the European Agreement. 
 
11.2.3 Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning and Joint Declaration on 
Lifelong Learning in the European Banking Sector 
 
As stated in chapter five, the Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning identified 
the following four priorities with regard to lifelong learning policy.  
 
• (1) To identify and anticipate the competencies and the qualifications needed 
• (2) To recognize and validate competencies and qualifications 
• (3) Informing, supporting and providing guidance 
• (4) Mobilizing resources 
 
The Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the European Banking Sector mirrored 
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the four priorities of the cross-sectoral text, yet applied them specifically to the 
European banking sector.   
 
It emerged that in the old member states that were the subject of the study the 
Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning seldom had a discernible impact upon 
the formulation of policy on lifelong learning. In Denmark, the text had little impact 
upon the content of national regulation on lifelong learning due to the fact that 
lifelong learning policy within the country was more highly developed than the terms 
of the European text. This was also the case in the UK, where lifelong learning 
policy had been a priority for national social partners prior to the existence of the 
European text. The data gathered at the European level also confirms that similar 
outcomes occurred in other old member states. These outcomes were also 
attributable to the existence of advanced existing policy on lifelong learning in these 
countries. 
 
It is a further finding of the study that the Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning in 
the European Banking Sector had a rather greater impact upon the content of lifelong 
learning policy in the European banking sector in old member states than the 
Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning did in old member states. This was 
attributable to the fact that the European sectoral level text offered targeted solutions 
to sectoral level actors and engaged them more directly than in the inter-sectoral text.  
In the Danish and Belgian banking sectors the Joint Declaration on Lifelong 
Learning in the European banking sector acted as an inspiring factor for the 
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development of collective agreements on lifelong learning in the two sectors. Data 
obtained at the European-level also demonstrates that the existence of the text helped 
coordinate sectoral policy on lifelong learning in many national banking sectors. This 
was particularly the case in new member states. In the Hungarian banking sector for 
example, the terms of the European banking sector text inspired an agreement on 
lifelong learning that introduced the topic into sectoral regulation for the first time.  
 
Interim conclusion 
 
The study found that the extent to which the Framework Agreements and texts on 
Lifelong Learning impacted upon levels of regulation within countries was 
contingent upon three main factors. These were (1) the Agreement or text in question 
and the level of existing regulation within countries, (2) whether the country in 
question was an old or new member state, and (3) the relative emphasis on sectoral 
regulation within a given country.  A clear division (1) between the degree of impact 
that the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements achieved in states was 
apparent. In the majority of national contexts, the Telework Agreement achieved a 
significant degree of impact upon the level of regulation. By way of contrast, the 
Work-related Stress Agreement did not achieve this in the majority of cases. This 
was mainly attributable to differing levels of existing national regulation on the 
topics of teleworking and work-related stress. The texts on Lifelong Learning, owing 
to their 'softer' nature, did not achieve a key level of impact. 
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There was also a basic difference (2) between the effects of the Agreements and texts 
upon regulatory contexts in old and new member states. In Czech Republic, the data 
revealed that the Agreements had a greater impact upon levels of regulation owing to 
the fact that there was less regulation on the topics addressed by the Framework 
Agreements prior to their implementation. Secondary data largely corroborates this 
picture with regard to the other new member states. Finally (3), there was a tendency 
for internal diversity with regard to the extent to which the Agreements contributed 
to regulation to be more pronounced in those countries where the sector is the level at 
which employment conditions are mainly determined. In Denmark, the impact of the 
Agreements upon differing sectors was more variable owing to the tendency of the 
Agreements to have differing levels of impact upon differing sectors. This was also 
manifest in Belgium, where there was a marked difference in the effect of the 
Agreements upon policy contexts within the private and public sectors.  
 
11.3 The Impact of the Agreements and texts 
 
As outlined in the introduction to the chapter, the chapter will now assess the impact 
of the Agreements and texts in terms of their effect upon the firm and sector levels in 
member states. This section will incorporate a sub-section on (i) the extent to which 
the policy tools used to implement the Agreements and texts were able to bind 
sectoral level actors to their content, and (ii) the extent to which the Agreements 
were likely to lead to an increase in firm-level policies on the topics of teleworking 
and work-related stress and lifelong learning. 
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11.3.1 The extent to which the tools used to implement the Agreements and texts 
were able to bind lower level actors to their content  
 
Concerns are expressed within the literature that 'hard' regulation emanating from the 
inter-sectoral level is not always implemented effectively by sectoral level actors 
(Falkner et al, 2005; Marginson and Sisson, 2004). However, it is a finding of the 
study that with regard to the implementation of the Agreements in national contexts, 
'hard' regulation appears to have been able to bind sectoral level actors at least 
adequately to the content of the Agreements and texts, and also appears to have 
achieved this more effectively than several of the non-legally binding alternatives 
used to implement the Agreements and texts. This was demonstrable in the cases of 
Belgium and Czech Republic. In these countries, the view of social partners was that 
the only way to comprehensively bind sectoral level actors to the content of the 
Framework Agreements and texts was to use legal instruments for implementation. 
The alternative 'soft' means used to implement the Agreements and texts within the 
countries were unlikely, in the view of the Belgian and Czech social partners, to bind 
sectoral level actors to the content of the Agreements and texts as effectively as the 
'hard' means used to implement the Agreements and texts within the states.  
  
It is a further finding of the study that certain non-legally binding policy instruments 
are able to bind the content of the Agreements and texts more effectively upon 
sectoral level actors than other non-legally binding policy instruments. This was 
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evident in the case of Denmark, where the Framework Agreements were partly 
implemented at the inter-sectoral level via the issuing of non-legally binding 
implementation guidelines to the Danish sectoral level social partners. As a result of 
the issuing of these guidelines, the Framework Agreements were implemented 
autonomously in several Danish sectors. It was also found that the Danish social 
partners regarded that implementation through the established route of collective 
agreements, rather than through legal instruments, was likely to solicit greater 
commitment to the terms of the European Agreements in the context of the Danish 
system. 
 
In countries such as Denmark, where there is a high degree of coordination between 
tiers of collective bargaining, secondary sources such as the Visser Report (2008) 
and the European social partner report (2006) on the implementation of the Telework 
Agreement also indicate that the use of non-legally binding guidelines by peak level 
actors to draw the attention of affiliates to the existence of the European Agreements 
can imply a greater likelihood of the content of the Agreements being incorporated 
into lower level collective agreements. In states such as Germany and Sweden, 
several sectoral level agreements were concluded to implement the Telework and 
Work-related Stress Agreements as a result of the prior publication of peak-level 
guidelines on the Agreements.  
  
In countries with systems with a lesser degree of coordination between levels, it was 
found that the use of non-legally binding guidelines to implement the Agreements 
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and texts were less effective in inspiring the conclusion of sectoral agreements to 
implement the Agreements and texts. In the UK, the data strongly indicates that the 
non-legally binding guidelines used at the inter-sectoral level to implement the 
Framework Agreements and texts were very likely to have been unable to produce 
agreements at the sectoral or firm level within the country. In the UK, although it 
was forecast that the non-legally binding nature of the tools used to implement the 
Agreements might make the Agreements more attractive to certain employers, it was 
generally considered by social partner officials that the dis-organized nature of 
bargaining arrangements and low levels of trade union density in the country implied 
that very few sectoral or firm level agreements had been concluded as a result of the 
Agreements and texts.  
 
11.3.2 Hypothesized impact of the Agreements at firm-level 
 
Although no data was collected on the firm-level impact of the Agreements, data 
were obtained on the degree to which national social partner organizations regarded 
that the Agreements would alter workplace level practices on the topics of 
teleworking and work-related stress. In the absence of actual data obtained by this 
study, this social partner data may throw light upon the issue of the impact of the 
Agreements at the company and workplace level. However, caution is required in 
interpreting these views as they are not necessarily dispassionate observers, but may 
have an interest in ‘talking up’ regulatory initiatives which they are implicated in. 
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Telework Agreement 
 
It was found by the study that the Belgian social partner organizations were generally 
skeptical about the degree to which the implementation of the European Agreement 
in Belgium would lead to the uptake of teleworking in Belgium. It was forecast by 
the Belgian social partners that the impact of the European Agreement in Belgian 
workplaces would be very limited as a result of a trade union culture that feared that 
teleworking would individualize and isolate workers, and the existence of concerns 
that teleworkers would be subject to exploitation in the areas of working time 
measurement and health and safety regulation despite the fact that the implemented 
European Agreement specifically addressed these areas. The Belgian social partners 
also forecast that the impact of the Agreement would be limited as a result of fears 
about the potential loss of managerial control of workers and because Belgium was a 
small country in which the majority of employees lived near their workplace and 
teleworking solutions were thus not required.  
 
In Denmark, the Danish social partners reported that the impact of the Telework 
Agreement upon the uptake of teleworking within Denmark was likely to have been 
mixed. This was attributed to the degree of existing regulation on the topic of 
teleworking within Denmark, and also to the fact that in many sectors (such as 
education and construction), teleworking solutions were likely to be unsuited to the 
pre-dominant forms of working within the sector. However, in certain sectors, it was 
forecast by the social partners that the Agreement would be likely to achieve an 
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impact. 
 
In the UK, despite the fact that the Telework Agreement was implemented via a non-
legally binding instrument, it was found that the UK social partner organizations 
reported that the Telework Agreement was likely to achieve a modest impact at firm-
level in the UK. This was attributed by the interviewees to the rising popularity of 
teleworking in the UK, the fact that the implemented Telework Agreement was one 
of the only documents that existed offering guidance on the issue, and also because 
the social partner organizations reported high levels of interest from their members 
on the topic of teleworking. 
 
In Czech Republic, it emerged that the Czech social partners did not consider that in 
the short-term, the Telework Agreement would lead to a major uptake of teleworking 
in Czech firms. This was primarily attributed to the existing lack of popularity of 
teleworking within the country. However, it was forecast by the Czech social partner 
officials that, in the longer term, the impact of the Agreement was likely to be 
greater. This was attributed to the status of the Agreement as the only form of 
regulation on the topic of teleworking in Czech Republic and the possibility that 
teleworking as a mode of working was likely to increase in fashion in Czech 
Republic. 
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Work-related Stress Agreement 
 
In Belgium, the prospect of the European Agreement achieving a direct impact upon 
work-related stress policies in the Belgian private sector was precluded by the fact 
that the Agreement was not implemented in the Belgian private sector owing to the 
existence of prior regulation. However, it emerged that the Belgian social partners 
regarded that the promotional activities to raise awareness of the 1999 Belgian 
Agreement that the European Agreement had triggered were likely to have a positive 
impact at firm-level in terms of the degree to which the 1999 Agreement was likely 
to aid the management of work-related stress in individual workplaces within the 
Belgian private sector. It was also found that Belgian social partner interviewees 
considered that the 2007 Royal Decree in the Belgian public sector that had 
implemented the European Agreement within the sector was likely to lead to a 
greatly increased level of policies on work-related stress in public sector workplaces.  
 
In Denmark, it emerged that the Danish social partners predicted that, in the majority 
of sectors, the Work-related Stress Agreement would trigger few workplace-level 
policies to regulate work-related stress. This was attributed to the existence of prior 
regulation on the topic of work-related stress and the perceived weakness of the 
content of the European Agreement. In sectors such as the industrial sector and local 
Government sector where the Agreement was implemented comprehensively 
however, social partners reported that the European Agreement was likely to have a 
key impact upon the regulation of work-related stress within the sector. Social 
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partner officials alluded to the existence of several works council agreements in these 
sectors that had been inspired by the European Agreement. It is a further finding of 
the study that, in the UK, UK social partner interviewees generally did not consider 
that the implemented Work-related Stress would achieve a major impact upon the 
work-place level management of work-related stress in the UK. Although it was 
acknowledged that 'Work-related Stress: A Guide' had been popular amongst some 
firms, it was also stated that the existence of the more high profile HSE 'Management 
Standards on Work-related Stress' and the very 'soft' nature of the UK text implied 
that the implemented European Agreement was unlikely to achieve a major impact in 
UK workplaces. 
 
In Czech Republic, it was found that Czech social partner officials doubted that the 
implemented Work-related Stress Agreement would exercise a key impact upon the 
management of work-related stress in Czech workplaces within the short term. This 
was attributed to a lack of interest in the topic amongst firm-level actors. However, it 
was also stated by Czech social partner officials that the impact of the Agreement at 
the firm-level was likely to be greater in the longer term. This was attributed to the 
fact that the implemented European Agreement was one of the only existing 
regulations on the topic and that the pace of work was likely to increase in intensity 
in Czech workplaces in future years. 
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Interim conclusion 
 
Various points must be made in summary. In line with the expectations of the 
literature (Marginson and Sisson, 2004), it emerged that the capacity of ‘hard’ 
regulation to bind sector and firm level actor to the terms of European Framework 
Agreements was greater than that of ‘soft’ law. Within the countries researched, it 
was demonstrable that in the cases where the Agreements and texts were 
implemented via the use of a ‘hard’ regulatory mechanism the Agreements and texts 
became binding upon sectoral and firm level actors. This was the case in both 
Belgium and Czech Republic. It is a further finding of this study that the capacity of 
‘soft’ implementations to bind lower level actors varies according to the form of 
‘soft’ implementation and the national system in question. In Denmark, it was 
demonstrable that the high level of coordination between bargaining tiers implied 
that the ‘soft’ guidelines issued by the inter-sectoral social partners were more 
effective than in countries such as the UK and Czech Republic, where there is a low 
level of coordination between bargaining tiers and the ‘soft’ means used to 
implement the Agreements and texts had little effect. 
 
It is a further finding of the study that there is not a necessary relationship between 
the extent to which the Framework Agreements are binding upon lower level actors, 
and the extent to which the Framework Agreements inspire policies at lower levels. 
In Belgium, despite the fact that national actors regarded that the implemented 
Telework Agreement would be binding upon firm-level actors, they also considered 
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that the Agreement would be unlikely to inspire the uptake of teleworking in many 
contexts owing to the existence of several cultural and social factors within Belgium 
that would be likely to impede the development of teleworking. The study also found 
that the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements were likely to inspire policies 
on teleworking and work-related stress to differing degrees in differing national 
contexts. In Belgium and Czech Republic, several potential impediments existed that 
were likely to prevent the spread of teleworking, whilst in the UK social partner 
representatives regarded the practice of teleworking as far more likely to be taken up 
at the firm level.  
 
11.4 A review of the hypotheses advanced in chapter three   
  
In line with the hypotheses outlined in chapter three of the thesis regarding the 
factors that were likely to enhance or impede the extent of the substantive 
effectiveness of the Agreements and texts, the thesis will now review its findings 
against the hypotheses established in the literature. These findings will then to 
establish the country and sector specific factors that are likely to enhance the 
substantive effectiveness of the Agreements and texts.   
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Table 11.3 Variables explaining differential substantive implementation outcomes 
 
 
Country/ 
sector 
The 
existence of 
a pre-
existing 
policy on 
the topic of 
the 
Framework 
Agreement 
The level of 
interest in 
the topic of 
the 
Agreement 
or text 
Coordination 
of 
bargaining 
levels  
The 
existence of 
an erga 
omnes 
procedure    
Union and 
employer 
association 
density rates
Homogeneity 
of sector  
'Europeanization' 
of sectoral 
markets (labour 
markets and 
product 
markets)  
EU-level 
pressures 
for the 
formation 
of an 
SSDC  
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Belgium 3 1 1 3 1 n/a n/a n/a  
Belgian 
banking 
sector 
2 1 1 3 1 1 1 1  
Belgian 
local 
Government 
sector 
2 1 1 3 1 1 1 1  
Czech 
Republic 
3 1 3 3 3 n/a n/a n/a  
Denmark 3 2 3 2 3 n/a n/a n/a  
Danish 3 2 3 2 3 1 1 1  
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banking 
sector 
Danish local 
Government 
sector 
3 2 3 2 3 1 1 1  
UK 3 1 3 3 3 n/a n/a n/a  
UK banking 
sector 
2 1 3 3 3 1 1 1  
UK local 
Government 
sector 
2 1 3 3 3 1 1 1  
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Key: 
3 = Strong relationship between existence of factor and implementation outcome 
2 = Medium relationship between existence of factor and implementation outcome 
1 = Weak relationship between existence of factor and implementation outcome 
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11.4.1 Factors that enhance the extent to which the Agreements and texts are 
likely to contribute to the content of national and sectoral regulation 
 
i) Convergence with national level policy agendas 
  
Within the literature, it is a well established point that where the topic of the EU-
level policy converges with the policy agendas of national and sectoral actors then 
the effect upon national and sectoral forms of regulation is likely to be greater 
(Leonard, 2005; Lopez-Santana, 2006; De La Porte and Pochet, 2002; Falkner et al, 
2005). With regard to the extent to which the Agreements and texts that are the 
subject of the study added to the content of national and sectoral regulation, the study 
found only limited evidence of the above principle in operation. In Belgium, where 
the topic of teleworking was not particularly prominent within the existing Belgian 
policy agenda due to limited interest in the topic, the European Telework Agreement 
nevertheless substantially added to the content of regulation on teleworking. The 
same was true with regard to the cases of the implementation of the Telework and 
Work-related Stress Agreements in Czech Republic, where there were limited levels 
of interest in the topic of the Agreements, but the Agreements nevertheless had a 
significant effect upon the content of national regulation. 
 
The data collected by the study offered limited evidence of the principle that interest 
in the topic of the Agreement or text led to the Agreement or text in question 
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achieving a greater level of effect upon national and sectoral regulation however. In 
many sectors in Denmark, the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements were 
not implemented autonomously by sectoral level actors due to a lack of interest in the 
content of the Agreements. Secondary data sources such as the Visser report (2008) 
also reveal that in countries such as Germany and Sweden with similar sectorally 
based systems of collective bargaining to Denmark such an effect also occurred. The 
European social partner report on the implementation of the Telework Agreement 
also reveals that in Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta the Telework 
Agreement was also not implemented at all due to a lack of interest in its content 
from national social partners.   
 
ii) The degree of national and sectoral regulation that exists on the 
Framework Agreement or text prior to its implementation 
  
As outlined in chapter three, various scholars assert that there is a relationship 
between the extent to which EU-level regulation contributes to the level of regulation 
within national policy contexts, and the extent of existing regulation on the relevant 
policy at the national level (Falkner et al, 2005; La Porte and Pochet, 2005; 
Jacobssen and Schmidt, 2002). With regard to the extent to which the Agreements 
and texts that are the subject of the study contributed to the level of regulation within 
national policy contexts, the study found that the effect of the Agreements and texts 
is greatly facilitated when there is no existing policy on the topic of the Agreement or 
text within a country or sector. This was evident in the case of the implementation of 
the Telework Agreement in the Belgian private sector. In this instance, the lack of 
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the existence of prior regulation specific to the teleworking issue meant that the 
majority of the content of the European Agreement was new in the context of 
Belgian private sector regulation. With regard to the Work-related Stress Agreement, 
the case of the implementation of the Agreement in the Danish local Government 
sector also demonstrates this principle. In other sectors in Denmark, the existence of 
prior regulation on the topic of work-related stress meant that the content of the 
European Agreement had little to no effect upon sectoral regulatory contexts. 
However, within the local Government sector, the fact that there was no regulation 
on the topic of work-related stress meant that the European Agreement had a marked 
effect upon sectoral regulation. In Czech Republic, the lack of pre-existing regulation 
on work-related stress meant that the European Agreement had a comprehensive 
effect upon the content of Czech regulation on the topic.  
  
Conversely, the data confirms the argument that when a body of regulation on the 
topic of European regulation exists in a country or sector then the impact of the 
Framework Agreement or text upon the content of employment regulation will be 
more minimal. In the Danish local Government and finance sectors, the European 
Telework Agreement had very little impact upon the content of sectoral regulation 
owing to the fact that quite developed regulation on the topic of teleworking existed 
prior to the implementation of the European Agreement. Also in Denmark, the 
existence of comprehensive labour law on the topic of work-related stress and 
several sectoral agreements on the topic meant that the European Agreement 
generally had a very small effect upon the content of employment regulation in the 
country. In the UK, the existence of the HSE ‘Management Standards for work-
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related stress’ also prevented the content of the European Agreement from having a 
major impact upon the level and quality of UK regulation of the work-related stress 
issue. In Belgium, the existence of a 1999 NLC agreement on the topic of work-
related stress precluded the European Agreement from exercising an impact in the 
Belgian private sector. The general effect of the Framework of Actions on Lifelong 
Learning upon the content of lifelong learning policy in UK and Denmark also 
confirm this principle. Here, the existence of developed lifelong learning policies 
prior to the existence of the EU text led to the European text achieving minimal 
effects.   
 
11.4.2 Factors that enhance the extent to which the Agreements and texts are 
likely to impact upon lower levels 
 
Industrial Relations variables  
  
iii) Coordination of bargaining levels  
  
Keller (2003) argued that in those countries where collective bargaining levels were 
coordinated the Framework Agreements and texts were likely to achieve a greater 
impact at lower levels. The data demonstrates that there is a discernible relationship 
between the level of impact of the Agreement and texts and the extent to which there 
is coordination of collective bargaining tiers in the country concerned. In Denmark, 
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the fact that there was substantial coordination between bargaining levels and an 
inbuilt collective agreement monitoring system meant that the terms of the two 
Agreements were largely binding upon lower level actors. Further, it was reported 
that several firm-level policies were also concluded on teleworking and work-related 
stress as a result of the Agreements; according to social partner representatives this 
was due in part to the coordination of bargaining levels within Denmark. Secondary 
sources report that similar effects were evident in states such as Germany and 
Sweden with high degrees of coordination between tiers of collective bargaining 
(Larsen and Andersen, 2007). Despite the high degree of coordination between 
bargaining tiers in Belgium however, the high degree of impact of the Telework 
Agreement was found to be attributable to the use of an erga omnes procedure within 
the Belgian context rather than the high degree of coordination between bargaining 
levels. Thus, it is a further finding of the study that where both an erga omnes 
procedure and a high degree of coordination between bargaining levels exists within 
a country it is the existence of the erga omnes procedure that is the more primary in 
securing higher degrees of impact.  
 
Cases that demonstrate the converse of this principle were found in Czech Republic 
(with reference to the supplementary tools used to implement the Agreements) and 
UK. In these countries, very similar effects were evident in that it was found that the 
non-legally binding routes that were used to implement the Agreements and texts 
were unlikely to bind lower level actors to the terms of the Agreement and texts. 
Further, it was also thought by national social partners that the non-legally binding 
routes used to implement the Agreements were unlikely to inspire many firm-level 
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policies on the topics of teleworking and work-related stress. In both cases, the lack 
of coordination between bargaining levels within the countries was a major cause of 
this.   
 
iv) Rates of collective bargaining coverage   
 
Keller also argued (2003) that high rates of collective bargaining coverage in 
countries and sectors was likely to increase the substantive effectiveness of the 
Agreements and texts. The data demonstrates that there is clear evidence of a 
relationship between rates of collective bargaining coverage in countries and sectors 
and the extent to which the content of the Agreements and texts are likely to be 
binding upon firm-level actors. In the Belgian private sector, the use of an erga 
omnes mechanism to implement the Telework Agreement and the 100% rate of 
coverage this entailed led to the content of the Agreement becoming more binding 
upon firm-level actors within the sector. In Denmark, the Framework Agreements 
binded lower level actors to their terms more successfully and also, according to 
social partner representatives, inspired a moderate amount of workplace level 
policies on the topic of teleworking and work-related stress. This outcome was linked 
to the high levels of collective bargaining coverage within the country according to 
the social partner representatives. Secondary sources report that similar effects were 
also evident in a country such as Sweden with relatively high levels of collective 
bargaining coverage (Larsen and Andersen, 2007).  Conversely, in countries and 
sectors where there were lower rates of collective bargaining coverage, the 
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Agreements and texts were less binding upon firm-level actors. Within UK, the lack 
of impact of the Agreements was attributable to low rates of collective bargaining 
coverage within the country. In the Czech Republic, the non-legally binding 
mechanisms that were used as supplementary tools to implement the Agreements did 
not achieve significant levels of impact within firms and sectors due to the low rate 
of collective bargaining coverage within the country. 
 
Sectoral variables   
 
v) Homogeneity of sector   
 
Keller and Sorries (1998) argued that sectors that were 'homogenous' in scope were 
likely to be more effective in implementing European-level output. With regard to 
the impact of the implemented Agreements and texts, evidence was found of this to 
only a limited degree and a robust link between the extent of sectoral homogeneity 
and the level of impact of the Agreements and texts thus cannot be established. As 
was stated in chapter three, in the countries that are the subject of the study, the local 
Government is a more homogeneous sector than the banking sector in terms of its 
sphere of economic activity. It emerged that the impact of the Agreements and texts 
had been more considerable in the local Government sectors that were the subject of 
the study than the banking sectors (see table 3). In the Danish and UK local 
Government sectors, implementations were affected of the Work-related Stress 
Agreement that guaranteed an impact within the sectoral contexts, whereas 
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implementations of the Agreement in the Danish and UK banking sectors were not 
affected. However, it is very arduous to establish a causal link between the level of 
impact manifest and the economic homogeneity of the sector. Therefore, a robust 
link cannot be inferred from the findings of the study between homogeneity of sector 
and the extent of the impact of the Agreements and texts. 
 
vi) 'Europeanization' of sectoral markets (labour markets and product 
markets)   
 
Leisink (2002) argued that where there were 'Europeanized' sectoral labour and 
product markets within sectors then the impact of European-level output within the 
sectors was likely to be greater. With regard to the extent of the impact of the 
implemented Agreements, the data found no link between this factor and the extent 
of the impact of the Agreements. As was stated in chapter four, there is greater 
'Europeanization' of sectoral markets to be found in the European banking sector than 
in the European local Government sector. However, it emerged that there was more 
impact of the Agreements in the local Government sectors that were the subject of 
the study than the banking sectors (see table 3). Further, there was no evidence found 
of a discernible link between factors related to the economic profiles of the sectors 
and the extent of the impact of the Agreements and texts. Owing to this, the 
hypothesized link does not find support from the findings. 
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vii) EU-level pressures for the formation of an SSDC   
 
Leisink (2002), Keller and Sorries (1998), and Kirton-Darling and Clauwaert (2003) 
argued that where there were significant EU-level pressures for the creation of an 
European sectoral social dialogue committee (SSDC) within sectors then the impact 
of EU-level output within the sectors was likely to be greater. As was stated in 
chapter four, there are equal EU-level pressures for the formation of an SSDC in both 
the European banking sector and the European local Government sector. However, 
the data obtained offered no evidence of any potential link between the series of 
factors identified by Leisink that increase EU-level pressures for the creation of an 
SSDC, and the extent of the impact of the Agreements and texts within the two 
sectors. Thus, the hypothesized link does not find support from the findings. 
 
Summary 
 
Above, the variables outlined in chapter three regarding the extent of the substantive 
effectiveness of the Agreements and texts were outlined. It emerged that the 
existence of a pre-existing policy on the topic of the Agreement or text was a key 
variable in explaining substantive implementation outcomes, but that there was only 
limited evidence of a link between ‘effective’ substantive implementation outcomes 
and the level of social partner interest in the topic of the Agreement or text. Further, 
it emerged that there was a strong relationship between ‘effective’ substantive 
implementation outcomes and the coordination of social dialogue levels and rates of 
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collective bargaining coverage in countries. Finally, no link was found between 
substantive implementation outcomes and the sectoral variables advanced. 
 
11.5 Conclusion 
 
Several key findings emerge from the analysis presented. Firstly, there was a basic 
variance in the degree to which the different Agreements and texts that were the 
subject of our project had an effect upon substantive aspects of the employment 
relationship in the countries and sectors that were the subject of study. The Telework 
Agreement had a quite comprehensive impact upon levels of regulation within states 
and sectors. This is attributable to the lack of prior regulation on the topic of 
teleworking in the majority of countries and sectors. By way of contrast, the Work-
related Stress Agreement did not achieve a comprehensive impact upon levels of 
regulation within countries and sectors. This is attributable to the fact that, in the 
majority of countries and sectors, there was a relatively high degree of existing 
regulation on the topic of work-related stress, and to the fact that many national 
actors perceived the content of the Work-related Stress Agreement as 'weak'. The 
Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning did not achieve a great impact upon 
levels of substantive regulation in member states and sectors. This is due to the 
content of the text being largely present in the majority of member states and sectors. 
By way of contrast, the Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the European 
Banking Sector had a rather greater impact upon levels of substantive regulation in 
the European banking sector. This is attributable to the fact that the text focused very 
specifically upon regulation within the banking sector. 
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The factors that explain differing substantive implementation outcomes were also 
outlined. With regard to the extent to which the Agreements and texts impacted upon 
substantial aspects of the employment relationship, a different set of explanatory 
factors animate the set of outcomes that were found by the study regarding (i) the 
extent to which the Framework Agreements and texts contributed to the level of 
employment regulation within member states, and (ii) the extent to which the 
Framework Agreements became binding upon lower level actors and were, according 
to the views advanced by social partner officials, likely to lead to an increase in 
workplace level policies on the topics of teleworking and work-related stress. 
 
With regard to (i) the extent to which the Framework Agreements and texts 
contributed to the level of employment regulation within member states, it is a major 
finding of this study that the key factor that explains the impact of the Agreements 
and texts upon levels of national and sectoral regulation is the level of pre-existing 
regulation on the topic of the Agreement or text prior to the implementation of the 
Agreement or text. Thus, it is a policy related factor, rather than a structural factor, 
that is the major explanatory factor in this case. Further, there is also a basic division 
between the extent to which the Agreements and texts impacted upon national and 
sectoral regulatory systems in old and new member states that was driven by the 
differing levels of existing regulation on the topics of the Agreements and texts in the 
differing contexts. Within old member states, the generally high level of existing 
regulation on the topics of the Agreements and texts often precluded the Agreements 
and texts from exercising a key impact upon regulatory contexts. By way of contrast, 
in new member states generally low level of existing regulation on the topics of the 
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Agreements and texts facilitated the extent to which the Agreements and texts 
exercised an impact upon regulatory contexts. As table 3 demonstrates, it is a further 
finding that there are no greatly consistent inter-old member state or inter-new 
member state trends, and the basic division is thus between old and new member 
states. 
 
In terms of (ii) the extent to which the Framework Agreements became binding upon 
lower level actors and were likely to lead to an increase in workplace level policies 
on the topics of teleworking and work-related stress, various trends were manifest. 
Concerning the degree to which the implemented Framework Agreements became 
binding upon sector and firm-level actors, the data demonstrates that European 
member states may be classified on the basis of three 'worlds'. This classification of 
states into ‘worlds’ follows Falkner et al’s (2005) fruitful use of such an analytic 
mechanism. Firstly, there is what will be called the 'world of static regulation'. In this 
'world', the existence of a tier of national inter-sectoral collective bargaining or the 
proximity of the social partners to the legislative process allows the relevant national 
social partners to affect implementations that are generally binding upon lower-level 
actors. Of the countries studied, the Czech Republic and the Belgian private sector fit 
into this classification. Secondly, there is what will be called the 'world of 
coordination'. In this world, although the inter-sectoral social partners who were 
signatory to the European Agreements do not have the appropriate policy tools to 
make the Agreements binding upon all lower level actors, the generally high degree 
of coordination between bargaining levels within these countries implies that the 
inter-sectoral social partners are able to coordinate implementation outcomes to 
ensure that the Agreements are implemented, and subsequently become binding, in 
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several sectors. Denmark may be classified within this 'world'. Other countries that 
were not the focus of the study but may be classified as belonging within this 'world' 
include Germany and Sweden. Finally, there is what will be termed the 'world of 
non-coordination'. In this world, the national inter-sectoral social partners do not 
possess the appropriate policy tools to make the Agreements binding upon all 
sectoral and firm-level actors, and, owing to the non-coordinated nature of collective 
bargaining tiers within the countries, also do not possess the ability to coordinate the 
implementation activities of lower level actors. As a result of this, the 
implementation activities affected in these countries are generally unlikely to bind 
lower level actors to the content of the Agreements. The UK may be classified as 
belonging to this 'world'. 
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Chapter 12: Assessing the findings and their implications 
 
This chapter concludes the thesis and is divided into four sections. Firstly (i), the 
chapter will summarize the empirical findings of the thesis. Here, the findings of the 
thesis on the extent to which ‘effective’ implementation took place, the efficacy of 
the national ‘procedures and practices’ implementation clause, and the factors that 
explain variance in national and sectoral implementation outcomes will be set out. 
Secondly (ii), the chapter will set out the wider analytical implications of the 
empirical findings that emerged. These implications relate to the literature, reviewed 
in chapter two, and relate to the Europeanization of industrial relations, EU-level 
industrial relations and European ‘soft’ law governance. Then (iii), the chapter will 
establish the implications for European social policy, and will set out a series of 
policy recommendations based on the findings that emerged. This section will 
discuss the relative advantages of the non-legally binding and legally binding routes 
for the implementation of European social partner framework agreements, and will 
also identify ways in which the Agreements and texts could operate more effectively 
as instruments of European social partner governance. Finally (iv), the chapter will 
make a series of recommendations for future research studies. 
 
12.1 Empirical Findings 
 
The section reviews the main findings that relate to (i) the procedural implementation 
of the Agreements, (ii) the substantive implementation of the Agreements and texts, 
and (iii) the factors that explain differing national and sectoral implementation 
outcomes. 
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12.1.1 The procedural implementation of the Agreements 
 
Two procedural benchmarks were developed to appraise whether 'effective' 
implementation outcomes had occurred in member states and sectors. The first of 
these related to whether the Agreements were implemented in some procedural form 
in member states and sectors. This benchmark has been widely employed by other 
authorities who have sought to assess the implementations of the Agreements 
(European Social Partners, 2006, 2008; Visser and Martin, 2008). The findings that 
emerged largely mirrored those of these authorities. Specifically, the Agreements 
were implemented 'effectively' in most cases. Aside from very minor infringements 
with the implementation of the Telework Agreement in the Belgian private sector, 
Denmark and Czech Republic (where, in all three cases, the Agreement was 
implemented marginally late), both Agreements were implemented in some 
procedural form within three years in the countries that were the subject of the study. 
On the basis of the first benchmark then, it was found that the Agreements were 
largely implemented ‘effectively’. 
 
Chapter three proposed a second benchmark to assess the 'effective' implementation 
of the Agreements. This involved assessing whether the Agreements had been 
implemented in accordance with national 'procedures and practices' for social 
dialogue in the member states. This benchmark was not elaborated by other 
authorities in their implementation reports. Visser (2008) considered that national 
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'procedures and practices' had mostly been adhered to in the case of the 
implementation of the Telework Agreement, but did not critically dissect the 
viability of the national 'procedures and practices' clause. Chapter three outlined that 
it was crucial to do this given that the national 'procedures and practices' 
implementation clause represents the only specific way European-level actors may 
insist on implementation outcomes. 
 
It has been demonstrated that if implementation outcomes are assessed on the basis 
of the national ‘procedures and practices’ implementation clause then the picture of 
whether ‘effective’ implementation took place is rather more mixed. If the 
implementation outcomes that took place are compared against national actors’ 
definitions of national ‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue, then, in many 
cases, the Framework Agreements were not implemented in forms that were 
consistent with national ‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue. In the UK, 
where national ‘procedures and practices’ were understood as being composed of a 
mixture of de-centralized social dialogue and the use of the law, ‘effective’ 
implementation cannot be said to have occurred. In Denmark, where national 
‘procedures and practices’ were interpreted as sectoral collective agreements, the fact 
that the Framework Agreements were not implemented in many sectors implies that 
‘effective’ implementation cannot be said to have taken place. In the Belgian private 
sector and Czech Republic however, implementation outcomes did take place that 
were consistent with actors’ interpretations of national ‘procedures and practices’ for 
social dialogue within the countries. This was largely attributable to the existence, in 
both countries, of an inter-sectoral level policy forum in which the organizations who 
had been signatory to the European Agreements were able to regulate the 
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employment relationship. 
 
A further key finding was that in many respects the national ‘procedures and 
practices’ implementation clause is a fragile one. Four problems with the clause were 
identified. Firstly (i), in several countries the constitution of national ‘procedures and 
practices’ for social dialogue are not clearly defined and are often contested by 
national actors. In the UK, the fact that national ‘procedures and practices’ for social 
dialogue are composite of a number of differing modes of regulation meant that 
national actors found it very hard to develop a definition of national ‘procedures and 
practices’ that all parties agreed upon. Secondly (ii), it was found that the issue 
addressed by the Framework Agreement sometimes fell outside the remit of social 
partner competence. The fact that the topic of work-related stress was traditionally 
regulated by the Danish state rather than the Danish social partners meant that there 
was confusion regarding the form in which the Work-related Stress Agreement was 
to be implemented in Denmark. Also (iii), many of the organizations who had been 
signatory to the European Agreements did not play a mandated role in national 
‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue. In such instances, it became difficult 
for these actors to participate in national ‘procedures and practices’ for social 
dialogue during the implementation phase. Finally (iv), it was found that national 
‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue were themselves liable to change, and 
that in several new member states, national ‘procedures and practices’ for social 
dialogue were at a youthful stage in their development. These factors were found to 
place serious strain upon the viability of the national ‘procedures and practices’ 
implementation clause. 
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In conclusion, that the national ‘procedures and practices’ implementation clause 
would appear to be characterized by these problems should be of concern to 
European-level actors. Indeed, the fact that the clause was drafted two decades ago 
when the European Union numbered only the twelve member states may imply that 
the clause is ill-equipped to deal with an enlarged European Union in which 
industrial relations regimes have also evolved. 
 
12.1.2 Substantive implementation outcomes 
 
Chapter three also proposed a benchmark to assess the effect of the Agreements and 
texts on substantive aspects of the employment relationship in member states. This 
was based on Falkner et al's (2005) use of such a benchmark to appraise the effect of 
European Social Policy Directives on systems of labour law in European member 
states. Specifically, Falkner et al assessed the degree to which the clauses of the 
relevant Directive had been present within systems of labour law prior to their 
implementation. This substantive benchmark formed the basis for Falkner et al's 
verdict on the success of the Directives in contributing to levels of employment 
regulation in member states. The substantive benchmark adopted by chapter three 
consisted of two elements. Firstly (i), and following Falkner et al, the extent to which 
the implementation of the Framework Agreements and lifelong learning texts 
contributed to levels of employment regulation in member states and sectors was 
considered. Secondly (ii), the extent of the impact of the Agreements and texts upon 
employment relations in member states and sectors was considered. 
 
In terms of the extent to which the Agreements contributed to the content of national 
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and sectoral regulation, there was major variance in the degree to which the 
Telework Agreement and Work-related Stress Agreement achieved this. The 
Telework Agreement managed to add new content to regulatory contexts in the 
majority of countries and sectors in which it was implemented, whilst the Work-
related Stress Agreement did not do this. This was attributable to two factors. Firstly, 
the Telework Agreement addressed a topic that had not been subject to regulatory 
attention in most countries and sectors. Thus, the Agreement offered new content to 
actors and it subsequently was able to add to existing regulation. By contrast, the 
topic of work-related stress had been regulated in many national and sectoral 
contexts prior to the implementation of the European Agreement. Secondly, the 
Telework Agreement was drafted in such a way as to specify clearly the obligations 
upon lower level actors. Therefore, there was little debate at lower levels regarding 
the interpretation of the Agreement’s clauses. In contrast, the Work-related Stress 
Agreement was described by several national-level social partner organizations as 
having been drafted in a manner made it hard to interpret concrete obligations. That 
such variance in the substantive effects of the two Agreements was identified is 
significant. One implication is that the form in which the European Agreement is 
concluded at the European-level is pivotal to its success during the implementation 
stage. 
 
A further finding was that The Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning did not 
achieve a great impact upon levels of regulation within national and sectoral 
contexts. This was attributable to two factors. Firstly, the status of the Framework of 
Actions as a non-article 138-9 social dialogue instrument was crucial. Given that 
national actors were not obliged to affect a procedural implementation of the text, as 
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they were with the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements, the terms of the 
text simply did not enter the content of national and sectoral regulation in the 
majority of cases. Secondly, the Framework of Actions on Lifelong Learning 
suffered from similar problems to the Work-related Stress Agreement. The topic of 
lifelong learning had been the subject of regulatory attention in the majority of 
countries and sectors, and the terms of the text were also deemed to be ‘weakly’ 
drafted by many national actors. These two factors also precluded the text from 
achieving a significant impact upon national regulatory contexts. 
 
The Joint Declaration on Lifelong Learning in the European Banking Sector 
achieved a rather greater form of impact upon the content of sectoral regulation than 
its sibling text impressed upon national regulation. Although the sectoral text 
suffered from similar problems to the inter-sectoral text, it nevertheless managed to 
achieve an impact upon the content of banking sector lifelong learning regulation in 
Belgium and Denmark that was greater than the inter-sectoral text achieved in either 
country. This was attributable to the fact that the text directly engaged actors within 
the banking sector and addressed the topic of lifelong learning within the banking 
sector in a form that the inter-sectoral text did not. 
 
Regarding the substantive impact of the Agreements and texts in terms of their 
impact at lower levels, one finding was that the capacity of ‘hard’ regulation to bind 
lower level actors confirm many of the assertions in the literature (Keller, 2003; 
Marginson and Sisson, 2004). This is that ‘hard’ regulation binds lower level actors 
to it more effectively than ‘soft’ law. In the cases of Belgium and Czech Republic, it 
emerged that the use of ‘hard’ regulation to implement the Agreements guaranteed 
  
355
that the Agreements would be binding upon workplace level actors in a way that 
‘soft’ implementations would be unable to achieve. In terms of the findings regarding 
‘soft’ law, it was found that the capacity of ‘soft’ law to bind lower level actors was 
context dependent. In a country such as UK, where there is de-centralization of 
collective bargaining and low levels of coordination between the social partners at 
different bargaining levels, the publication of non-legally binding guidelines by 
peak-level actors on the topics of the Framework Agreements did not lead to the 
content of the Framework Agreements becoming binding upon workplace level 
actors. However, in a country such as Denmark, where there is tight articulation 
between tiers of collective bargaining, the publication of ‘soft’ guidelines on the 
implementation of the Agreements by the peak-level social partners led to the 
Agreements being implemented via several sectoral collective agreements and 
subsequently becoming binding upon workplace level actors. 
 
In terms of the number of company and workplace level policies the Agreements and 
texts inspired, it became evident that the impact of the Agreements mirrored the 
effect of the Agreements in terms of their contribution to national and sectoral 
regulation. Specifically, the fact that the topic of work-related stress had been subject 
to substantial regulation prior to its implementation meant that it appears to have 
inspired few company and workplace level policies on the topic of work-related 
stress. By contrast, the fact that the topic of teleworking had not been subject to 
substantial regulation prior to its implementation meant that it appears to have 
inspired rather more company and workplace level policies on the topic of 
teleworking. 
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12.1.3 Factors explaining differing procedural and substantive outcomes 
 
Chapter three identified factors that potentially explained differential procedural and 
substantive implementation outcomes in country and sector-specific contexts. Three 
sets of variables were identified to potentially explain divergent procedural 
implementation outcomes; the 'culture' variable, policy variables, and institutional 
industrial relations variables. Three sets of variables were also identified to 
potentially explain divergent substantive implementation outcomes; policy variables, 
institutional industrial relations variables, and sectoral variables. The findings on the 
factors shaping procedural implementation outcomes are reviewed first. 
 
Differential procedural implementation outcomes: the findings that emerged in 
comparison to the expectations within the literature 
 
(i) The 'culture' variable 
 
As outlined in chapter three, Falkner et al (2005) identified 'worlds of compliance' 
that explained divergent national implementation outcomes of European Social 
Policy Directives. As outlined in chapter ten, there is mixed evidence to support 
Falkner et al's 'culture' thesis with regard to the implementation of the Framework 
Agreements. A ‘cultural of compliance’ was found to exist in several Danish sectors 
that validates Falkner et al's insertion of Denmark in the 'world of law observance' 
grouping, and the identification of a ‘culture of compliance’ in the UK DTI with 
regard to the need to implement the Framework Agreements in an 'effective' manner 
was also found. However, it also emerged that 'cultural' obligations to implement the 
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Framework Agreements were not present in many national and sectoral contexts, and 
that it was also methodologically difficult to establish a link between 'culture' and 
'effective' implementation outcomes. 
 
(ii) Policy variables 
 
Three policy variables that potentially explained differing national and sectoral 
implementation outcomes were identified. These were a variable that stated that 
procedural implementation outcomes were likely to improve if national and sectoral 
policy agendas converged with the topic of the Framework Agreement (De La Porte 
and Pochet, 2002; Leonard, 2005; Lopez-Santana, 2006), a variable that stated that 
procedural implementation outcomes were likely to improve if there was a lower 
degree of national and sectoral regulation on the topic of the Framework Agreement 
prior to its implementation (De La Porte and Pochet, 2002; Falkner et al, 2005; 
Jacobssen and Schmidt, 2002), and a variable that stated that procedural 
implementation outcomes were likely to improve if social partner organizations had 
prior experience of the implementation of similar policies (Lopez-Santana, 2006). 
 
Concerning the first two variables, the findings supported the expectations expressed 
in the literature. Across the countries studied, a strong relationship was found 
between 'effective' and 'ineffective' procedural implementation outcomes and the 
convergence of national and sectoral policy agendas with the topic of the Framework 
Agreement and the degrees of national and sectoral regulation on the topic of the 
Framework Agreement prior to its implementation. Little evidence was however 
found to support the influence of the third variable. Isolated cases were confined to 
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the Danish inter-sectoral implementation of the Telework Agreement and the UK 
inter-sectoral level implementation of the Work-related Stress Agreement. 
 
(iii) Institutional industrial relations variables 
 
In chapter three, the variable was also advanced that there was a relationship between 
high levels of coordination of social dialogue levels in countries and 'effective' 
implementation outcomes (Keller, 2003). The findings did not provide this 
hypothesis with support. In the Czech Republic, a country with low levels of 
coordination of social dialogue levels, 'effective' procedural implementation of the 
Framework Agreements was found to have occurred. In Denmark, a country with 
high levels of coordination of social dialogue levels, 'effective' procedural 
implementation of the Framework Agreements was found not to have occurred in 
certain instances. However, the analysis of the data suggested the significance of 
another institutional variable. It was demonstrated that the structure of national 
‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue within countries bore a crucial 
influence on the extent to which ‘effective’ implementation outcomes occurred. As 
outlined in chapter ten, should there be an inter-sectoral level of collective bargaining 
within a state or an established national policy forum in which national social 
partners are represented, then ‘effective’ implementation outcomes become more 
likely.  
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Differential substantive implementation outcomes: the findings that emerged in 
comparison to the expectations within the literature 
 
i) Policy variables 
 
In chapter three, two policy related variables were advanced concerning the potential 
substantive impact of the Framework Agreements and texts. These stipulated that the 
substantive impact of the Agreements and texts was likely to increase if the topic of 
the Agreement or text converged with national level policy agendas (De La Porte and 
Pochet, 2002; Leonard, 2005; Lopez-Santana, 2006) and if there was a low degree of 
national and sectoral regulation on the topic of the Framework Agreement prior to its 
implementation (Jacobssen and Schmidt, 2002; De La Porte and Pochet, 2002). 
There was limited evidence to support the former variable, but considerably more 
evidence to support the latter variable. Although in some Danish sectors levels of 
interest in the Telework Agreement led to implementations that added markedly to 
the content of sectoral regulation on teleworking, in countries such as Belgium and 
Czech Republic the Telework Agreement added to levels of regulation on 
teleworking despite the fact that there were limited levels of interest in the topic of 
teleworking. 
 
(ii) Institutional industrial relations variables 
 
In chapter three, variables were advanced that related to the potential substantive 
impact of the Framework Agreements and texts and the institutional character of 
national industrial relations systems. Three variables were established; that levels of 
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substantive impact were likely to be higher should be there high levels of 
coordination of collective bargaining levels in countries (Keller, 2003), that they 
would be higher with high rates of collective bargaining coverage in countries 
(Keller, 2003; Arcq, Dufresne and Pochet, 2003), and that they would be higher with 
should an erga omnes procedure exist in countries (Keller, 2003). The findings 
provide some support for all three variables. In Denmark, the fact that there were 
high levels of coordination of collective bargaining tiers meant that the Framework 
Agreements were able to inspire several lower level policies on the topic of the 
Agreements. In the UK, the fact that there were low levels of coordination of 
collective bargaining tiers meant that this did not occur. With regard to the existence 
of an erga omnes procedure, in Belgium the existence of the procedure ensured that 
the content of the Telework Agreement was binding upon lower level actors. Finally, 
in Denmark, the fact that there were high levels of trade union and employer 
association density meant that the Framework Agreements were able to inspire 
several lower level policies on the topic of the Agreements. In the Czech Republic, 
the fact that there were low levels of trade union and employer association density 
meant that this did not occur. 
 
iii) Sectoral variables 
 
In chapter three, three variables were outlined that concerned the sectoral profile of 
the sectors in which the Agreements and texts were being implemented. Specifically, 
it was advanced that the substantive effects of the Agreements and texts would be 
enhanced in sectoral contexts if the sector in question was more homogenous in 
terms of its commercial profile (Keller and Sorries, 1998; Leisink, 2002; Marginson, 
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2005), if markets within the sector were more 'Europeanized' (Leisink, 2002; 
Marginson, 2005; Kollewe and Kuhlmann, 2003), and if a SSDC existed within the 
sector in question (Leisink, 2002; Keller and Sorries, 1998; Kirton-Darling and 
Clauwaert, 2003). The findings demonstrated that there was no relationship between 
the substantive impact of the Agreements and texts within sectors and the variable 
factors identified.  
 
Although the implementation of the Agreements and texts was studied in only four 
countries and it is undeniable that specific national implementations differ in some 
way (European Social Partners, 2006), wider applicability can be claimed on three 
grounds. Firstly, the analysis of documentation in chapter five (European Social 
Partners, 2006, 2008; Visser and Martin, 2008) outlining the various national 
implementations that took place and the subsequent use of this data to arrive at 
conclusions in chapters ten and eleven gives the findings wider applicability. 
Secondly, and as chapter four outlines, the fact that four countries were selected for 
the study that represented a cross-section of differing systems of industrial relations 
in Europe means that the findings obtained are likely to be applicable to other 
countries that share institutional characteristics with, respectively, Belgium, 
Denmark, UK and Czech Republic. Finally, the fact that it was policy/actor-related 
factors rather than structural factors that primarily explained divergent 
implementation outcomes has key implications for the issue of applicability. Given 
that one of the key rationales for regarding national implementations as likely to be 
different is the existence of different systems of industrial relations in member states 
(Keller, 2003), the fact that structural factors peculiar to these systems did not play 
the major role in determining implementation outcomes suggests that the factors that 
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explain differential implementation outcomes may converge across member states 
more than previously thought. 
 
12.2 Wider Analytical Implications 
 
The empirical findings of the thesis lead to a number of key analytical implications 
for European industrial relations and European governance. In chapter two, the 
analytic debates concerning European integration and the Europeanization of 
industrial relations were outlined. Pessimists such as Keller (2003) and Streeck 
(1994, 1998) argue that the processes associated with European integration are 
leading to the 'Americanization' of industrial relations in Europe, whilst optimists 
such as Falkner (1998) and Goetschy (1994) argue that a genuinely European system 
of industrial relations is emerging. The findings of this study provide the pessimists 
with more ammunition than the optimists. Firstly, the frailty of the national 
'procedures and practices' implementation clause weakens the control of European-
level actors upon implementation outcomes within member states. The ambiguity of 
the clause allows multiple interpretations to arise implies that national 
implementation outcomes are likely to be dependent on the will of national actors to 
a great degree. When benchmarked against the ability of Directives to impose 
specific procedural and substantive outcomes upon national actors, the non-legally 
binding Framework Agreement approach implies a weakening of the European-level 
of industrial relations. Secondly, the fact that the substantive contribution of the 
Agreements and texts to national systems of employment regulation was only modest 
also leads to concerns regarding the form of regulatory regime that is emerging at the 
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European-level. Whilst the Telework Agreement offered new content in most cases 
to national and sectoral regulatory systems, the same cannot be said with regard to 
the Work-related Stress Agreement and the Lifelong Learning texts. Given that it has 
been demonstrated that previous European Social Policy Directives have indeed 
provided national systems of employment regulation with new content (Falkner et al, 
2005), the performance of the 'new phase' when benchmarked against European 
Social Policy Directives is therefore disappointing. 
 
In chapter two, the concerns of some regarding the potential of the post-2004 
enlargements of the European Union to further weaken the social dimension of the 
European Union were outlined. Authorities such as Marginson and Sisson (2004) 
have argued that the entry of countries with significantly lower levels of wages and 
employment conditions threatens to place pressure upon the terms and conditions of 
workers in old member states and will lead to an exacerbation of the collective-action 
problem at the European-level. In so far as the 'new phase' and its use of 'soft' policy 
is a symptom of enlargement of the European Union, these concerns have some 
justification. The procedural and substantive problems that characterize 'new phase' 
regulation, outlined above, would appear to be a response to a political system in 
which there are greatly diverse levels of wages and working conditions and very 
different means of regulating the employment relationship are used. 
 
The findings of the study also imply various things for other 'soft' law mechanisms 
that are employed at the European-level. It emerged that although structural factors 
are important in explaining implementation outcomes it is primarily actor and policy 
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related factors that drive implementation processes rather than factors related to the 
structures of national systems. Although it was found that the existence of an erga 
omnes procedure and the level of coordination of social dialogue tiers was an 
important factor in explaining substantive implementation outcomes, the key 
explanatory factor was whether a pre-existing policy on the topic of the Framework 
Agreement or text existed. Although the structure of national 'procedures and 
practices' were very important in explaining procedural implementation outcomes, 
key factors explaining procedural implementation outcomes included the extent to 
which national and sectoral policy agendas converged with the topic of the 
Agreement and text and the level of pre-existing policy on the topic of the 
Framework Agreement or text in countries and sectors. Given that it emerged that the 
design of European-level policy in terms of the issue it addresses and its propensity 
to offer new content to national policy contexts correlates so strongly with national 
implementation outcomes, it becomes of the utmost importance that European-level 
actors select topics that are likely to relate to the interests of national-level actors and 
that do not cover ground that has already been addressed at the national-level. This 
finding will give cause for optimism to European-level actors, for it implies that it is 
in the hands of European-level actors to markedly shape national policy via the use 
of 'soft' law. 
 
The findings that emerged during the analysis of the data also have key relevance for 
debates in the literature. One implication concerns Falkner et al's 'worlds of 
compliance' argument and its associated emphasis on 'culture of compliance' as a key 
precipitator of 'effective' implementation outcomes. As stated above, the study only 
found some evidence to support Falkner et al's assertions. In some sectors in 
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Denmark, a 'culture of compliance', whereby a powerful cultural sense of obligation 
impelled actors to implement the Framework Agreements 'effectively', was evident. 
A 'culture of compliance' was also found to exist in the UK DTI. However, such a 
'culture' was not found in other regulatory contexts, and, as was also found, it was 
very difficult to establish a robust link between 'effective' implementation and 
'culture'. In conclusion then, our study only provides Falkner et al's' argument with 
lukewarm support. Concerning the study's findings with regard to the literature on 
the OMC, a variety of themes emerged. Firstly, the attention paid by OMC writers to 
actor and policy centred factors such as the convergence of national and sectoral 
policy agendas (De La Porte and Pochet, 2002; Lopez-Santana, 2006) and the degree 
of national and sectoral regulation that exists on the Framework Agreement prior to 
its transposition (Jacobsson and Schmidt, 2002; De La Porte and Pochet, 2002) was 
validated by the findings that were obtained in the course of this study. It is thus a 
conclusion that the literature on the OMC's attention to such factors when explaining 
variation in implementation outcomes is a fruitful one. The demonstration that the 
factors that shape OMC implementation outcomes also shape 'new phase' 
implementation outcomes also reveals that the explanatory factors advanced by 
OMC scholars are generalizable on wider scale. 
 
The employment of a multi-level governance analytic framework also had benefits in 
two regards. Firstly, and as outlined in chapter two, one reason for the adoption of 
the multi-level governance theoretical paradigm was its attention to the relationships 
between levels of governance. This aspect of multi-level governance theory 
underpins the finding, outlined above, that the weakening of the European-level of 
industrial relations that the 'new phase' of the European social dialogue represents 
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has major implications for institutional developments at lower levels. Specifically, 
the weaknesses found to characterize the 'new phase' of the European social dialogue 
are likely to lead to increased levels of diversity within national systems of industrial 
relations. Secondly, multi-level governance theory's attention to non-Governmental 
actors and their agency allowed the 'new phase' of the social dialogue  to be 
adequately framed as a particular species of European-level 'soft' law that is distinct 
from OMC policy processes that are mainly the preserve of Governmental actors. A 
key finding was that the 'new phase' of the European social dialogue represents a 
distinct form of European 'soft' law when compared to other varieties. Most notably, 
the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements use of the national 'procedures 
and practices' implementation clause and the challenges that this presents with regard 
to implementation outcomes means that the 'new phase' of the social dialogue is 
clearly different from other forms of 'soft' law.  
 
12.3 Policy recommendations and implications for European social policy 
 
Three main policy recommendations are identified and the implications of the 
findings for European social policy and its development are considered. Firstly (i), 
the section will identify ways in which European-level actors could ensure that the 
procedural implementation of the Agreements is more effective before (ii) 
identifying how the substantive effects of the Agreements and texts could be 
enhanced. Finally (iii), the relative merits of Article 139’s non-legally binding 
implementation route in comparison to the legally binding implementation route set 
out in Article 139 will be outlined. 
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12.3.1 Improving procedural implementation outcomes 
 
It was established that the problematic nature of the national 'procedures and 
practices' implementation clause is the source of many of the difficulties encountered 
in the implementation process by national actors. Accordingly, four specific 
recommendations are made regarding ways in which the national ‘procedures and 
practices’ implementation clause could be strengthened, national actors’ 
comprehension of it increased, and procedural implementation outcomes improved. 
Firstly, if European-level and national-level social partners were able to agree a set 
of definitions related to national ‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue in 
each national context then it is likely that the debates surrounding the procedural 
implementation of the Agreements would be lessened. Admittedly, such an exercise 
would be controversial given that coherent national ‘procedures and practices’ for 
social dialogue do not exist in many national contexts and that national social 
partners often wish to be afforded the flexibility to select an implementation tool that 
suits the topic of the Agreement at hand. However, if such an exercise at the least 
attempted to define national ‘procedures and practices’ and then allowed national 
social partner organizations the option of straying from these definitions in certain 
circumstances the benefit would be that a given definition of national ‘procedures 
and practices’ would at least exist at the European-level. As research on the OMC 
has demonstrated, even non-legally binding ‘symbolic’ pronouncements on national 
level political structures that are made by European-level actors can be potent 
(Jacobssen, 2003). 
 
A second recommendation also draws lessons from the experience of the OMC (De 
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La Porte and Pochet, 2002; Jacobssen, 2003). This is that European-level and 
national-level actors would do well to compile national action plans (NAPs) prior to 
the implementation of the Agreements regarding the steps that national actors plan to 
take during the process of the implementation of the Agreements. As research on the 
OMC has demonstrated (Jacobssen, 2003), the production of NAPs has the effect of 
focusing the minds of national actors on the implementation of European-level 
output and often leads to more efficient implementation outcomes. Further, the 
‘moral’ pressure that is borne on national actors who stray from their NAPs ensures 
that the political processes associated with the NAPs are more than symbolic. 
Specifically, national social partner organizations could jointly agree NAPs with the 
European-level social partners in the months after the conclusion of Framework 
Agreements. Social partner compliance with these NAPs would then be monitored 
by the European-level social partners, and national social partners failing to honour 
their NAPs would be ‘named and shamed’ at the European-level. 
 
Thirdly, it would be useful to establish an European-level arbitration body composed 
of representatives from the European social partners and European Commission to 
rule on differing national implementation processes where disputes have arisen. The 
creation of such an institution has been suggested by sections of the Danish trade 
union movement, and could potentially be modeled on the inter-sectoral level 
arbitration bodies that exist in the Scandinavian countries. Such an institution could 
be composed of a suitable number of representatives from the European-level social 
partners and European Commission, could rule on complaints lodged by national 
social partner organizations, and would return non-legally binding judgments. Should 
a case arise, such as the dispute of the Norwegian social partners in the case of the 
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Telework Agreement, the institution would be able to return a judgment taking 
account of the views of the differing national social partners and also the constitution 
of national ‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue within the country 
concerned. Although non-legally binding decisions would not carry the weight of 
legally binding ones, the moral pressure that such decisions would be likely to bear 
upon the national-level social partner organizations concerned would be likely to be 
very considerable. 
 
Fourth, it is recommended that the European-level social partners engage in review 
exercises establishing the exact role of their affiliate organizations in national 
‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue in the member states. A key source of 
strain on the national ‘procedures and practices’ implementation clause was that 
many of the organizations who were signatory to the Agreements at the European-
level did not play a mandated role in national ‘procedures and practices’ for social 
dialogue. Further, many of the organizations who did assume a key function in 
national ‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue were not directly signatory to 
the European Agreements. Such an exercise would allow the European social 
partners to anticipate the capacity of their affiliates to implement the Agreements in 
accordance with national ‘procedures and practices’. Also, it would allow the 
European-level social partners to establish the organizations who do play major roles 
in national ‘procedures and practices’ and increase their level of engagement with 
these organizations. 
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12.3.2 Improving substantive implementation outcomes 
 
There are two recommendations on ways in which the substantive implementation 
outcomes of the Agreements and texts could be improved. The first relates to the 
topic addressed by the Framework Agreement or text. As was emphasized in section 
one, a key influence on the degree of the substantive impact of the Agreement or text 
upon national and sectoral contexts is the extent to which the topic of the Agreement 
or text is ‘new’ in regulatory contexts. The implication for the European social 
partners and European public authorities is that a precondition to Agreements and 
texts adding regulatory value to national systems is that they address a topic that has 
not been substantially regulated at lower levels. Accordingly, the European 
Commission would be advised to establish existing levels of regulation on relevant 
topics before issuing consultations on the topics, and the European social partners 
would also be advised to do this before negotiating a Framework Agreement or text 
on a particular topic. Such a task could potentially be carried out by surveying 
national social partners or public authorities, or by engaging with experts to conduct 
research on existing regulation in member states. The result of such research would 
be an increase in the substantive effectiveness of any Agreements or texts that were 
subsequently concluded and also a role for EU-level regulation in filling regulatory 
gaps in member states. 
 
A second recommendation relates to the drafting of the clauses of the relevant 
Framework Agreement or text. The extent to which the Framework Agreements and 
texts were precisely drafted bore an important influence on the extent to which they 
were able to contribute substantively to regulation in countries and sectors. The 
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implication is that the European-level social partners must ensure that Agreements 
and texts agreed at the European-level are drafted in terms that are unambiguous. As 
evident in the case of the Work-related Stress Agreement, a lack of clear wording 
means that the Agreement or text in question is likely to be misinterpreted by lower 
level actors and will not achieve a key impact upon levels of regulation in countries 
and sectors. 
 
12.3.3 Non-legally binding Framework Agreements versus legally binding 
Framework Agreements 
 
Given the debates that exist in academic and policy circles (Larsen and Andersen, 
2007; Keller, 2003), it is also necessary to address the question of the performance of 
the Framework Agreements that were implemented via Article 139’s first, non-
legally binding route, against those Framework Agreements that were implemented 
via the second legally binding route. In keeping with the expectations of several 
commentators, the implementation of the Framework Agreements via the legal route 
leads to far more predictable implementation outcomes within member states. As 
Falkner et al (2005) demonstrated, the use of the legally binding route to implement 
social partner Framework Agreements ensured that the content of the Framework 
Agreements of the 1990s entered into bodies of legal regulation within member 
states. Our findings demonstrate that this did not occur to the same degree with the 
Framework Agreements that were implemented via the non-legally binding route. As 
a result of the problematic nature of the national ‘procedures and practices’ 
implementation clause and the non-legally binding nature of the Agreements, 
European actors were often unable to specify given implementation outcomes and 
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the content of the Agreements often did not enter national legal systems or collective 
agreements. Thus, the use of the legally binding route foreseen in Article 139 
guarantees the more predictable and uniform implementation of social partner 
Framework Agreements. 
 
With regard to the use of the non-legally binding implementation route, certain 
advantages do exist for the European social partners however. Firstly, it is notable 
that the process of implementation of the Framework Agreements on Telework and 
Work-related Stress involved the European social partners and their national 
affiliates to a far greater degree than the implementation of the legally binding 
Framework Agreements of the 1990s. In the case of the non-legally binding 
Framework Agreements, the fact that the Agreements were largely implemented by 
national social partners rather than public authorities, and that the implementation of 
the Agreements was monitored by the European social partners implied a key social 
partner role in the European governance process. This was not the case with the 
legally binding Framework Agreements, in which national public authorities took the 
lead in the implementation process and the European Commission monitored 
national implementation outcomes. Thus, the use of the non-legally binding 
implementation route implies the involvement of the European and national social 
partners in the European governance process to a greater degree. In terms of the 
extent to which this encourages broader and more participative forms of governance, 
this would also appear to be a positive outcome for the European polity. 
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12.4 Recommendations for future research 
 
Three issues calling for future research are (i) the process of the European-level 
negotiation and drafting of the Agreements and texts, (ii) outcomes within other 
countries and sectors regarding the implementation of the Agreements and texts, and 
(iii) the impact of the Agreements and texts at workplace level. 
 
Given that the topic of the Framework Agreement or text and the form in which the 
clauses in the Agreement or text are drafted has a key impact on the level of 
substantive effect that the Agreement or text has in countries and sectors, the role of 
the European-level social partners in producing Agreements and texts that offer new 
content to lower level actors and that are clearly drafted is of crucial importance. 
Accordingly, it would be fruitful for future research to explore the process of the 
European-level drafting and negotiating of the Agreements and texts. Such a study 
could explore several themes. Firstly, the relations of the European social partner 
organizations with their affiliates in the course of the negotiating process. Many 
authors have identified the collective action problem as a key barrier to the 
development of effective EU governance (Marginson and Sisson, 2004), and an 
exploration of the processes by which the European social partners consult and 
secure a negotiating mandate from their affiliates would potentially be able to 
identify many of the impediments to the production of useful Agreements and texts 
at the European-level. Further, such a study could explore the process of the 
negotiation of the Agreements and texts at the European-level. Given its influence on 
the eventual efficacy of the Agreements and texts, a comprehensive understanding of 
the process and the issues that present themselves would do much to shed light on 
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barriers at this level to the development of more effective social dialogue 
Agreements and texts. 
 
More research could also be conducted on the procedural implementation of the 
Telework and Work-related Stress Agreement in other European countries and 
sectors. Our study was able only to analyze implementation within four countries and 
two sectors, and other researchers (Larsen and Andersen, 2007) have scarcely been 
able to cover the gaps that still exist regarding the processes that animated 
implementation outcomes within other countries and sectors. A body of knowledge 
does not yet exist that compares to that generated by Falkner et al, who were able to 
carry out a study of implementation of European social policy directives within each 
EU-15 country. Some of the discrepancies between the results of our study and other 
researchers’ studies with the official reports of the European social partner 
organizations and public authorities suggests that the data offered by the European 
social partners and public authorities is inadequate in this regard. Rather, academic 
research that engages with the underlying analytic problems within countries and 
sectors is required. 
 
A final recommendation relates to the impact of the Agreements and texts at 
workplace level. Almost no data are available on the workplace level impact of the 
Agreements and texts. Although the thesis was able to make informed comment on 
the extent of the workplace level impact of the Agreements and texts, this does not 
negate the need for comprehensive research on the impact of the Agreements and 
texts within workplaces. Although such a study would have problems isolating the 
effects of the European-level Agreements and texts upon workplace level policies 
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from other factors, this could also lead to interesting findings regarding the 
methodological issues presented by an analysis of the effects of European-level ‘soft’ 
law upon workplace level policies. 
 
12.5 Conclusion 
 
The specific contribution of this thesis has been to increase knowledge of the effect 
of 'new phase' Agreements and texts in European member states, consider the form 
of 'Europeanization' that the 'new phase' entails and its relationship to other forms of 
European 'soft' law, and to identify the factors that drive differential implementation 
outcomes of 'new phase' output in national and sectoral contexts. As stated in chapter 
two, these themes had previously been insufficiently explored, and the thesis can 
therefore claim to have made an important contribution. The key empirical findings 
that were obtained were (i) that the procedural implementations of the Telework and 
Work-related Stress Agreements were sometimes 'ineffective' and that the national 
'procedures and practices' implementation clause was fragile; (ii) that the substantive 
effect of the Agreements and texts in member states was patchy and there was a key 
difference between the substantive effect of the Telework Agreement in comparison 
to the substantive effect of the Work-related Stress Agreement and lifelong learning 
texts; and (ii) that it was actor-policy related factors, rather than structural factors, 
that primarily explained divergent national and sectoral implementation outcomes.  
 
Concerning the implications for the 'Europeanization' of industrial relations and the 
European social dialogue's role in it, it was concluded, in line with the empirical 
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findings, that the 'new phase' represented a backward step in terms of the ability of 
European-level actors' to regulate industrial relations in member states. The silver 
lining for European-level actors is that the findings on the importance of actor-policy 
related factors in explaining implementation outcomes demonstrates that European-
level actors may affect real change via 'soft' law should the 'soft' law in question be 
designed carefully. In summary then, it was found that the 'new phase' of the 
European social dialogue has achieved modest success in improving levels of 
employment protection in member states. Also, the continued existence of an 
European-level social dialogue means that there is at least a symbolic European-level 
of industrial relations, and that if a more socially minded European Commission 
were to emerge then the European social dialogue could become a more powerful 
regulatory force. However, the final verdict on the 'new phase' of the European social 
dialogue must be that it represents a disappointing development for Europeans who 
wish to see decent levels of employment protection.  
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Appendix A: List of organizations interviewed 
Name of organization Date of interview Form of interview 
EU-level   
Business Europe September 2006 Face to face 
CEMR September 2007 Telephone 
EBF September 2007 Face to face 
EPSU September 2007 Face to face 
ESBG September 2007 Face to face 
ETUC September 2006 Face to face 
ETUI September 2006 Face to face 
European Commission September 2006 Face to face 
UEAPME September 2006 Face to face 
UNI November 2007 Face to face 
Belgium  Face to face 
ABVV/FGTB       September 2007 Face to face 
ABVV/FGTB local Gov 
branch 
September 2007 Face to face 
ACLVB/CGSLB September 2007 Face to face 
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ACV-CSC September 2007 Face to face 
Belgian Ministry of Labour September 2007 Face to face 
Febelfin September 2007 Face to face 
Setca September 2007 Face to face 
Unizo September 2007 Face to face 
VBO/FEB November 2007 Telephone 
Denmark  Face to face 
AC February 2007 Face to face 
COI February 2007 Face to face 
DA February 2007 Face to face 
DFL February 2007 Face to face 
DI February 2007 Face to face 
FA February 2007 Face to face 
FF February 2007 Face to face 
HK February 2007 Face to face 
FTF February 2007 Face to face 
KL February 2007 Face to face 
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KTO February 2007 Face to face 
LO February 2007 Face to face 
UK  Face to face 
Amicus November 2007 Face to face 
CBI November 2006 Face to face 
CEEP UK November 2006 Face to face 
DTI November 2006 Face to face 
FPB November 2006 Face to face 
HSE November 2006 Face to face 
LGA January 2008 Telephone 
TUC November 2006 Face to face 
Unison January 2008 Telephone 
Czech Republic   
CMKOS November 2007 Face to face 
SPCR November 2007 Face to face 
   
 
 
